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FROM THE EDITOR

Dear readers,

Welcome back to the new issue of *Ilahiyat Studies*.

This issue of *IS* features five research articles and a book review. “Translating the Sacred: Islamic Law, Ottoman Readership, and Two Examples of a Transitional Genre”, by Oğuzhan Tan, analyzes the transformation of Qur’ānic exegetical literature, examining “quasi-translations”. Following a debate of the premodern conservative position on the written translation of the Qur’ān, Tan addresses the hybrid Qur’ān translations in terms of Islamic law and theology, Ottoman theopolitics, and modernity. The author articulates his theoretical account by considering two of the most well-known works in the transitional genre among Ottoman readers: *Tibyān* of ‘Ayntābī Meḥmed Efendī and *Mawākib* of Ismā‘il Farrūkh Efendī.

Muhammed Yamaç and Nihal İşbilen’s joint article “Religion Paradigm of Artificial Intelligence” aims to understand and explain the impact of artificial intelligence on social areas, the transformations it may induce in religious life, and the associated religious and sociological opportunities, risks, and threats it presents. Yamaç and İşbilen provide an analysis of the literature about AI religious paradigm, contending that AI, shaped by a Western religious framework, serves as the successor of apocalyptic and eschatological religious promises. The article concludes that there is a great need for research based on scientific data in the field of AI, especially within the scope of religious sciences.

In his article, “Legal Reasoning in Postclassical Period: Abū Sa‘īd al-Khādīmī’s (d. 1176/1762) Justification regarding to the Prohibition of Smoking”, Murat Karacan presents a detailed account of how new individual cases can be approached argumentatively from the perspective of Islamic law. To that end, Karacan methodologically

analyzes two treatises on the prohibition of smoking by the Ottoman scholar Abū Saʿīd al-Khādimī. The author draws attention to al-Khādimī's intersubjective and balanced manner of reasoning in jurisprudence.

"Discussions on Ibn Sīnā's Proof (*Ishārah*) That Existence Is Not Added to the Necessary: al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, and Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah", by Güvenç Şensoy, compares the perspectives of some prominent Islamic thinkers regarding the differentiation between existence and essence. The central argument revolves around the proof of Ibn Sīnā's *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*. Şensoy traces Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah's discourse on the on *wujūd*, concluding that Ṣadr al-Sharīʿah departed from traditional views by challenging the perspectives of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ṭūsī.

Finally, in their engaging article, "Preliminary Empirical Findings on the Adapted Faith Development Model for a Muslim Context", Üzeyir Ok and Carsten Gennerich attempt to validate the multi-dimensional model of religiosity styles adapted to Islamic culture. The article discusses the outcomes of quantitative studies performed on two sets of empirical data to attain this objective and concludes that these empirical studies corroborate the theory and hypothesis of a two-dimensional orthogonal model of religiosity styles. The authors also assert that this model is applicable for individual assessment in clinical settings and for conducting comprehensive research on faith development.

There are some changes in our editorial team. We thank Asst. Prof. Sümeyra Yakar, Asst. Prof. Ümmügül Betül Kanburođlu Ergün, R.A. Samed Yazar, and R.A. Pınar Zararsız for their meticulous work as members of the editorial team thus far. We extend our best wishes to them.

We, the editorial team, are grateful to our authors, referees, and readers for their continued support and look forward to being with you in the next issues of *Ilahiyat Studies*.

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ARTICLES

*Translating the Sacred:
Islamic Law, Ottoman Readership, and Two Examples of a
Transitional Genre*

Oğuzhan Tan



Religion Paradigm of Artificial Intelligence
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to the Necessary: al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, and Şadr al-Sharīʿa*

Güvenç Şensoy



*Preliminary Empirical Findings on the Adapted Faith Development
Model for a Muslim Context*

Üzeyir Ok & Carsten Gennerich

**TRANSLATING THE SACRED:
ISLAMIC LAW, OTTOMAN READERSHIP, AND TWO
EXAMPLES OF A TRANSITIONAL GENRE**

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Abstract

The historical tenses around the translation of the Qurʾān have brought about transitional genres in Qurʾānic exegetical literature. In the absence of contemporary Qurʾān translations, the first genre to appear was “interlinear translations”, which were study books that provided disjointed translations of the words and phrases of the Qurʾān’s passages but not textual translations of the passages. The characteristics of a contemporary Qurʾānic translation were absent from these study books, which began as fragmented works and developed into comprehensive works. The jurisprudential question of whether the Qurʾān could be translated into other languages was joined by a new argument in the 8th/15th century: the Qurʾān’s reproduction on printing presses. Thus, conservatism about the sacred

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nature of the Qurʾānic text expanded from translation to publication. This standpoint shifted, particularly in the 11th/17th century in Ottoman Turkey, as a result of the transformative impacts of modernity. Thus, another transitional genre of what I call “quasitranslations” emerged. They were books that included translations of certain short Qurʾānic commentaries written in Arabic or Persian alongside translated excerpts from other Islamic works. Two of the most popular early examples of this genre in Turkish were the *Tibyān* of ʿAyntābī Meḥmed Efendī (d. 1110/1699) and *Mawākib* of Ismāʿīl Farrūkh Efendī (d. 1256/1840). Much like the broader process of Ottoman modernization, these works had a hybrid character: they were neither literal translations of the Qurʾān nor merely translations of the short *tafsīr* volumes whose titles they bore; instead, they were a mixture of both, offering a scope of interpretation customized according to local demands and sensibilities. Second, the barriers before the publication of the Qurʾān and other Islamic books were lifted, marking a great transformation in Islamic intellectual history. Those who adhered to the same theological tradition now allowed and even encouraged the Qurʾān translation, which had been met with resistance a century ago. This study addresses the transformation of the Qurʾānic scripture from the perspectives of Islamic law and theology, Ottoman theopolitics, and modernity.

Key Words: Islamic law, the Qurʾān, *Tibyān*, *Mawākib*, ʿAyntābī Meḥmed, Ismāʿīl Farrūkh, Turkish Qurʾān translation, Ottoman theopolitics

Introduction

The Turkish language today has hundreds of different translations of the Qurʾān,¹ all of which were produced over only the last century. Some might regard this as a sort of intellectual wealth, but these translations sell very well, and the explosion in their number is driven largely by commercial motivations. Most are the products of pseudo-translators working on the basis of a few respectable earlier translations, with copyright concerns accounting for the varying names on the covers.

¹ For an inventory covering the 228 Qurʾānic translations in Turkish as of 2022, see Mehmet Akif Koç, “Ek 2. Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkçe Kurʾan Çevirmenleri Listesi”, *Kurʾan İlimleri ve Tefsir Tarihi*, ed. Mehmet Akif Koç (Ankara: Grafiker Yayınları, 2022), 415-418.

As the number and popularity of these translations make clear, most Turkish-speaking Muslims today favor translating the Qurʾān. Historically, however, developing a pro-translation theology was painful and quite evolutionary. Before Islamic law fully permitted modern Qurʾān translations in the 14th/20th centuries, it had to facilitate the composition of two transitional categories that would be easily welcomed. The first category included interlinear translations, which primarily functioned as study aids for individuals with foundational knowledge of the Arabic language seeking to engage with the Qurʾān in its original text. The second category comprised concise *tafsīr* books translated from Arabic or Persian into Turkish, aimed at a broader readership. This article analyzes the theo-political factors contributing to the emergence of the second category that I refer to as the quasi-translations of the Qurʾān, with a focus on two examples, *Tibyān* and *Mawākib*, their stylistic elements, theological discourses, and classical references.

1. Early Opposition to Qurʾānic Translation

We do not have enough evidence to suggest that the early scholars had exclusively addressed the issue of Qurʾānic translation in the modern sense. Historically, the earliest context in which we can find theological debates about the translation of the Qurʾān was the doctrine of *al-iʿjāz*, the inimitability of the Qurʾān. Although the doctrine basically rules out the possibility of creating another Qurʾān with the same level of eloquence, style, and content, it seems to have been expanded later to challenge creating any kind of equivalent of the Qurʾān in a non-Arabic language. Since there were no such attested attempts to translate the entire Qurʾān, the theories put forward within the context of *al-iʿjāz* must not have been meant to be against translating the Qurʾān in the first place. On the other hand, the word *tarjamah*, which eventually came to mean “translation”, originally meant “explanation” or “interpretation” in early times, which is why Ibn ʿAbbās was called *tarjumān al-Qurʾān*, even though he did not translate it into another language. The biographical notes and the headings that feature explanations about chapters in the ḥadīth books are also called *tarjamah* for other reasons than covering any translation.

The alleged early stance against the translation of the Qurʾān is primarily concluded in retrospect from the meaning of the debates on the nature of the Qurʾān, for the most part, and supported by the actual lack of entire Qurʾānic translations. According to this back-projectionist account, early opposition to the translation rested on two pillars: First, the literary translation of the Qurʾān, a word-for-word interpretation maintaining the syntactic, grammatical, and aesthetic qualities of the original, was a challenge to the doctrine of *al-iʿjāz* and had been viewed as impermissible or even impossible.² On this view, translating the Qurʾān into another language would have been tantamount to producing a new Qurʾān, which was considered impossible even in Arabic, which supposedly has a richer linguistic potential.³

One of the few early examples of making a case for why the Qurʾān is untranslatable, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muslim Ibn Qutaybah (d. 276/889) argued that Arabic in general, rather than Qurʾānic Arabic specifically, is superior to other languages in terms of rhetorical arts:

Arabs do have figurative patterns in their language... All of these metaphorical styles are included in the Qurʾān... That is why no translator is able to translate the Qurʾān into another language, unlike the Gospel, which was translated from Syriac into Ethiopic and Greek, and the Torah and Psalms, as well as other books of God, into Arabic. Because non-Arabs do not use figurative language as widely as Arabs do.⁴

The inimitability of the Qurʾān was viewed not just as a creed but also, allegedly, as historical fact, supported by the observation that no one throughout history had ever produced anything comparable to the Qurʾān. Those who had purportedly tried to do so were dismissed as fools and heretics.⁵

² Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīm al-Zurqānī, *Manābil al-ʿirfān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Maṭbaʿat ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa-Shurakāh, n.d.), 2/144.

³ Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī Rashīd Riḍā, *Tafsīr al-Manār* (Cairo: al-Hayʾah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Kitāb, 1990), 9/66.

⁴ Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muslim Ibn Qutaybah al-Dīnawarī, *Taʾwīl mushkil al-Qurʾān*, ed. Ibrāhīm Shams al-Dīn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2014), 22.

⁵ Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373) refers to Abū l-Ṭayyib al-Mutanabbī (d. 354/965), who proclaimed himself prophet and wrote poetry that was similar to some Qurʾānic passages, as a weak-minded man: Abū l-Fidāʾ Ismāʿīl ibn ʿUmar Ibn Kathīr, *al-Bidāyah wa-l-nihāyah*, ed. ʿAlī Shīrī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, 1988),

Some adopted a softer position. Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Shāṭibī (d. 790/1388), for instance, distinguished between two categories of Qurʾānic verses in terms of feasibility of translation: verses with a simple topic and style, which are expressible in another language, and verses with more intricate linguistic characteristics and meanings, which are not.⁶ In another example, Taqī al-Dīn Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728/1328) appears to have permitted the oral interpretation of Qurʾānic passages to promote and clarify Islam's message.⁷ However, he did not mention his opinion on whether the entire Qurʾān might be translated into writing, most likely because such a trend did not exist. Yet, in terms of prayers in non-Arabic languages, he asserted that "we do deny translating the Qurʾān because its words are meant to be primary".⁸

This legalistic opposition has been based on an extensive theological grounding: Islam is a strictly aniconic religion in terms of how the divine is represented, yet it has other sacred elements to establish associations with the divine. The *muṣḥaf*, the Qurʾānic codex, is one of them: it is the only authoritative written material representing the Qurʾān, God's original speech, which was revealed orally and not in writing, unlike the inscribed stone tablets of Moses (Ex. 31:18, Q 7/145). Thus, the *muṣḥaf* is to be the only source of Arabic scripture, the only substitute for the Arabic speech of God, which, in turn, is the only supplier of divine meaning. These all make up the Qurʾān. According to this conception, the meaning of the Qurʾān could not be separated from its speech and script, which are both Arabic. In this context, the Qurʾān's constant emphasis on its Arabic character becomes more relevant: "*Indeed, We have sent it down as an Arabic Qurʾān (Qurʾān^{an} 'arabiyy^{an}).*" (Yūsuf 12/2), "*Thus have We revealed to you an Arabic Qurʾān.*" (al-Shūrā 42/7),

10/291. For a few other classic examples of individuals alleged to have engaged in verbal imitation of the Qurʾān, see Muṣṭafā Šādiq al-Rāfiʿ, *Iḡāz al-Qurʾān wa-l-balāghab al-nabawiyyah* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 2005), 120-130.

⁶ Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm ibn Mūsā ibn Muḥammad al-Shāṭibī, *al-Muwāfaqāt*, ed. Abū ʿUbaydah Mashhūr ibn Ḥasan ʿĀl Salmān (Cairo: Dār Ibn ʿAffān, 1997), 2/105.

⁷ Taqī al-Dīn Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah, ed. ʿAbd al-Qādir Aḥmad ʿAṭā - Muṣṭafā ʿAbd al-Qādir ʿAṭā, *al-Fatāwā l-kubrā* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, n.d.), 5/334.

⁸ Taqī al-Dīn Abū l-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah, *Majmūʿ fatāwā*, ed. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim (Medina: Majmaʿ al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭibāʿat al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 1995), 12/477.

and “*We have made it an Arabic Qurʾān.*” (al-Zukhruf 43/3). Islamic theology, therefore, has usually viewed Arabic as an intrinsic, rather than an extrinsic, property of the Qurʾān, without which it would not be.

The Arabic quality of the Qurʾān relates not just to the scripture but, more significantly, to God’s nature as well, as Muslim theologians discussed whether God’s speech must be among the divine attributes that Muslims are required to believe in, such as oneness, eternity, everlastingness, and nonresemblance to creatures. According to the traditionalist (*abl al-ḥadīth*) perspective, well represented by Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855), the Qurʾān is not an incidental outcome of His attribute of speech but rather an eternal attribute of God’s speech.⁹ Therefore, the Qurʾān represents the *muṣḥaf* itself as the written, audible, and understandable speech of God.¹⁰ From this perspective, the Qurʾān is inextricably linked to God’s divine nature and distinct from all creation. On the other hand, the Ashʿarī theory, which has not generally enjoyed as much popularity, distinguishes between God’s attribute of speech and the Qurʾān, which is viewed as its product. According to this reading, the former is the unuttered inner speech of God (*al-kalām al-naḥsī*), which is, in a sense, identical to Him, while the latter is God’s speech put into letters and words, recited by mouths, and heard by ears.¹¹ Advocating for the traditionalist position, Ibn Taymiyyah summed up the opinions of both Ibn Kullāb (d. 240/854) and Abū l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/935-36) as follows:

Ibn Kullāb used to say, “This Qurʾān is the verbal transmission of the eternal meaning (*ḥikāyah ʿan al-maʿnā l-qadīm*).” Al-Ashʿarī disagreed with it... and said, “Rather, the Qurʾān is the utterance of the eternal meaning (*ibārah ʿan dhālika*).” None of these views are correct!¹²

⁹ Abū l-Faḍl Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, *Fatḥ al-Bārī bi-sbarḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, ed. Muḥammad Fuʾād ʿAbd al-Bāqī - Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1379/1959), 13/492.

¹⁰ Taqī al-Dīn Abū Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Ghanī Ibn Surūr al-Maqdisī, *al-Iqtisād fī l-iʿtiqād*, ed. Aḥmad ibn ʿAṭīyah ibn ʿAlī al-Ghāmīdī (Medina: Maktabat al-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ḥikam, 1993), 130.

¹¹ Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ṭayyib al-Bāqillānī, *al-Inṣāf fī mā yajib iʿtiqādubū wa-lā yajūz al-jahl bibī*, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyyah li-l-Turāth, 2000), 89-99.

¹² Ibn Taymiyya, *Majmūʿ fatāwā*, 6/634.

This assessment notwithstanding, neither the Ash‘arīs nor the Kullābīs went so far as to say that the uttered or transmitted speech of God, the Qur‘ān, was created. Only Mu‘tazilah took that step, coming up with the theory of the Qur‘ān’s createdness (*kbalq al-Qur‘ān*), according to which God has no eternal attribute of speech. When He wants to speak, He creates it through a speaker.¹³ Both this and the softer Ash‘arī position regarding the nature of the speech of God (*kalām Allāh*) provided the grounds for permitting translating the Qur‘ān into other languages. However, the consensus sided with the more conservative theory, which bestows sacredness upon all aspects of the Qur‘ān, including its meaning, script, and recitation. Even the *muṣḥaf*, made of paper and ink, has also sometimes been seen as sacred, in line with the impermissibility of touching it without first performing ablutions.¹⁴

Second, a literal but nonliterary translation of the Qur‘ān, a word-for-word interpretation to convey the meaning of the Qur‘ān without claiming to imitate aesthetic qualities of the original, was likewise frowned upon, at least until comparatively recently,¹⁵ out of a fear that such translations might eventually create literary works that would be understood as rivals to the Qur‘ān.¹⁶ The early out-of-context reservations on Qur‘ānic translation eventually evolved into a list of more specifically articulated fears toward the modern era when demands for literal translations of the Qur‘ān increased.¹⁷ First, even though neither literal nor literary translations were expected to be as eloquent as the original Qur‘ān, some people might mistake the translation for the original scripture and base their rituals and beliefs

¹³ Qāḍī Abū I-Ḥasan ‘Abd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, *Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-kbamsab: ta‘fīq al-Imām Aḥmad ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn Abī Hāshim*, ed. ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uthmān (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 2nd ed., 2010), 531-35.

¹⁴ Abū I-Ḥasan Sayf al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad al-Āmidī, *Ghāyat al-marām fī ‘ilm al-kalām*, ed. Ḥasan Maḥmūd ‘Abd al-Laṭīf (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A‘lā li-l-Shu‘ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1391/1971), 96.

¹⁵ Mannā‘ ibn Khalīl al-Qaṭṭān, *Mabāḥiṭh fī ‘ulūm al-Qur‘ān* (Riyadh: Maktabat al-Ma‘ārif, 2000), 325.

¹⁶ Muḥammad Ṭāhir ibn ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Kurdī al-Makkī, *Tārīkh al-Qur‘ān al-karīm* (Jeddah: Maṭba‘at al-Faṭḥ, 1946), 190.

¹⁷ Among many others, a concise *risālah* on the risks of translating the Qur‘ān is *Tadbkirah* by Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Shāṭir in 1936, which was addressed to the sheikh of al-Azhar, Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (1881-1945), who supported the idea of Qur‘ān translation.

on it.¹⁸ Second, amid an abundance of translated versions, “the miraculously inimitable eloquence of the Qurʾān” would be lost or its significance reduced in the eyes of believers.¹⁹ Third, with a translation of the Qurʾān into their languages, non-Arab Muslims, in particular, would lose their enthusiasm for learning the Qurʾānic language and Islamic sciences, the traditional authorities guiding the legitimate understanding of the religion.²⁰ Without the Arabic text’s authority, the Muslim *ummah* would be divided over religious and political issues.²¹ Finally, the Qurʾān would be vulnerable in the face of conspiracies.²²

The premodern conservative position on the translation and publication of the Qurʾān has also been associated with interreligious dialectics. On these accounts, the Islamic theo-psychology has usually been that, as with many other religious matters, Muslims must behave differently from Jews and Christians with regard to sacred scripture and its preservation.²³ On this view, Jews and Christians had lost the original texts of their sacred writings when they translated them into other languages centuries ago, and when they later published these books, their wide dissemination risked shattering their political and religious unity.²⁴ Even the Qurʾān’s emphasis on its Arabic character was, according to some comments, a response to its Judeo-Christian detractors.²⁵

¹⁸ Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, *Masʾalat tarjamat al-Qurʾān* (Cairo: al-Maṭbaʿah al-Salafiyyah, 1351/1932), 21.

¹⁹ Mālīk ibn Nabī, *al-Zābirah al-Qurʾāniyyah* (Damascus: Dār al-Fikr, 2000), 49.

²⁰ Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār*, 9/66, 274.

²¹ Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār*, 9/66.

²² Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār*, 9/270; Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ al-Bundāq, *al-Mustashriqūn wa-tarjamat al-Qurʾān al-karīm* (Beirut: Dār al-Āfāq al-Jadīdah, 1983), 104.

²³ Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār*, 9/267; Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Abū Zahrāʾ, *al-Muʿjizah al-kubrā al-Qurʾān* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 418.

²⁴ Muḥammad Muṣṭafā Shāṭir, *Tadbkirah li-ūli l-baṣāʾir wa-l-abṣār ilā mā fī tarjamat maʿnā l-Qurʾān min akbtār* (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Naṣr, 1936), 4; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 51.

²⁵ John Andrew Morrow, “Arabic”, *Islamic Images and Ideas: Essays on Sacred Symbolism*, ed. John Andrew Morrow (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, 2014), 252.

2. Permissible Acts of “Translation” in the Islamic and Turkic Traditions

2.1. Oral Translation

While the debate so far has centered on written translations, the oral translation of Qurʾānic verses was permitted and practiced from the beginning, as it was always required for Islamic *daʿwab*. However, jurists were generally opposed to the use of oral translations in Islamic ritual prayers, despite the exceptional view of figures like Abū Ḥanīfah (d. 150/767), who held that anyone may recite in translation even though he could pronounce Arabic properly.²⁶ His disciples, Abū Yūsuf (d. 182/798) and Muḥammad al-Shaybānī (d. 189/805), believed that reciting in translation was permissible, but only for people who were unable to correctly recite the Arabic. Therefore, as far as the liturgy is concerned, Abū Ḥanīfah prioritized the meaning of the verses regardless of the language in which they were uttered. In contrast, his two disciples required the Qurʾān to be recited in its original language whenever possible.²⁷ Meanwhile, some claim that Abū Ḥanīfah later changed his mind and came out against the use of oral translation in prayers,²⁸ which is the view that Burhān al-Dīn al-Marghīnānī (d. 593/1197) regards as the most trustworthy in the Ḥanafī *madhhab*.²⁹ Although the Ḥanafī tradition tends to relegate Abū Ḥanīfah’s opinion in support of non-Arabic prayer, Abū Bakr al-Kāsānī (d. 587/1191), a highly esteemed Ḥanafī jurist, argues for it overtly, which is, according to Muṣṭafā Šabrī (1869-1954), due to his fanatical loyalty to the Imām:³⁰

They say, “The Qurʾān was sent in Arabic; [consequently, the translated verses must not be considered Qurʾānic verses].”

The answer to it will be in two parts: First, the fact that the

²⁶ Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Shaybānī, *Kitāb al-Aṣl*, ed. Abū l-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī (Karachi: Idārat al-Qurʾān wa-l-ʿUlūm al-Islāmiyyah, 1966), 1/15.

²⁷ Abū l-Maʿālī Burhān al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibn Māzah al-Bukhārī, *al-Muḥīṭ al-burbānī fī l-fiqh al-Nuʿmānī*, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm Sāmī al-Jundī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2004), 1/307; ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Abū Bakr ibn Masʿūd al-Kāsānī, *Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ fī tartīb al-sharāʾiʿ* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1986), 1/112.

²⁸ ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz ibn Aḥmad al-Bukhārī, *Kaṣḥf al-asrār sharḥ Uṣūl al-Bazdawī* (Istanbul: Sharikat al-Šiḥāfah al-ʿUthmāniyyah, 1308/1890), 1/25.

²⁹ Abū l-Ḥasan Burhān al-Dīn ʿAlī ibn Abī Bakr al-Marghīnānī, *al-Hidāyah fī sharḥ Bidāyat al-mubtadī*, ed. Ṭalāl Yūsuf (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 1/49.

³⁰ Muṣṭafā Šabrī, *Masʿalat tarjamat al-Qurʾān*, 5.

Arabic text is the Qurʾān itself does not negate the possibility that other versions could also be the Qurʾān. Because the verse “We have made it an Arabic Qurʾān” [Q 43/3] does not exclude that possibility. In fact, the Arabic text has been called the Qurʾān for the very reason that it guides to the Qurʾān, which is, in essence, the attribute of speech [of God]. Therefore, when we say, “The Qurʾān is not created”, we mean by this that the attribute of speech was not created, but we do not mean the Arabic words and expressions [written in the *muṣḥaf*]. As a result, the Persian [translation] may have also guided to the Qurʾān, the attribute of speech. The verse “Had We sent this as a Qurʾān in a language other than Arabic...” [Q 41/44], likewise, indicates that if the Qurʾān had been uttered in a non-Arabic language, it would have been a Qurʾān too.³¹

This position of Abū Ḥanīfah does not align well with Sunni theology on a great scale, which sees the Qurʾān as a combination of its stylistic structure (*al-naẓm* or *al-lafẓ*) and meaning (*al-maʿnā*). To him, the *naẓm* was not a required component of the Qurʾān when it was recited in prayers and other rituals, at least before he allegedly changed his opinion.³² Muḥammad ibn Abī Sahl al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090) deduced from Abū Ḥanīfah’s endorsement of prayer in Persian that he must have believed that non-Arabic speakers could understand the Qurʾān’s *ijāz* from its meanings.³³ Zayn al-Dīn Ibn Nujaym (d. 970/1563) explained in further detail how Abū Ḥanīfah did not consider Arabic to be a necessary component of the Qurʾān in terms of prayer.³⁴ The Shāfiʿī, Mālikī, Ḥanbalī, and Shīʿī schools, on the other hand, strictly prohibited performing prayers with translated verses.³⁵ Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī (d. 794/1392), a Shāfiʿī jurist,

³¹ Al-Kāsānī, *Badāʾiʿ al-ṣanāʾiʿ*, 1/112–113.

³² ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Bukhārī, *Kaṣḥf al-asrār*, 1/24.

³³ Abū Bakr Shams al-aʿimmah Muḥammad ibn Abī Sahl al-Sarakhsī, *Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī*, ed. Abū l-Wafāʾ al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, n.d.), 1/282.

³⁴ Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, *al-Baḥr al-rāʾiq sharḥ Kanz al-daqaʾiq* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, n.d.), 1/324.

³⁵ Muḥyī al-Dīn Abū Zakariyyā Yaḥyá ibn Sharaf al-Nawawī, *al-Majmūʿ sharḥ al-Mubadhab* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1344/1925), 3/379–380.

contended that reading such verses aloud outside of prayer is also improper.³⁶

2.2. Interlinear Translation

Another way to access the meanings of the Qurʾān was through “interlinear translation”, which appeared only in the 4th/10th century following the rise of New Persian as a literary expression.³⁷ This approach launched the entire process of Qurʾān translations that has lasted up to the present.

The first “translations” of the entire Qurʾān were most likely interlinear in which the meanings of the words and phrases were vertically located immediately under them and separated from each other by spaces. By utilizing such a style, it is clear that the composers of these works intentionally avoided giving the translated statements a text structure consisting of grammatically accurate, eloquent, and consecutive paragraphs. Despite being called translations, they were not exactly so in the modern sense. They were more “study books” intended for *ʿulamā*³⁸ or at least for those who could read the original scripture with some basic knowledge of Arabic grammar and wanted to improve their Qurʾānic culture by seeing the correspondence between original words or phrases and their meanings. Contrary to what is generally imagined, these works, which did not include a finalized textual translation, rather revealed ongoing concerns. Actually, “the robust history of rendering the text into the vernacular languages used by Muslim communities”³⁹ does not prove that the widespread reservations were surmounted. Thus, I believe that the interlinear works are precursors of Qurʾān translations that would only be created after the compromises of Islamic law and the demands of the people jointly set the scene. I think that explains the rationale behind the fact, as noted by Brett Wilson, that the translations of the

³⁶ Abū ʿAbd Allāh Badr al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Zarkashī, *al-Burbān fī ʿulūm al-Qurʾān*, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Beirut: Dār Iḥyāʾ al-Kutub al-ʿArabīyah, 1957), 1/464.

³⁷ Travis Zadeh, *The Vernacular Qurʾān: Translation and the Rise of Persian Exegesis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 264.

³⁸ M. Brett Wilson, *Translating the Qurʾān in an Age of Nationalism: Print Culture and Modern Islam in Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 21.

³⁹ M. Brett Wilson, “Translations of the Qurʾān: Islamicate Languages”, *The Oxford Handbook of Qurʾānic Studies* (552–564), ed. Mustafa Shah - Muhammad Abdel Haleem (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 552.

Qurʾān have not usually been considered a separate category from *tafsīr* in Islamicate literary taxonomies⁴⁰ until recently.

The earliest interlinear Qurʾānic translation was prepared by a council appointed by the Samanid ruler Maṣṣūr ibn Nūḥ (d. 365/976). It was not an easy task. Maṣṣūr needed to first obtain a fatwā on the permissibility of Qurʾānic translation. Perhaps he had hoped to have a Persian translation of the Qurʾān in the form of a typical text; however, the book that came out was only interlinear. Abdülkadir İnan (1889-1976) thought that the fatwā was given based on Q 14/4, “We never sent a messenger who did not speak the tongue of his people.”⁴¹ He mentions no evidence in support of his view other than the fact that Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) said in his interpretation of the verse that “the Qurʾān does not need to be sent in all the languages. Its translations into other languages would serve as substitutes”.⁴² The translation was completed in 345/956.⁴³ Over the following century or two, Turkic peoples in Khurasan began to obtain bilingual interlinear Qurʾān translations into Persian and Turkic dialects, such as Turkmen,⁴⁴ Qarakhanid,⁴⁵ and Chagatay.⁴⁶ According to Zeki Velidi Togan (1890-1970), these translations were modeled on an early

⁴⁰ Brett Wilson, “Translations of the Qurʾān: Islamicate Languages”, 553.

⁴¹ Abdülkadir İnan, *Kurʾân-ı Kerim’in Türkçe Tercemeleri Üzerinde Bir İnceleme* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1961), 7.

⁴² Abū l-Qāsim Jār Allāh Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq ḡhawāmiḍ al-tanzīl wa-ʿuyūn al-aḡāwīl fī wujūb al-taʾwīl* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1407/1986), 2/539.

⁴³ İnan, *Kurʾân-ı Kerim’in Türkçe Tercemeleri*, 161; János Eckmann, “Eastern Turkic Translations of the Koran”, *Studia Turcica* (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1971), 149-157.

⁴⁴ For an analysis of the manuscript of an incomplete interlinear Qurʾān translation in Turkmen dialect (most likely belonging to the 5th-8th/11th-14th centuries) preserved in the Central Library of Astan Quds Razavi, Mashhad, Iran, see Emek Üşenmez, “Türkçe İlk Kurʾân Tercümelelerinden Meshed Nüshası Satır Arası Türkçe-Farsça Tercümesi (No: 2229) (Orta Türkçe)”, *Turkish Studies* 12/3 (2017), 717-772. Also, for a comparative assessment of five manuscripts of Qurʾān translation, all of which were produced in Khwārazm Turkish, see Mustafa Argunşah, “Harezm Türkçesiyle Yapılan Kurʾân Çevirisinin Beş Nüshası”, *Uluslararası Türkçe Edebiyat Kültür Eğitim Dergisi (TEKE)* 8/2 (2019), 654-698.

⁴⁵ A detailed case has been made in support of the theory Abdülkadir İnan and Zeki Velidi Togan put forward in 1952 and 1960, respectively, that the language of the Rylands manuscript of the Qurʾān translation is Qarakhanid Turkish. For this, see Aysu Ata, *Karabanlı Türkçesinde İlk Kurʾân Tercümesi (Rylands Nüshası - Giriş, Metin, Notlar, Dizin)* (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 2013).

⁴⁶ Eckmann, “Eastern Turkic Translations”, 156.

Turkic translation produced by Turkish council members, contemporaneously with the Persian one.⁴⁷ Later, these interlinear translations were taken to Anatolia by scholars who fled Khurasan and Khwārazm because of the Mongol invasion, paving the way for new translations in western dialects of Turkish to come out after the 8th/14th century.⁴⁸

2.3. Exegetical “Translation”

One final approach to the issue of translation was that of the exegetical/explanatory translation of the Qurʾān. This approach, which involves a concise commentary on the Qurʾān in a language other than Arabic, was never legally forbidden,⁴⁹ despite the lack of early attested examples. This genre has three categories in Turkish: The first category, which first appeared in Anatolia around the 8th/14th century,⁵⁰ includes literal translations of well-known Arabic *tafsīr* books. The second category consists of loose translations of these *tafsīr* works adapted for particular audiences, often with some added commentary by the translator and additional material from other sources. Ottoman examples in this category date back to the 11th/17th century. Most of these works were produced by translators who were also Qurʾānic scholars. One such work, and one this article addresses at some length below, is *Tibyān*, which was translated by a *mufasssīr*. Although rarer, a few such works were created by non-*mufasssīr* authors who possessed some particular linguistic expertise rather than a background in the Qurʾānic sciences. *Mawākib*, the other work discussed below, is of this kind since it was translated into Turkish from a Persian *tafsīr* by a man not considered an Islamic scholar. The final category, which came into existence only in the early 14th/20th century, covers short exegetical books written in Turkish as original works. Although none of these categories was created as an explicit translation of the Qurʾān, they all contained translations of Qurʾānic verses that were found in the texts of the translated or originally written

⁴⁷ Zeki Velidi Togan, “Londra ve Tahran’daki İslami Yazmalardan Bazılarına Dair”, *İslam Tetkikleri Enstitüsü Dergisi* 3/1-2 (1959-1960), 135.

⁴⁸ For a study on this kind of Qurʾānic translation, see Ahmet Topaloğlu, *Mubammed b. Hamza XV. Yüzyıl Başlarında Yapılmış Satırarası Kur’an Tercümesi* (Ankara: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1976).

⁴⁹ Muḥammad al-Sayyid Ḥusayn al-Dhahabī, *al-Tafsīr wa-l-mufasssīrūn* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1389/1969), 1/22.

⁵⁰ İnan, *Kur’ân-ı Kerim’in Türkçe Tercemeleri*, 15.

commentaries. A discerning reader could pick out those verse translations from the text, and these works thus represented a de facto form of Qurʾānic translation.

The first state-run printing press under the Ottomans was established in 1139/1727, more than two centuries after the first, with the permission of Sultan Aḥmed III (d. 1149/1736) and, more significantly, the approval of the *sheikh al-Islām*.⁵¹ Both Sheikh al-Islām ‘Abd Allāh Efendī’s (d. 1156/1743) fatwā and the Sultan’s edict (*farmān*) explicitly stated that establishing such a press company was permissible as long as religious books were not published.⁵²

In the absence of a translation, an Ottoman reader could learn about the meaning of the Qurʾān through study circles for the general public organized in mosques by scholars and imams. Those who were luckier studied the Qurʾān in a madrasah. The rural population had the opportunity to encounter traveling preachers, in particular during the three holy months. Literate people, meanwhile, could read scattered translations of certain Qurʾānic verses or passages cited in various genres of Turkish-Islamic literature, or in one of the few *tafsīr* books translated from Arabic. The best-known of these books was the *Tafsīr* of Abū l-Layth al-Samarqandī (d. 373/983).⁵³ However, given their length and complexity, these works were not intended for a general audience. Because of the early ban on Islamic publishing, which was first broken by the Bulaq Press in 1820 in Cairo, publishing various religious books in Turkish, which was only lifted at the end of the thirteenth/nineteenth century in Istanbul, ordinary people found it difficult to obtain a copy of these massive volumes, which were produced by hired calligraphers. Additionally, there were some fragmentary *tafsīr* books in Turkish dating back to the 4th/10th century, interpreting certain chapters of the Qurʾān, such as *al-Fātiḥah*, *al-Yāsīn*, and *al-Mulk*.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Osman Ersoy, *Türkiye’ye Matbaanın Girişi ve İlk Basılan Eserler* (Ankara: Güven Basımevi, 1959), 33.

⁵² Şeyhülislam Yenişehirli Abdullah Efendi, *Behcetü’l-Fetâvâ*, ed. Süleyman Kaya et al. (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2011), 557-58; Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye’de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2022), 57; Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 51.

⁵³ İnan, *Kur’ân-ı Kerim’in Türkçe Tercemeleri*, 15.

⁵⁴ İnan, *Kur’ân-ı Kerim’in Türkçe Tercemeleri*, 14.

3. The Emergence of Hybrid Qurʾān Translations: *Tibyān* and *Mawākib*

In terms of Qurʾān translations, this state of affairs began to change in the late 11th/17th century. Initially, not the Qurʾān itself, but certain short commentaries on the Qurʾān were translated into Turkish and adapted for an Ottoman readership. These sorts of adapted works were often based on contributions from multiple authors and were fairly common in different fields of Ottoman Islamic literature. A scholar could pick an original book in any field and add to it his own contributions along with quotes he acquired from various sources, or he could merge the original text and his own commentary under what was often a hybrid title. In doing so, he did not feel obliged to mention his references precisely.

Two widely accepted *tafsīr* books used as Qurʾān translations were *Tafsīr-i Tibyān* and *Mawākib*. The first was composed by ʿAyntābī Meḥmed Efendī as a translation of an Arabic *tafsīr* called *al-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qurʾān*, written by Khaḍr ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī (d. 773/1371).⁵⁵ However, ʿAyntābī’s translation was highly composite, drawing on certain *tafsīr* books such as the *Mafāṭiḥ al-ghayb* of al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210), *Maʿālim al-tanzīl* of al-Baghawī (d. 516/1122), *al-Durr al-manṭbūr* of al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505), and *Anwār al-tanzīl* of al-Bayḍāwī (d. 685/1286), as well as some other Islamic masterworks like Ibn al-ʿArabī’s (d. 638/1240) *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyyah* and al-Ghazālī’s (d. 505/1111) *Iḥyāʾ*. In his translation, ʿAyntābī edited out the original author’s particular interpretations, as well as certain details concerning Arabic grammar and readings of the Qurʾān (*qirāʾāt*). He also tried to create a popular discourse full of parables, reports, and anecdotes (*al-manāqib*, *al-aḥādīth*, and *al-āthār*).

A good illustration of ʿAyntābī’s style is his Turkish translation of Āl ʿImrān 3/7. In the text below, the italicized parts in brackets serve as a veiled, literal translation of the verse. The other parts are mostly based on al-Azdī’s original text with a few modifications.

(وَمَا يَعْلَمُ تَأْوِيلَهُ إِلَّا اللَّهُ وَالرَّاسِخُونَ فِي الْعِلْمِ يَقُولُونَ آمَنَّا بِهِ) However, [Allah knows the interpretation of the ambiguous verses (mutashābihāt), and so do those who are firmly grounded in

⁵⁵ The manuscript is preserved in the Süleymaniye Library, Nuruosmaniye Collection (34 NK 244: 2a-363b.).

knowledge. They] additionally [say, “We believe in it.”] What supports this explanation is a report from Ibn ‘Abbās, who said, “I am the first to be among those who are firmly grounded in knowledge”, implying that he knew the interpretation of those verses. Mujāhid also stated that he was one of the people who understood the meanings of the *mutashābihāt*. Notwithstanding that, according to the majority, the meaning of this verse is that no one knows the true interpretation of the *mutashābihāt* except Allah. And those who are firmly grounded in knowledge say, “We believe in it”.⁵⁶

In this passage, ‘Ayntābī appears to have taken the initiative to translate a highly contested verse based on a specific interpretation, according to which not only God but also some individuals with deep knowledge would have the authority to know the ultimate meanings of the Qur’ān’s ambiguous passages. In the second part, he refers to the majority view, which is also shared by al-Azdī,⁵⁷ the author of the original text, that only God knows the true meaning of the Qur’ānic allegories. However, by positioning this view only after his own reading, ‘Ayntābī critically alters the source book’s point of view, thereby privileging an interpretation that would have been more welcome in *taṣawwuf*-friendly Ottoman culture.

Another aspect ‘Ayntābī ignores is that al-Azdī’s reference in the text to “those individuals with profound knowledge” in this context are none other than Jewish scholars.⁵⁸ Accordingly, the broad meaning of the verse, according to al-Azdī, is as follows: “Allah knows the true meaning of the ambiguous verses. And those who have sound knowledge about the Torah would say, ‘We believe in it.’”. Given the vast gulf between this and his own translation, ‘Ayntābī was not a typical translator.

Because of the unique contributions of its translator, some researchers consider ‘Ayntābī’s *Tibyān* a stand-alone work. Even the library indexes are ambivalent about whether to list ‘Ayntābī as the

⁵⁶ ‘Ayntābī Meḥmed Efendī, *Tafsīr-i Tibyān* (İstanbul: Maṭba‘ah-i ‘Āmirah, 1306/1889), 1/235. (English translation, emphasis, and punctuation by the author.)

⁵⁷ Khaḍr ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Azdī, *al-Tibyān fī tafsīr al-Qur’ān*, Süleymaniye Library, Nuruosmaniye (34 NK 244: 2a-363b), 46b.

⁵⁸ Al-Azdī, *al-Tibyān*, 46b.

book's author or just a translator. This question, "Is 'Ayntābī an author or a translator?"⁵⁹ raises a series of others about the text's hybrid character. Is his work an original composition or a translation? If it is a translation, is it a translation of the Qur'ān itself or a translation of a *tafsīr* book written on the Qur'ān? Or is it simply an all-in-one work?

In the introduction of his work, 'Ayntābī wrote that he was introduced to Sultan Meḥmed IV (d. 1004/1693) by Sheikh al-Islām Minqārīzādah Yaḥyá Efendī (d. 1088/1678) and that the Sultan asked him to prepare a Qur'ān translation with due care for all the features of the original text. He also stated that the Sultan gifted him four volumes of *tafsīr* books and ten volumes of works on the Arabic language, apparently to assist him in his task. After finishing his work in 1109/1698, 'Ayntābī prepared two handwritten copies, one for Sultan Meḥmed IV and another for the benefit of the general public.⁶⁰ *Tibyān*'s popularity grew as a Qur'ānic quasi-translation, especially after it was published in 1889 by Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-Āmirah, the Ottoman State Printing House. In the preface of the 1906 edition, the book is said to have been such a well-esteemed book that everyone desired to obtain a copy of it as a wonderful treasure, owing to the translation's clear Turkish and the translator's sincerity. *Tibyān* inspired scholars and publishers to create several similar works in the future.⁶¹

The Sultan played a significant part in this translation. He desired a translation that would truly represent the Qur'ān's linguistic characteristics, which was something that did not align well with the viewpoint of traditional Islamic law. Meḥmed IV was very interested in translation issues. He saw translation as a means of cultural breakthrough during that period. The Hebrew Bible was also translated into Turkish in 1666 by 'Alī Ufqī Beg, his chief translator.⁶²

⁵⁹ İsmail Çalışkan, "Tefsîrî Mehmed Efendî'nin *Tefsîr-i Tibyān* Adlı Eserinin Osmanlı Dönemi Tefsîr Faaliyetindeki Yeri ve Dönemin Siyasi-Sosyal Yapısı İçin Anlamı", *Osmanlı Toplumunda Kur'ân Kültürü ve Tefsîr Çalışmaları I*, ed. Bilal Gökçir et al. (İstanbul: İlim Yayma Vakfı, 2011), 226.

⁶⁰ 'Ayntābī, *Tibyān*, 1/3-4.

⁶¹ Hidayet Aydar, *Kur'ân-ı Kerim'in Tercümesi Meselesi* (İstanbul: Kur'ân Okulu Yayıncılık, 1996), 142.

⁶² The original manuscript is preserved in the Leiden University Library (Cod. Or. 1101a-f.)

Mawākib, the other commentary-translation I address here, is primarily a Turkish translation of *al-Mawāhib al-‘aliyyah*, which was originally authored in Persian by Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī al-Wā‘iz al-Kāshifī al-Harawī (d. 910/1505). The book’s translator, Ismā‘īl Farrūkh Efendī, did not belong to the class of the *‘ulamā’*. As a retired ambassador, he was fond of Persian-Islamic literature and authored a Turkish commentary on Rūmī’s *Mathnawī*.⁶³ That might be why he chose a Persian book to translate rather than an Arabic one. In fact, the Ottoman legacy has always been attracted to Persian literature as well as Arabic Islamic literature. Thus, the interest in *al-Mawāhib* might be seen as a sign of the Ottoman affinity with the Persian-speaking cultural hinterland because of the work’s Persian character and Khurasan origin.

Al-Wā‘iz al-Kāshifī, the author of the original work, was also an interesting figure. As implied by his famous title, al-Wā‘iz, he was a preacher who actively participated in *da‘wah* in Khurasan, especially in Herat and Nishapur.⁶⁴ His books, most notably *al-Mawāhib*, spread through India under the name of *Tafsīr-i Ḥusaynī* and were translated into the languages of neighboring regions, including Urdu, Pashtu,⁶⁵ and some Turkic dialects such as Chagatay.⁶⁶ Since the Ottoman-Safavid rivalry had not yet culminated in bloody wars during his lifetime, al-Wā‘iz al-Kāshifī managed to address Sunnī and Shī‘ī Muslims at the same time. That is why both Sunnī and Shī‘ī biographers list him among the scholars of their respective *madbhabs*. He adopted an inclusive approach that he learned from Sufi masters and mystics in the region, such as Mullā Jāmī (Mawlānā Nūr al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān) (d. 897/1492) and ‘Alī Shīr Nawā‘ī (d. 907/1501), to whom he reputedly dedicated his work, as the word *al-‘aliyya* in the title implies.⁶⁷

Like ‘Ayntābī, Ismā‘īl Farrūkh Efendī enriched his translation with quotations from popular *tafsīr* books such as al-Bayḍāwī’s *Anwār al-*

⁶³ Bursalı Meḥmed Ṭāhir, *‘Uthmānī Mu‘allifları* (İstanbul: Maṭba‘ah-ı ‘Āmirah, 1333/1915), 1/394-395.

⁶⁴ Adnan Karaismailoğlu, “Hüseyn Vâiz-i Kâşifî”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 1999), 19/16-19.

⁶⁵ Karaismailoğlu, “Hüseyn Vâiz-i Kâşifî”, 19/17.

⁶⁶ A manuscript of the Chagatay translation of *al-Mawāhib* is preserved in Topkapı Museum, the Library of Ahmed III, collection no. 16.

⁶⁷ Abdulhamit Binşik, “Osmanlıca Tefsir Tercümelere ve Hüseyn Vâiz-i Kâşifî’nin *Mevâhib-i Aliyye’si*”, *İslami Araştırmalar Dergisi* 17/1 (2004), 67.

tanzil, al-Zamakhsharī's *al-Kashshāf*, and al-Khāzin's *Lubāb al-ta'wīl*. He also greatly benefited from *Tafsīr-i Tibyān*.

Ismā'īl Farrūkh translates al-Baqarah 2/249 as follows:

[When Ṭālūt and his troops set out] from Holy Jerusalem, because of what he was informed about by the prophet or inspiration, [he said, "Indeed, Allah has tested] and tried [you with a river. So, whoever drinks from it is not of me] or my followers; [and whoever does not drink from it is of me! Only those who drink one sip with their hands are exempt!]" Upon that, they all drank from it; just a few of them drank once with their hands.] Accordingly, [Ṭālūt crossed the river along with those who believed.] Since they were very few in number, while Jālūt's army was so large, [they said, "Today, we have no power against them] since we are in such a situation". [Those who were certain that] by performing this jihād, [they would meet Allah] and be closer to him, [said, "How many a small group has defeated a large group by Allah's permission] and demand[?] [Allah]'s support [is with the patient ones!]"⁶⁸

Following this passage, Ismā'īl Farrūkh gives additional information about the river's location, the number of the soldiers of Ṭālūt, and the difficulties they faced crossing it. One very intriguing point about *Mawākib* is that it was very generous about narratives of foreign origin (*isrā'iliyyāt*) in line with its aforementioned sources. It sometimes narrates stories that are not included in *al-Mawāhib* as in the interpretation of Q 2/59.⁶⁹

This has rendered it partly unsuitable for modern readers because the opinion of *isrā'iliyyāt* in *tafsīr* has ideologically changed in Turkey over the last century, due to modernist readings that tend to consider the Qur'ān as a guideline speaking to today, rather than a narrative about ancient times,⁷⁰ the concept of scientific *tafsīr*, the political atmosphere after the establishment of Israel in 1949, or neo-Salafist

⁶⁸ Ismā'īl Farrūkh Efendī, *Tafsīr-i Mawākib* (İstanbul: Maṭba'ah-ı Bahriyyah, 1323/1905), 40. (English translation, emphasis, and punctuation by the author.)

⁶⁹ Ismā'īl Farrūkh, *Mawākib*, 8.

⁷⁰ İsmail Kara, "Türkiye'de Din ve Modernleşme (Modernleşme Teşebbüslerinin Dinleşmesi) -Metodolojik Temel Problemler-", *Modernleşme, İslâm Dünyası ve Türkiye: Milletlerarası Tartışmalı İlmî Toplantı*, ed. Sabri Orman (İstanbul: Ensar Neşriyat, 2001), 193-194.

perspectives that limit the religious authority to the Qur'ān and hadith.⁷¹ Elmalılı's approach may provide insights into the change in attitudes toward *isrā'iliyyāt* in *tafsir* literature; he uses *isrā'iliyyāt* limitedly, mostly under the name of *asāṭir al-awwālīn* (stories of the ancients).⁷² Despite the length of his *Hak Dini Kur'an Dili*, Elmalılı has not given as many details about the origin of *isrā'iliyyāt* as Ismā'īl Farrūkh did about Q 2/249. In his interpretation of Q 5/27-28, "And recite to them the story of Adam's two sons, in truth, when they both offered a sacrifice ..." too, he does not go into details about Adam's sons, which came up in the traditional *tafsir* books; instead, he openly states that the benefitting from these verses does not depend on the determination of their identities.⁷³

Tâhirü'l-Mevlevî (1877-1951), a litterateur of Persian who later undertook translating *al-Mawāhib* but could not finish it, criticized Ismā'īl Farrūkh's translation on the grounds that he did not adhere to the original text's framework by excluding some parables full of wisdom and morals.⁷⁴ Tâhirü'l-Mevlevî's criticism is based on al-Wā'iz al-Kāshifî having drawn on a wide range of Persian material, including poetry and mystic insights, that he gathered from Sufi figures such as Ibn al-'Arabî, 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānî (d. 730/1329), Şadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawî (d. 673/1274), Farīd al-Dīn 'Aṭṭār (d. 627/1230), and Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmî (d. 672/1273)⁷⁵; however, Ismā'īl Farrūkh excluded many of these quotes while organizing his work. This explains why *al-Mawāhib* was translated into Turkish many times by multiple translators. Other than Abū l-Faḡl Meḡmed Efendî (d. 982/1574), who translated *al-Mawāhib* into Turkish before Ismā'īl Farrūkh, there were also Selanikli 'Alî ibn Walî (d. 999/1590), Sheikh 'Umar 'Adülî

⁷¹ Ronald Nettle, "A Post-Colonial Encounter of Traditions: Muhammad Sa'īd al-Ashmāwī on Islam and Judaism", *Medieval and Modern Perspectives on Muslim-Jewish Relations* (London: Routledge, 1995), 176-179; Roberto Tottoli, *Biblical Prophets in the Qur'ān and Muslim Literature* (London: Routledge, 2002), 176, 182.

⁷² Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır, *Hak Dîni Kur'an Dili*, ed. Asım Cüneyd Köksal - Murat Kaya (İstanbul: Türkiye Yazma Eserler Kurumu Başkanlığı Yayınları, 2021), 3/90.

⁷³ Yazır, *Hak Dîni Kur'an Dili*, 610.

⁷⁴ Tâhirü'l-Mevlevî, "Mawlānā Ḥusayn Wā'iz wa-Tafsīr-i Ḥusaynī", *Bayān al-Ḥaqq* (21 Sha'bān 1327/24 August 1909), 916.

⁷⁵ Kristin Zahra Sands, "On the Popularity of Husayn Va'iz-i Kashifi's *Mawāhib-i 'aliyya*: A Persian Commentary on the Qur'an", *Iranian Studies* 36/4 (December 2003), 470.

Nighdawī (d. 1044/1635), Ghurābzādah Aḥmad al-Nāsiḥ (d. 1099/1688), and Muḥammad Ṣādiq Īmānqulī (d. 1911). Except for Abū l-Faḍl's faithful translation, *Tarjamab-ʿi Tafsīr-i Mawāhib-i ʿAliyyah*,⁷⁶ these works differed from one another in their reconstruction of the entire material, including the translation of *al-Mawāhib*'s text and the additional explanations. Ismāʿīl Farrūkh seems to have used the freedom he had in his translation to favor *isrāʿīliyyāt* and to have transmitted literary quotations in a much more limited way.

Tibyān and *Mawākīb* may initially be categorized as short *tafsīr* translations since they featured some extra material going beyond an ordinary Qurʾān translation; however, they did not really fit into any of the categories of encyclopedic, madrasah-style, or *ḥāshiyah*-style Qurʾān commentaries, as outlined by Walid Saleh.⁷⁷ They were neither literal translations of the Qurʾān nor literal translations of short *tafsīr* volumes produced in other languages. They were, rather, a mixture of both or a kind of creative translation that reconstructs a scope of brief interpretation (*maʿāl*) beyond what the original text provided, functioning differently according to demand and local sensibilities. Thus, if a Qurʾān translation was needed, they could be used as one; but if there was an accusation of a literal translating of the Qurʾān – a potentially heretical act – they could also be downplayed as merely a translated *tafsīr*. In the late Ottoman context, they were ambiguous, polysemous works that could be read in many ways, much like the broader process of Ottoman modernization that was extended to modern Turkey.

Susan Gunasti speaks of how some translations of the Qurʾān commentaries emerged in the 19th-century non-Arabic reading context, tending to be a cross between an interpretive Qurʾān translation and a summary Qurʾān commentary. Written in a relatively easier vernacular, as she said, they do not fall under the abovementioned categories but deserve to be treated as a subgenre of *tafsīr* in their own right.⁷⁸ The

⁷⁶ Ersin Çelik, “19. Yüzyılda Bir Tefsir Klasığının Farsçadan Türkçeye Tercümesi: İsmâil Ferrûh Efendi'nin Tefsîr-i Mevâkib Adlı Eseri”, *Sabn-ı Semân'dan Dârülfünûn'a XIX. Yüzyıl Osmanlı'da İlim ve Fikir Dünyası*, ed. Ahmet Hamdi Furat (İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları, 2021), 248.

⁷⁷ Walid Saleh, “Preliminary Remarks on the Historiography of *tafsīr* in Arabic: A History of the Book Approach”, *Journal of Qurʾanic Studies* 12 (2010), 20-21.

⁷⁸ Susan Gunasti, *The Qurʾān between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic: An Exegetical Tradition* (London: Routledge, 2019), 39.

13th-14th/19th-20th centuries witnessed an increase in the number of these kinds of works. The distinction between translation and exegesis, however, was not always evident.⁷⁹ Apparently, both *Tibyān* and *Mawākib* represent two typical examples of this genre. Therefore, just like the interlinear ones, these books might be seen as Qurʾān translations within the understanding of translation (*tarjamah*) at the time. With reference to the Qurʾān, as Travis Zadeh stresses, translations in the medieval period were different from those in modern times, since there were discrepancies, amendments, and adaptations between a vernacular Qurʾān commentary translation and its original. Such differences were still understood as part of the practice of translation.⁸⁰

4. Toward Modern Qurʾān Translations: Between Pan-Islamism and Secularism

The Qurʾān's translation into various languages was the subject of contention in the early 14th/20th century, notably in Egypt and Istanbul. The debate on Qurʾānic translation, which was sparked by a few articles published in magazines like *al-Manār* and *Majallat al-Azhar* and featured in several books and *risālahs*, was, despite seeming to be a theological issue, basically about whether Islam should embrace the concept of the modern nation-state with new political references.

The Ottoman mass-publishing industry blossomed in 1908 and 1909, the last two years of the reign of Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamid II (1842-1918), when he no longer exercised the firm authority of his earlier reign.⁸¹ The articles published during this period presented new ideas about the constitution and citizenship. Who is an Ottoman citizen? Are Muslims the only true citizens of the caliphate, or must all Ottoman subjects, regardless of creed or ethnicity, be considered citizens with equal rights? At the turn of the 14th/20th century, some intellectual figures wanted to highlight the Turkish character of the Ottoman state, something it had not been identified with during its classical periods, and wanted the Turkish language to be more present and prevalent in

⁷⁹ Gunasti, *The Qurʾān between the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic*, 39.

⁸⁰ Travis Zadeh, *The Vernacular Qurʾān*, 314.

⁸¹ Server İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları* (Ankara: Başvekalet Basın Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 1943), 142-152.

the state and public life. Like many others, Aḥmed Midḥat Efendī⁸² (1844-1912) advocated for a Turkish translation of the Qurʾān as well as a new *tafsīr* that would be written directly in Turkish rather than translated from Arabic. The proposal was basically promoted by the secular groups classified as “Westernists” and by nationalist circles. They were more interested in decentralizing traditional political authority in the country than in making the meanings of the Qurʾān more accessible for pious reasons. The traditional Islamic faith was one of the most significant components of the sultanate regime. Some Islamic figures who were likely impressed by the Qurʾānist discourse of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1839-1897) and Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905) also supported the idea of translation. Mehmed Akif Ersoy (1873-1936) was probably one of the most prominent followers of the path of al-Afghānī and ʿAbduh. Meanwhile, Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), another follower of ʿAbduh, considered the translation of the Qurʾān a deviation from the consensus of the past thirteen centuries. To him, as opposed to the Seljuks and the Buwayhids, the Ottomans used Turkish instead of Arabic in their official records, which kept the nationalistic inclinations alive in the hearts of some people who eventually demanded the change of the Qurʾān’s language.⁸³ Rashīd Riḍā also reported that he heard about the idea of Qurʾān translations from Mehmed ʿUbayd Allāh Efendī (1858-1937),⁸⁴ who told him that the mission of the Prophet would come true if only the Qurʾān was translated into all languages.⁸⁵ Another person Rashīd Riḍā debated Qurʾān translations with was Ṭalʿat Pasha (1874-1921), the then Minister of the Interior.⁸⁶ However, the proposals did not resonate with the general public. Since Islamic law would not have objected to the proposal for a Turkish *tafsīr*, it might have had a better chance of being

⁸² For an assessment of Aḥmed Midḥat Efendī’s role in the Ottoman intellectual transformation, see Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 189-191.

⁸³ Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār*, 9/271.

⁸⁴ ʿUbayd Allāh Efendī was a member of the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti). During his exile before 1914, the year he was chosen for the Ottoman parliament (*Majlis-i Mabʿūthān*), he stayed in Egypt for a short time in 1908. That is when he must have had the chance to meet with Rashīd Riḍā. For details, see Ahmet Turan Alkan, “Ubeydullah Efendi”, *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı Yayınları, 2012), 42/20-22.

⁸⁵ ʿUbayd Allāh Afghānī, *Qawm-i Jadīd* (İstanbul: Shams Matbaʿahsi, 1332/1914), 15-18.

⁸⁶ Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār*, 9/273.

realized than the other proposal for a direct Qurʾān translation. However, neither of these proposals was realized. The real power behind the denial or obstruction of the Turkish *tafsir* project was Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd II himself. Apparently, he thought the Turkification of the Qurʾān, one way or another, would undermine his pan-Islamist politics and his concept of citizenship. This kind of demand, in his eyes, would only lead to the division of the Ottoman state. A close friend of the sultan and well-known conservative figure, Muṣṭafā Şabrī, wrote three articles in opposition to the proposal in 1908. He started one of them by saying, “I am sure that I will be labeled as an obstructor of a benevolent deed, yet I oppose it”.⁸⁷

During this turbulent period, the Qurʾān was at the center of the debates over its contents and language. In a time when demands for a Turkish translation and *tafsir* were not met by the state and *ʿulamāʾ*, the void was being filled predominantly by *Tibyān* and *Mawākib*. After its first publication by the Bulaq Press in 1840, among other religious books that were prohibited from being printed in Istanbul, *Tibyān* had reached vast masses. It was printed sixteen times in Ottoman-Arabic script, nine of them in Istanbul and seven in Egypt. Even after the modern Qurʾānic translations appeared on the market in the 14th/20th century, it maintained its reputation and has been printed three times in romanized script: a simplified version by Süleyman Fahir in 1956 and 1963 and an annotated one by Ahmed Davudoğlu (1912-1983). These editions were reprinted several times after 1980.⁸⁸ *Mawākib*, in turn, was published at least fifteen times in the late Ottoman period and was romanized and printed several times during the Republican era. *Tibyān* and *Mawākib* were also printed together in four editions issued between 1900 and 1906.⁸⁹ Two advertisements for these joint editions that appeared in *İlqām* on 6 July 1900 and 24 December 1900⁹⁰ reveal the readership’s interest in *Tibyān* and *Mawākib*. Arpa also cites two

⁸⁷ Muṣṭafā Şabrī, “Kurʾân-ı Kerim İçin Türkçe Bir Tefsir Yazmak Meselesi”, *Millet* (September 2, 1908), 29-30.

⁸⁸ Seyfettin Özege, *Eski Harflerle Basılmış Türkçe Eserler Kataloğu* (İstanbul: Fatih Yayınevi, 1977), 4/1785-1825.

⁸⁹ Muhammed Hamidullah, *Kurʾân’ı Kerim Taribi*, trans. Salih Tuğ (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2000), 197.

⁹⁰ Recep Arpa, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Osmanlı Gazete ve Dergilerinde Yer Alan Tefsir İlanları”, *Usul İslam Araştırmaları* 16/16 (December 2011), 29, 31.

other advertisements of *Mawākib* alone, which were published in *Taqwīm-i Waqāyi*⁹¹ in 1865 and 1870.⁹¹

The political perspective on the translation of the Qurʾān, paradoxically, changed from the last ten years of the Ottomans to the first ten years of the Republic of Turkey. While Sultan ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd in the 1910s did all in his power to block translation attempts, Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s vigorously campaigned for a Turkish translation. The former opposed it to keep the Ottoman state as an Islamic nation (*umma*). The latter, however, supported it to create a new political identity under the Turkish nation.

What is striking at this point is that the Turkish-speaking modern Islamists, who are mostly fans of ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd II, seemed perfectly happy to have a Qurʾānic translation in their tongue, even though, from ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd’s “Islamic” or “Islamist” perspective, it seemed a poor idea at the time. On the other hand, ten years later, from the secular perspective of Atatürk, the Qurʾān translation became a vital step to take, not for the benefit of an Islamic or Islamist agenda, but for the interest of a secular agenda.

Mehmed Akif, the eloquent author of Turkey’s newly accepted national anthem, was formally tasked with translating the Qurʾān into Turkish. According to the contract made in 1925 between the Presidency of Religious Affairs and Mehmed Akif and his colleague Muhammed Hamdi Yazır (1878-1942), after the former completed his Qurʾān translation, the latter was to prepare a Turkish *tafsir* based on his translation.⁹² Akif traveled to Egypt in 1926, probably for a more comfortable study setting. While studying in Egypt, he unilaterally terminated the contract with the government in 1932,⁹³ possibly fearing that his translation might be used in the so-called Turkish prayer project.⁹⁴ This was the same year that it became mandatory to recite the call to prayer in Turkish instead of Arabic, and Muṣṭafá Şabrī Efendī, a

⁹¹ Arpa, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Osmanlı Gazete ve Dergilerinde Yer Alan Tefsir İlanları”, 33.

⁹² For a copy of the contract dated 26 November 1925, see Mehmet Ünal, “Bir Mukâvele’nin Serencâmı: Mehmed Akif’in Akîim Kalan Meâli Üzerine”, *Diyanet İlmî Dergi* 44/1 (January-February-March 2008), 27-29.

⁹³ Eşref Edip, *Mehmed Akif: Hayatı, Eserleri ve Yetmiş Mubarririn Yazıları* (İstanbul: Sebülürreşad Neşriyatı, 1962), 109.

⁹⁴ Dücane Cündioğlu, *Türkçe Kurʾân ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 1998), 10-20.

former Ottoman *sheikh al-Islām* and a furious exiled dissident of the Republic, published a book in Egypt titled *Mas'alat tarjamat al-Qur'ān*, which adopted a position against translation. After Akif resigned, Hamdi Yazır prepared a Turkish translation of the Qur'ān and a *tafsīr*, which were published together in 1938, the same year that Atatürk passed away, under the title *Hak Dini Kur'ān Dili*.

After 1928, when the alphabet was changed from Arabic to Latin, *Tibyān* and *Mawākib* remained out of print because of their Arabic letters. This was a de facto ban on two books. When they were romanized and published in the 1950s, other translations and *tafsīr* books were in circulation. Due to their out-of-date styles and languages, they have lost their popularity to the point that, in today's Turkey, neither *Tibyān* nor *Mawākib* is well-known to the general public, among the many contemporary Qur'ān translations.

Conclusion

There is no attestation of any request or attempt to translate the whole Qur'ān into another language during the early centuries of Islam. The belief in the Qur'ān's *i'jāz*, which stated that nothing can be produced like it in Arabic, led the theological discourse to suggest that translating it into other languages was also impossible. The reasons given by scholars for rejecting this endeavor make a long list.

Leaving aside Abū Ḥanifah's controversial and still in many ways mysterious view that translations of the Qur'ānic verses can be recited in worship, the entire translation of the Qur'ān was met with resistance by Islamic law and theology for centuries before modernity. However, scholars found two intermediate formulas for those who want to access the meaning of the Qur'ān. First, in approximately the eleventh century, interlinear translations of the Qur'ān were prepared for Persian readers. These translations later extended to Turkish and numerous other languages. These books, commonly referred to as *tarjamah*, cannot be considered typical translations. Rather, they serve as study books for readers with some Arabic knowledge, enabling them to relate to the Quran. The second intermediate solution entails the adaptation of short *Tafsir* translations from Arabic and Persian into the target language, functioning as Qur'ānic translations.

Two of the most well-known works in this transitional genre among Ottoman readers are *Tibyān* and *Mawākib*. Some may still view these

volumes as exegetical works. However, because they include an “embedded translation” of the Qurʾān, they could also be viewed as Qurʾān translations that were intentionally designed to overcome the theological limitations of their era. These transitional genres made way for contemporary translations of the Qurʾān in the following century. The Qurʾānic text has been a topic of discussion during this entire process from various perspectives, including Islamic law, theology, politics, national and cultural identity, nationalism, and secularism.

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RELIGION PARADIGM OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have recently been applied in many fields. In many sectors, such as medicine, transportation, automotive, education, construction, furniture, and e-commerce, robotic experiments with AI are being carried out. These new developments in AI robot technologies, such as autonomous driving vehicles, robotic surgeries, smart education, home, and transportation, indicate that the need for a human labor force will be greatly reduced in the future. The issue of how AI robots, which are developed instead of humans in many jobs and processes to facilitate individual and social life, will continue to evolve and spur many discussions. Among these debates, our study focuses on the religious paradigm of AI. This study aims to understand, make sense of, and analyze the problem of the AI religion paradigm. In this context, various dimensions, such as AI's conception of God, its religious foundations, how it shapes religious

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life, and whether it has an apocalyptic background that could bring about the end of humanity, are examined. In addition, the study discusses whether AI will bring good or evil to humanity in the religious dimension, what it promises or contains in the religious sense, and its opportunities, risks, or threats. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the gap in the relevant literature on the paradigms of AI and religion. In this respect, the originality of the study and its contribution to the literature is important. This study adopts a qualitative method and in-depth analysis of documents as a task.

Key Words: Sociology of religion, artificial intelligence, religion, society, technology

Introduction

Technological developments are increasing in their impact and intensity every day. There is almost no area where technology or digitalization has not touched. In the 21st century, AI technologies and robots, which are frequently discussed, serve as a bridge between the age of technology and humanity. The structure, functions, and capability of the human brain, which has incredible equipment and unique features, has been a source of inspiration with its emergence. The unique and marvelous design of the human brain, together with the rapid development of technology, has led us to question the possibilities of AI. In this context, the desire to access a similar copy of the human brain with AI technologies has started to be voiced, especially in the Western world. With the integration of technologies such as ChatGPT, this desire has made significant progress in terms of maneuverability. Indeed, ChatGPT technology plays a functional and pioneering role in certain areas with features such as chatting, facilitating individual and social life, taking part in robotic surgery operations in medicine, autonomous driving in automotive parts manufacturing and assembly, learning different languages in education, deep learning, and rapid analysis. However, AI is positioned as an entity rivaling humans in terms of capability and hardware in the future. For this reason, it is necessary to consider AI in a multidimensional way without fitting it into a “box” of only a few functions and equipment. At this point, the questions of where AI will

evolve in the future and what it can and cannot do are of vital importance.

Today, AI technologies are encountered in many individual and social fields, such as medicine, education, transportation, media, industry, e-commerce, furniture, and construction. However, the religious dimension of AI is at the center of intellectual and academic debates. Within the framework of the religious dimension of AI, research and analysis of its theological foundations, relationship with God, and possible equipment/structure in terms of spirituality, worship, and belief are essential. The religious dimension of AI has been sufficiently researched at either the global or the national scale. Research, discussions, and analyses on AI and religion have recently attracted attention. The increasing number of academic publications on this subject indicates a growing interest in exploring the complex relationship between AI and religion. In this context, there has been a significant growing interest in the study of religion on a global scale in recent years. A search using the Scopus database in 2023 identified 287 articles titled “AI and religion” from 1988 to 2022.¹ However, the number of articles is insufficient when we look at religious studies on AI, especially in Turkey.² This shows a significant gap in the literature for studies on the religious dimension of AI.

The development of AI and its relationship with religion can be considered parallel to the development of science and technology with religion. Therefore, expanding the academic literature on the dynamic relationship between AI and religion is essential. In the literature, it is clear that there is a need for this, especially in the sociology of religion studies. There is an increasing number of AI studies in social fields at

¹ See Yuli Andriansyah, “The Current Rise of Artificial Intelligence and Religious Studies: Some Reflections Based on ChatGPT”, *Millab: Journal of Religious Studies* 22/1 (February 2023), xi-xii.

² See DergiPark Akademik (DP) (accessed September 2, 2023). One of the most important contributions to the studies on artificial intelligence and religion in Turkey is the “Workshop on Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, and Religion” held by Atatürk University Faculty of Theology in 2021 and the “International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, Posthumanism, and Religion” organized by the same University and Faculty in 2021. The papers presented at the workshop were published as a book titled “Artificial Intelligence, Transhumanism, and Religion” by the Publications of the Presidency of Religious Affairs, and the papers presented at the symposium were published as an e-book by Atatürk University Publications. Nearly 50 papers were presented and published in both meetings.

both national and global scales. Considering the sociological dimension, this makes it necessary to discuss and make sense of AI from a multidimensional perspective. In this sense, the claim that AI will encompass social fields, especially religion, in the future constitutes the focal point of an important discussion, especially in the field of sociology of religion. This study, which addresses the religion paradigm of AI using a qualitative approach involving an in-depth analysis of documents, hopes to make a modest contribution to the relevant literature by attempting to understand, make sense of, and examine this focal point. In this context, this study, which focuses on the religion paradigm of AI, includes some discussions on the observed religious perspective of AI, how it affects social areas, what kind of changes it can lead to in religious life, and what kind of religious and sociological opportunities, risks, and threats it poses.

1. Religious/Theological Origins of Artificial Intelligence

AI emerged as a specialized field of research in the mid-20th century with the digital transformation of computers.³ In the following period, AI and robotics gained ground in the West under the influence of names such as Australian Hans Moravec and American Ray Kurzweil. Moravec and Kurzweil's works⁴ have been influential in changing the West's cultural perception of AI technologies. Popular science books written by these scientists are based on religious foundations that advance Judeo-Christian (apocalyptic) beliefs, such as the resurrection of the dead and the attainment of eternal salvation through freedom from earthly obstacles or constraints.⁵ Early Judeo-Christian apocalyptic belief was characterized by three main factors: "the

³ For a historical overview of AI, see George M. Coghill, "Artificial Intelligence (and Christianity): Who? What? Where? When? Why? and How?", *Studies in Christian Ethics* 36/3 (May 2023), 604-619.

⁴ See Ray Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human Intelligence* (New York: Viking, 1999); id., "The Coming Merging of Mind and Machine", *Scientific American* (accessed September 3, 2023); id., *The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology* (New York: Viking, 2005); id., "Expect Exponential Progress", *The Christian Science Monitor* (accessed September 3, 2023); Hans Moravec, "Today's Computers, Intelligent Machines and Our Future", *Analog* 99/2 (February 1979), 59-84; id., *Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988); id., *Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

⁵ Robert M. Geraci, "The Popular Appeal of Apocalyptic AI", *Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science* 45/4 (December 2010), 1003-1004.

transformation of human beings so that they can live in this world in purified bodies, the desire to build a new heavenly world, and alienation within the World”.⁶ According to this belief, the AI-oriented technological revolution that arises with the uploading of human minds into machines will inevitably take place. Due to this revolution, robots with superior intelligence will take over the universe and build a world in which they will live forever. In the formation of the perception of apocalyptic Judeo-Christian beliefs about AI (whether rational or not), it is crucial to foster public opinion and at least keep it on the agenda by ensuring that it is discussed. The construction and direction of public discourse, social perspective, and even expert opinions on AI are also shaped within the framework of this perception.

In the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic-based theological perspective, it is argued that AI corresponds to “a spiritual quest”⁷ and “the need for a new religion”.⁸ Analyses and interpretations of Judeo-Christian apocalyptic theologies can be read as an effort to fit into a perceptual perspective that seeks to establish and enhance the legitimacy ground of the fictionally designed AI. This can be seen as another way to strengthen the religion-science relationship because of the sacred position assigned to AI. On the other hand, the association of AI with apocalyptic theology on religious grounds in popular science books reveals the power of religion over technology.⁹ At this point, AI, which is built on an apocalyptic theology and constructed/designed with religious background perspectives, is presented as a utopia of salvation for humanity and marketed as a tool that advocates the discourse/approach of “perfection”, “immortality”, and “resurrection of the dead”. In this sense, it is understood that AI follows a parallel course with transhumanist approaches as well as its apocalyptic origin.

⁶ Robert M. Geraci, “Apocalyptic AI: Religion and the Promise of Artificial Intelligence”, *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 76/1 (March 2008), 138.

⁷ Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines*, 185.

⁸ Kurzweil, *The Singularity is Near*, 374; see also Hugo de Garis, *The Artilect War: Cosmists vs. Terrans: A Bitter Controversy Considering Whether Humanity Should Build Godlike Massively Intelligent Machines* (Palm Springs, California: ETC Publications, 2005), 1004-1005.

⁹ Geraci, “The Popular Appeal of Apocalyptic AI”, 1004.

AI can be positioned as a counterpart to traditional Japanese religious beliefs as an alternative to the Judeo-Christian apocalyptic foundation. In particular, the presence of the technological ideas of Buddhist and Shinto beliefs in public perception and the existence of popular science books on AI and robotic technologies reveal this relationship. The animist belief of “kami”, which corresponds to an important spiritual power in the Shinto faith and refers to worshipped spirits (gods) distributed through nature and supernatural beings, has had an impact on the development and use of robotic technologies in Japan.¹⁰ According to this animist belief, it is natural for robots to have a (spiritual) spirit or power, just like anything else in nature. Therefore, in Japan, a robot with AI can be seen as a friend or partner rather than a machine made of metal.¹¹ In this respect, traditional Japanese religions allow for “technological sacraments”.¹² The Japanese press often emphasizes that AI robots have the potential to become Buddhas, and for some Buddhists, AI robots are part of Buddhism’s cosmic history of salvation.¹³ Buddhism also believes humans are created from an immaterial entity called “citta”, the “mind”.¹⁴ The sanctity that Buddhists ascribe to AI is directly related to the meaning they attribute to the conception of God (i.e., the mind).

The sacred status that people ascribe to AI robots or machines (i.e., machine deification) is based on a sense of awe mixed with fear of the (mysterious savior) representations portrayed in science fiction books and movies.¹⁵ This has been interpreted as reflecting German

¹⁰ Geraci, “The Popular Appeal of Apocalyptic AI”, 1007-1008.

¹¹ Timothy N. Hornyak, *Loving the Machine: The Art and Science of Japanese Robots* (New York: Kodansha International, 2006), 132.

¹² For technological sanctities in different regions in Japan, see Ian Reader - George J. Tanabe, *Practically Religious: Worldly Benefits and the Common Religion of Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991), 46; see also Robert M. Geraci, “Spiritual Robots: Religion and Our Scientific View of the Natural World”, *Theology and Science* 4/3 (November 2006), 235-240.

¹³ Masahiro Mori, *The Buddha in the Robot: A Robot Engineer’s Thoughts on Science and Religion*, trans. Charles S. Terry (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Co., 1981), 13.

¹⁴ Somparn Promta - Kenneth Einar Himma, “Artificial Intelligence in Buddhist Perspective”, *Journal of Information, Communication and Ethics in Society* 6/2 (June 2008), 176.

¹⁵ Anne Foerst, “Cog, a Humanoid Robot, and the Question of the Image of God”, *Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science* 33/1 (March 1998), 91-111.

theologian Rudolf Otto's definition¹⁶ of the human encounter with the divine.¹⁷ Despite the limited empirical data, the human relationship with AI robots or machines can be seen as the human experience of the divine.¹⁸ It can be inferred, then, that there is considerable similarity between the theology on which science fiction books and movies are based or associated and the religious origins of AI.

2. Artificial Intelligence Paradigm of Religion

In the 21st century, significant progress has been made in the development of AI-oriented technologies. ChatGPT achieved an impressive milestone of 100 million monthly active users shortly after its launch, making it the fastest-growing consumer application to date.¹⁹ Experts estimate that 50% of businesses will be significantly impacted in the next five years as ChatGPT is integrated into technologies. As it continues to be developed in this context, AI is potentially promising in many social fields, especially in the field of medicine.²⁰ However, it remains unclear how AI will proceed in the dimension of religion.

When AI or robots with AI are designed, the software is first loaded with a background perspective based on purely mechanical work and operations. At the current stage, in addition to a fully autonomous or semi-autonomous structure independent of humans, a mental process capacity that exceeds the limits of human intelligence is also expected from AI. However, human intellectual capacity has not changed for centuries. Therefore, what (exactly) does AI aim or attempt to do? Is it only the capacity of human beings to transcend themselves? Or is it for man to create his god? Or is it the desire to reduce and ultimately end the human need for God? When the transcendent dimension of the human being is erased by AI, or when this dimension is not considered

¹⁶ For Otto, religion is the experience of the sacred. The sacred can be expressed in terms of *mysterium tremendum* and *mysterium fascinans*. Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, trans. John W. Harvey (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 50-65.

¹⁷ Robert M. Geraci, "Robot and the Sacred in Science and Science Fiction: Theological Implications of Artificial Intelligence", *Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science* 42/4 (December 2007), 961-962.

¹⁸ See Foerst, "Cog, a Humanoid Robot, and the Question of the Image of God", 91-111; id., *God in the Machine: What Robots Teach Us about Humanity and God* (New York: Dutton, 2004), 47.

¹⁹ Andriansyah, "The Current Rise of Artificial Intelligence and Religious Studies", ix.

²⁰ Andriansyah, "The Current Rise of Artificial Intelligence and Religious Studies", ix.

in the integration, the possibility and difficulty of the purely mechanical cyborg human being to survive in its new format gives rise to a few debates. These debates include whether the idea of cloning (copying) or coding human beings is compatible with reality, whether it is possible to transition from *Homo sapiens* to *Homo Deus* with the help of technology, whether human beings will transcend everything as intended if this happens, whether it is possible to prevent aging and death, which are seen as barriers to human transcendence, and to what extent these thoughts affect the view of God's ability to create. AI and the dimension of religion are among the important topics of intellectual and academic discussions, especially in the recent period.

According to Soysal, transhumanism's policy of human reproduction is inconsistent. The transhumanist approach underestimates the consequences of reproduction for women, such as pregnancy, childbirth, and child-rearing, which are seen as sources of pain at every stage. In addition, it prioritizes the development of adults in the quest for immortality and, therefore, ignores the production of new life. On the other hand, the movement utilizes new reproductive technologies to develop human beings, thus promising and ensuring unlimited individual reproductive freedom in various contexts.²¹

According to Dağ, on the one hand, the development of the limits of the concepts of freedom with artificial intelligence, digitalization, and robotics (AIDR) has increased; on the other hand, it has created the problem of violation of personal rights, such as privacy, confidentiality, and security, which are the most basic concepts of humans and society. When the Metaverse, i.e., the Web 3.0 process, is added to this phenomenon, the concept of freedom will develop further by transcending time and space. Nevertheless, violations of personal rights, more opportunities to commit crimes, and new types of crimes will emerge. The further development and increased visibility of AIDR require the ancient issue of freedom to be reconsidered in the context of "freedom and responsibility".²²

²¹ Esra Kartal Soysal, "The Production of Human Reproduction: Impacts of Transhumanism's Inconsistent Reproductive Policy on Classical Ethical Principles", *İlahiyat Studies* 14/1 (July 2023), 9-11.

²² Ahmet Dağ, "Freedom as an Issue in the Context of Transhumanism and Artificial Intelligence, Digitalization, and Robotics (AIDR)", *İlahiyat Studies* 14/1 (July 2023), 51-52.

According to Can, transhumanism sets the goal of reaching the transhuman stage first and then the posthuman stage, which represents the maximum cognitive, emotional, and psychological empowerment of human beings. At this point, this movement, which is accepted as a continuation of humanism, is criticized within the framework of Islam's understanding of human beings as an object in achieving this goal, despite its goal of developing human beings physically, cognitively, and emotionally.²³ In this sense, revising transhumanist goals and harmonizing them with the principles of Society 5.0 will be more than necessary, as neglecting the spiritual welfare of society may negatively affect the achievement of the desired goals and trigger social crises.²⁴ In fact, one of the most fundamental factors that make human beings understand and give them meaning is spiritual and cultural codes.

Doko argues that a Muslim who accepts classical theism should be open to the possibility of an AI with real mental states.²⁵ Accordingly, the development of triune AI would not be surprising from an Islamic perspective, and its creation may even provide confirmatory evidence for classical theism. This provides a philosophical basis for the existence of conscious and intelligent machines and their potential compatibility with Islamic beliefs.

According to Yılmaz, in the face of posthumanism, transhumanism, and new materialism, now is the most critical time to protect human beings and the values of humanity. However, if this is not realized, then people may lose their most precious memories and personal self-consciousness, their comprehension may be manipulated, their perceptions may change, they may not know who they are or what they want while they are alive, humanity may be destroyed with a single click of a button with the desire for immortality; furthermore, it may be easier to believe that God does not exist at all, despair,

²³ Seyithan Can, "Critique of Transhumanism's Concept of Humans from the Perspective of Islamic Thought", *Ilabiyat Studies* 14/1 (July 2023), 107-108.

²⁴ Abdulkadir Büyükbıngöl - Taylan Maral, "A Criticism of Transhumanism from the Society 5.0 Perspective in the Context of Social Values", *Ilabiyat Studies* 14/1 (July 2023), 170.

²⁵ Enis Doko, "Islamic Classical Theism and the Prospect of Strong Artificial Intelligence", *Ilabiyat Studies* 14/1 (July 2023), 85-86.

rebellion, and chaos may arise in a world where “cyborgs people”²⁶ exist, and thus death may be the only way out.²⁷

Regarding the physical and psychological capacities of robots developed with high technology through GPT-3 and GPT-4 software languages such as Ameca, Mika, Sophia, and Marbot with AI with the latest technological developments, humanity faces many religious, sociological, psychological, philosophical, and biological problems.

The intersection or dimension of religion and science in general and AI technologies and religion, in particular, seems to have gained vital importance in the modern era. For this reason, AI technologies and religion are among the important issues emphasized/discussed by philosophers, theologians, and scientists, especially in recent years. Indeed, religion has a strong role in the formation of scientific theories.²⁸ Therefore, the scientific basis, aspects, and dimensions of AI cannot be considered independent of religion. There is necessarily a human factor at the intersection of AI and religion. In this sense, just as there cannot be an individual or society independent of religion or belief, it does not seem possible to think of AI, one of the most important discoveries that concerns humanity, as completely independent of religion. Moreover, it has already been stated that apocalyptic Judeo-Christian beliefs are effective in the religious foundations of AI. However, the conception of religion, the individual, and society of a technology that is integrated with digital structures and software such as AI and the Metaverse is not only utopian but also dominated by secular, materialist, and positivist ideologies.²⁹

The Judeo-Christian utopia of salvation “shares the basic understanding that God intends to soon eliminate or defeat the evil forces that cause good people to suffer. This will end with God establishing a new transcendent kingdom purged of all evil, and humans, tainted by sin, will receive glorified angelic bodies to live in

²⁶ Muhammed Yamaç, “Transhümanizm Bağlamında Siborgist İnsan Tasavvuru ve Din”, *Yapay Zekâ, Transhümanizm, Posthümanizm ve Din Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildiri Özet ve Tam Metin Kitabı*, ed. Muhammed Kızılgeçit et al. (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2021), 210-229.

²⁷ Sait Yılmaz, “The New Materialism and Post-Humanist Studies”, *İlahiyat Studies* 14/1 (July 2023), 226-228.

²⁸ Geraci, “Spiritual Robots”, 229.

²⁹ For manifestations of the Metaverse in religion and society see Muhammed Yamaç, “Metaverse’te Dinî ve Toplumsal Tezahürler”, *Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* 23/1 (March 2023), 29-57.

this kingdom for eternity. Such changes in the world are predestined as part of God's divine plan".³⁰ This theological understanding reduces the future of humanity to Judeo-Christian apocalypticism and argues that it will follow an entirely parallel course. In this context, Yeşilyurt questions the possibility of reconciling the *Imago Dei* doctrine of Christianity with transhumanism and states that this will not be possible based on the data. Accordingly, it is understood that there is a fundamental incompatibility between Christianity, which sees man as a mortal being created in the image and likeness of God, and transhumanism, which does not see creation and mortality, illness, old age, and similar conditions that this creation brings about in man as the unchangeable destiny of man.³¹

Moravec and Kurzweil argued that human beings are slow to learn and quick to forget but that they will soon become freer and more independent by overcoming the bodily limitations that alienate them through technologies such as AI and that a new technological evolution will lead to the establishment of a cyber world surrounded by highly equipped AI robots.³² Accordingly, AI robots will be freed from bodily limitations and become more independent in a superhuman position. However, there is a large gap as to how human beings will change spiritually and religiously. Thus, the issue of how AI robots will establish a relationship with God cannot be made sense of, and the transcendental dimension of the cyborg man remains unclear. The religious paradigm of AI technologies, grounded in apocalyptic understanding, is based on a dualistic belief based on the distinction between the (valuable) mind and the (hindering) body. According to this understanding, it is thought that the human body limits learning both physically and in terms of memory; therefore, the dissolution of the human mind from its usual patterns and the transformation of "protein-based" bodies into immortal machines is a requirement of inevitable technological progress. In this way, by transferring the human mind to AI technologies, the body will be able

³⁰ Geraci, "The Popular Appeal of Apocalyptic AI", 1005.

³¹ Muhammet Yeşilyurt, "Hıristiyanlığın 'Imago Dei' Öğretisinin Transhümanizmle Uzlaştırılmasının İmkânı", *İnsan ve Toplum Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi* 9/5 (December 2020), 3645.

³² See Geraci, "Apocalyptic AI", 138-166; id., *Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven in Robotics, Artificial Intelligence and Virtual Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 87.

to learn everything that it wants to learn easily and instantaneously, and thanks to its “replicability”, it will be able to resolve the alienation arising from the dualism it is in by achieving immortality. Within this framework of understanding, a techno-mechanical conception of life is advocated in which virtual bodies (which can change according to the situation and function) will be sufficient instead of a physical body.³³ Thus, the promise of perfection and the alluring vision of an unlimited life in the future, such as immortality, keeps the apocalyptic belief utopian and dynamic. However, the proponents of this belief fail to consider that the environment that will be created in the future with the proliferation of AI robots in all areas of life points to a possible conflict between humans and robots. Since the unpredictable religious dimension of the transcendent human being is not included in this intricate utopian belief construct or is not seen as an area worth considering, transcendence is not considered a need within the boundaries of the AI apocalyptic imagination.

The claim or perception that AI robots correspond to something sacred, as in Western-indexed science fiction books or movies, offers insight into how religion is understood or portrayed in the modern era. In this framework, there is a significant correlation between AI technologies and the Western perception or perspective of sacredness.³⁴ In this sense, the relationship or intersection of AI technologies and religion is understood to be reduced to a utopian world perception in the West. When we go to the source of this concern, it is seen that the door is opened to a graver theological error. Foerst’s claim³⁵ that man created the AI robot as God created man is logically a striking example of this theological fallacy. According to Geraci, this theological logic leads to the analogy that “man is to God what AI is to man”.³⁶ In theological terms, this logic implies a situation that is completely outside the learned or known logical patterns in the God-human relationship, namely, the deification of man. In a sense, this analogy is also a manifestation of a virtual kingdom. This virtual kingdom, which is reduced to the digital, rejects traditional religion, on

³³ See Kurzweil, *The Age of Spiritual Machines*, 142.

³⁴ Geraci, “Robot and the Sacred in Science and Science Fiction”, 977.

³⁵ See Foerst, “Cog, a Humanoid Robot, and the Question of the Image of God”, 91-111.

³⁶ Geraci, “Robot and the Sacred in Science and Science Fiction”, 977.

the one hand, and the traditional human model, on the other hand, favors the purely mechanical life of a body that is emptied of emotions and thus liberated.³⁷ Indeed, this idea was expressed in Christian theology in the 20th century with the concept of a “created co-creator”, and it has been made to play a highly functional role in the establishment of the religion-technology relationship through the Christian *Imago Dei* doctrine as an intermediary.³⁸ When we look at the relevant literature, there are different approaches to AI technologies, which are expressed as dystopia and digitopia, corresponding with positive or negative interpretations.³⁹ Reed states that AI experiments can contribute to the religious field by helping develop new understandings of religious beliefs, texts, or practices.⁴⁰ Singler, on the other hand, argues that the discourse that AI refers to a field that is not generally perceived as religious and is considered rational, secular, and modern is blind but rather a strong indicator of new manifestations of religion.⁴¹ In this sense, it is argued that AI has the potential to provide impetus to new religious movements (as in the case of the Turing Church).⁴² In this framework, Singler’s field study found that AI fits into the “God field” in new religious movements and transhumanist imagination.⁴³ Geraci, on the other hand, argues that AI can play the same role as a singular theistic God in Christian apocalyptic visions.⁴⁴ At this point, AI is understood to express a hopeful recycling of eschatological narratives. In addition, within the scope of religious transhumanist movements, Yeşilyurt’s research on Christian

³⁷ Geraci, “Apocalyptic AI”, 160.

³⁸ Yeşilyurt, “Hıristiyanlığın ‘Imago Dei’ Öğretisinin Transhümanizmle Uzlaştırılmasının İmkânı”, 3629-3631.

³⁹ Ali Kemal Acar, “Din ve Teknoloji Etkileşiminde Yapay Zeka ve Transhümanizm’e Yaklaşımlar”, *Pamukkale Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 10/1 (June 2023), 399.

⁴⁰ Randall Reed, “A.I. in Religion, A.I. for Religion, A.I. and Religion: Towards a Theory of Religious Studies and Artificial Intelligence”, *Religions* 12/6 (May 2021), 12.

⁴¹ Beth Singler, “The AI Creation Meme: A Case Study of the New Visibility of Religion in Artificial Intelligence Discourse”, *Religions* 11/5 (May 2020), 15.

⁴² The Church of Turing, a transhumanist new religious movement, deifies AI from a scientific perspective and argues that gods can only be found through technology. For more detailed information please see Beth Singler, “‘Blessed by the Algorithm’: Theistic Conceptions of Artificial Intelligence in Online Discourse”, *AI and Society* 35/4 (April 2020), 952-954.

⁴³ Singler, “Blessed by the Algorithm”, 954.

⁴⁴ See Geraci, “Apocalyptic AI”.

transhumanism as an example of new approaches emerged from the interaction of religion-technology titled “Christian Transhumanism: A New Techno-Eschatological Interpretation of Christianity” and “Terasem Trans-Religion as an Example of Religious Transhumanism”. In the first research in question, it was concluded that Christian transhumanism’s attitude toward the religion-technology relationship, which is gradually turning into a theological problem for religions, is in favor of both the “religiousization of technology” and the “technologization of religion”, thus preferring the compromise option.⁴⁵ Second, the Terasem Trans-Religion Movement, which was established as a religious movement, presents the trans-human (transcendental human) to be achieved through transhumanism as a transcendental religion that is reconciliatory and inclusive with all religions.⁴⁶

According to Kafalı, AI, although it is based on Christian apocalypticism, has revealed a technology-based religion developed to reach God.⁴⁷ According to him, some changes in social life can be realized with the development of AI technologies. In this context, AI can trigger possible positive or negative changes in daily life practices focused on communication and interaction, reduce discriminatory behaviors between social classes, remedy global inequality and poverty, lessen gender inequality, prevent violence, reduce social deviations, and facilitate the provision of basic vital services but may lead to asociality, loss of common values, social disharmony, and not learning or accepting norms and values. On the other hand, it is predicted that AI may increase the need for religious environments that serve as a refuge for escape from mechanization. With this, there may be an increase in the quality and intensity of religious life, which may help the ideals of religion, affect the level and dimensions of religiosity, and lead to the formation of new sects, movements, and

⁴⁵ Muhammet Yeşilyurt, “Hıristiyan Transhümanizmi: Hıristiyanlığın Tekno-Eskatolojik Yeni Yorumu”, *Dinbilimleri Akademik Araştırma Dergisi* 21/2 (September 2021), 815-816.

⁴⁶ Büşra Yeşilyurt - Muhammet Yeşilyurt, “Dini Transhümanizmin Bir Örneği Olarak Terasem Trans-Dini”, *Mîzânü'l-Hak: İslami İlimler Dergisi* 15 (December 2022), 555.

⁴⁷ Hasan Kafalı, “Yapay Zekâ, Toplum ve Dinin Geleceği”, *Ondokuz Mayıs Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 46 (June 2019), 145-172.

congregations.⁴⁸ According to Dağ, AI is a technological system with transhumanist tendencies and promises immortality.⁴⁹ According to Berk, deepfake videos designed using AI are a very powerful manipulation tool that is positioned as a new danger in the digital age.⁵⁰

According to Dorobantu, as a theological hope for the future, if AI achieves human intelligence, then it could help expand the understanding of divine revelation by providing a completely new perspective on some of the fundamental principles of religion.⁵¹ According to a study addressing the problem of granting moral and legal status to AI in terms of Islamic morality and law, a human being who is legally competent and liable and morally a voluntary and responsible person due to his soul and consciousness cannot be considered at the same level as a robot devoid of all these.⁵² For AI to be supported for the benefit of humanity, the basic criterion that it should not cause any harm in individual, social, or environmental terms has been adopted. However, AI cannot be handled independently of morality, values, and law since it is not the technology itself but its possible consequences that can be evaluated as good or bad.

Byung-Chul Han stated that AI is a calculative tool that can learn but cannot experience.⁵³ Based on Han's inference, it is understood that even if AI has epistemologically religious thought and content, it does not/will not have any developmental mechanism for religious experience or practice. This leads to a discussion of how AI will encompass the transcendent dimension of human beings. In this case, AI's claim to reach and even surpass human mental, religious, and

⁴⁸ Kafalı, "Yapay Zekâ, Toplum ve Dinin Geleceği", 161-168.

⁴⁹ Ahmet Dağ, "Dijitalleşme-Yapay Zekâ-Transhümanizm Bağlamında Din ve Dindar'a Dair", *Yapay Zeka Transhümanizm ve Din*, ed. Muhammed Kızılgeçit et al. (Erzurum: Atatürk Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2022), 175-185.

⁵⁰ Mustafa Evren Berk, "Dijital Çağın Yeni Tehlikesi Deepfake", *OPUS Uluslararası Toplum Araştırmaları Dergisi* 16/28 (August 2020), 1508-1523.

⁵¹ Marius Dorobantu, "Artificial Intelligence and Religion: Recent Advances and Future Directions", *Zygon: Journal of Religion & Science* 57/4 (December 2022), 987.

⁵² See Ülfet Görgülü - Sena Kesgin, "Yapay Zekâ Robotlara Ahlâkî ve Hukukî Statü Tanınması Problematığı – İslam Ahlâkî ve Hukuku Açısından Bir Değerlendirme", *Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 20 (December 2021), 37-65.

⁵³ Byung-Chul Han, *The Palliative Society*, trans. Daniel Steuer (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021), 45-55.

spiritual capacity does not seem possible, at least in the current context. Thus, AI robots, which are designed as alternatives to human beings, harbor a great gap, risk, and threat in terms of religion in terms of their current structure and limited capacity. In addition, biomechanical human beings designed with AI technologies face the danger of being commoditized and detached from its meaning and purpose.

In the context of Western dualistic and apocalyptic beliefs, the religious paradigm of AI reflects the impact of transhumanist, secular, and materialist ideologies. Nonetheless, Islam asserts that the human intellect is a sacred endowment, rendering AI incapable of exceeding human capabilities.⁵⁴ According to Çevik, the fundamental difference between humans and robots is not developmental or evolutionary but ontological: since robots do not have free will, they cannot believe in or deny God.⁵⁵ One of the points neglected by those interested in AI technologies is that they approach the soul, mind, and consciousness from a purely materialist perspective and reduce them to algorithms and mathematical software, seeing them as mere skulls and brains, bypassing the divine.⁵⁶ In this sense, human beings are separated from the purpose of their existence and their souls. They are aimed at being reduced to unlimited and infinite pleasure in a commoditized world, away from the sense of psychological and physical pain. The reproduced cyborg causes the human being to be displayed in the network of meta-indices built with algorithmic perceptions in the triangle of pleasure, image, and consumption.

Conclusion

Emerging from the mid-20th century as a specialized research field, AI has entered a rapid development course with the technological developments of the 21st century. In this process, especially because of the integration of the GPT-3 and GPT-4 software languages into AI, the

⁵⁴ Mahmoud Dhaouadi, "An Exploration into the Nature of the Making of Human and Artificial Intelligence and the Qur'anic Persepctive", *American Journal of Islam and Society* 9/4 (January 1992), 465. Artificial Intelligence and the Qur'anic Persepctive makalenin oriinalinde ve sayfasında yazım bu hatalı şekliyle

⁵⁵ Mustafa Çevik, "Will It Be Possible for Artificial Intelligence Robots to Acquire Free Will and Believe in God?", *Beytulbikme* 7/2 (December 2017), 86.

⁵⁶ Samet Yahya Bal - Berat Sankaya, "Kelami Açıdan İnsan Fıtratı ve Bilinci Bağlamında Yapay Zekâ ve Transhümanizm", *Mavi Atlas* 10/2 (October 2022), 417.

(relative) improvements in physical and psychological capacity have opened the door to discussions on many religious, sociological, psychological, philosophical, and biological dimensions of AI. While man, who is still an enigma in many aspects, has not been able to fully analyze or comprehend himself, his goal and desire to bring AI, which is quite primitive compared with him, to his standard is quite thought-provoking and problematic. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether human beings will be able to design a corresponding and better equipped one even after they have fully resolved themselves. Even if he can, the discussion of whether this being can be God in the theological context corresponds to a different problem. There is no doubt that evaluating the results or outputs of AI, especially the paradigm of religion, in a collapsed way would be more consistent. First, although the type of relationship that AI establishes with the individual, society, and God is somewhat similar to that of human beings, it is clearly not the same, at least in the current context. From this point of view, the religious paradigm of AI is a critical issue.

Looking at the religious or theological basis of AI, the influence of Western theology is visible. At this point, it can be said that Judeo-Christian apocalyptic and eschatological understandings or strategies have played a leading role in the development of AI technologies. Christian theology's expectations of cosmic purpose and the hope of salvation through supernatural mechanics and the virtual body or mind play a functional role in keeping Western researchers' interest in AI technologies dynamic. In this sense, AI, which draws an appearance based on an apocalyptic religious foundation, is the inheritor of apocalyptic and eschatological religious promises. In this respect, AI is understood as a refuge for the integration of religion and science in the future or a desire for the need to integrate the two. However, debates will continue on many different issues, such as the form and level of relationship that AI robots establish with humans, the direction in which the struggle between value judgments such as good and evil evolves within the framework of apocalyptic dualistic understanding, and the metaphysical dimensions of purified AI beings. However, there is a need for a new perspective and paradigm in this field other than the apocalyptic and eschatological approach of the West. Hence, there is a great need for research based on scientific data that can

contribute to the field of AI, especially within the scope of religious sciences.

There is no doubt that AI technologies have the potential to affect almost every aspect of life. However, it is very difficult to predict the possible situations or changes in many areas of life, especially religion, which are put forward as predictions about AI technologies. It is against the nature of science and academia to put forward ideas that do not go beyond speculation on what kind of consequences a phenomenon or situation may have socially and religiously by the general principle that “sociology studies what is, not what should be”. In our opinion, the evaluations on AI and religion made thus far are largely not based on field research and data and are, in a sense, a projection of the historical journey.

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**LEGAL REASONING IN THE POSTCLASSICAL PERIOD:
ABŪ SA‘ĪD AL-KHĀDIMĪ’S (d. 1176/1762) JUSTIFICATION
REGARDING THE PROHIBITION OF SMOKING**

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Abstract

This article analyzes the manner of legal reasoning of the Ottoman scholar Abū Sa‘īd al-Khādimī (d. 1176/1762) in his two treatises on the prohibition of smoking (*Risālatān ‘an ḥazriyyat al-dukbān*) to determine the nature of the justification of a postclassical scholar relating to an individual juristic case. Since tobacco was introduced to the Muslim world in the 17th century, many jurists formed responses about smoking. Although some scholars such as ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nāblusī (d. 1143/1731) –especially when smoking later became a social issue– pronounced tobacco consumption as permissible, the majority considered it forbidden (*ḥarām*) or at least to be discouraged (*makrūb*). Al-Khādimī also expressed his opinion on this issue in two

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short treatises, which he wrote after discussion with some scholars in Damascus, who were most likely students of al-Nāblūsī. As the title of the epistles indicates, al-Khādimī considers smoking forbidden. However, the wording is softened, and his reasoning is intersubjective and balanced, making his answer nuanced and justified with many different methodical and legal arguments. This approach illustrates how al-Khādimī makes Islamic law responsive and relevant to a case of his time, which is still applicable to present contexts. As the treatise is only available in the manuscript or in an old collection that is difficult to access, I have attached the text in the original language to this article.

Key Words: Islamic law, legal norm of smoking, Abū Saʿīd al-Khādimī, legal reasoning

Introduction

When al-Khādimī wrote his treatises on the case of the legal norm of tobacco consumption, smoking was already popular and had become commonplace. As Grehan noted, tobacco use was a key factor in the breakdown of old moral barriers and contributed to the emergence of a distinctly early modern culture in which the pursuit of pleasure became increasingly public, routine, and uninhibited.¹

Since the early 17th century, smoking has been a prevalent issue in Muslim society and a subject among various disciplines, such as law and even poetry.² Smoking from this time onward also became a subject of social and political disputes in the Middle East and Ottoman Anatolia. As a result, some sultans even banned smoking by an edict. Aḥmed I (r. 1603-1617), for example, outlawed the tobacco trade. However, this political decision is said to have had little effect and was quickly forgotten. Approximately two decades later, when the riots over smoking were reignited by adherents of a strict interpretation of religion, namely, the Qāḍīzādahlīs, the policy under the reign of Murad IV (r. 1623-1640) took a harder line against tobacco consumption.

¹ James Grehan, "Smoking and 'Early Modern' Sociability: The Great Tobacco Debate in the Ottoman Middle East (Seventeenth to Eighteenth Centuries)", *The American Historical Review* 111/5 (December 2006), 1356.

² Simon Leese, "Connoisseurs of the Senses: Tobacco Smoking, Poetic Pleasures, and Homoerotic Masculinity in Ottoman Damascus", *The Senses and Society* 17/1 (February 2022), 91-106.

Smokers on public streets were severely punished by the vice squad, and therefore, few dared to smoke outside.³

In this tense discussion climate, it was unthinkable that the scholars would have remained silent. Many scholars responded in the form of dedicated treatises (*rasāʾil*) in which they expressed different positions on the harms of smoking or even its benefits as the basis for their normative decisions.

Rasāʾil are relatively short texts that address specific individual cases and are usually directed by scholars to scholars or to society. For Ayoub, the *Rasāʾil* enjoyed an enormously important role, especially among Ottoman scholars of the 16th-19th centuries, because on the one hand, it dealt with highly topical issues of the time, and on the other hand, it provided a platform for the actualization and adaptation of legal opinion.⁴

Many scholars have dealt with the subject and communicated their views in the form of treatises. The views expressed in the relevant treatises on the normative determination of smoking can be generally divided into three groups, namely, those that consider it permissible (*mubāḥ*), discouraged (*makrūḥ*), or prohibited (*ḥarām*). Although there were representatives for all three categories of norms, the number of those who considered smoking to be forbidden predominated.⁵

One of the very first treatises containing a positive statement was written by the Egyptian scholar ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ujhūrī (d. 1066/1656). In principle, al-Ujhūrī is against prohibiting smoking, in part because it is not intoxicating, as others would claim. However, he also recognized that under certain circumstances, the normative rule

³ Grehan, "Smoking and 'Early Modern' Sociability", 1363; Eugenia Kermeli, "The Tobacco Controversy in Early Modern Ottoman Christian and Muslim Discourse", *Hacettepe Üniversitesi Türkiyat Araştırmaları (HÜTAD)* 21/21 (December 2014), 129-130.

⁴ Samy Ayoub, "Creativity in Continuity: Legal Treatises (*al-Rasāʾil al-Fiqhiyya*) in Islamic Law", *Journal of Islamic Studies* 34/3 (September 2023), 1-3.

⁵ Aydemir, who examined a total of 12 treatises in his unpublished master's thesis, found that two of the respective authors argued against the ban on smoking and seven in favor of it. While one author abstained, the last two treatises dealt with other aspects of smoking or tobacco. See Bilal Aydemir, *Sigara ile İlgili Yazılmış Risâlelerin İslam Hukuku Açısından Değerlendirilmesi* (Kastamonu: Kastamonu University, Institute for Social Sciences, Master's Thesis, 2018), 16.

can be changed into a prohibition if, for example, an experienced physician deems it harmful to the individual patient.⁶

In the relevant section of his work, *Mizān al-ḥaqq fī ikhtiyār al-aḥaqq*, the Ottoman polymath Ḥājī Khalīfah (d. 1067/1657), also known as Kātib Chalabī, reflects on possible conclusions about how to think about smoking in terms of Islamic law. Known for his balanced and tolerant attitude, Ḥājī Khalīfah states that smoking cannot be banned definitively simply because it is widespread in society, even if it were legally possible. For him, such a ban would result in marking the many smokers as permanent sinners, which would be irresponsible. Even though he would prefer permissibility to outright prohibition, there is no question in his mind that smoking is a disliked act, especially for those who are addicted to the act, simply because it leaves an unpleasant odor on the body and clothing.⁷

The treatise on the permissibility of tobacco consumption by the Syrian scholar ‘Abd al-Ghanī al-Nāblusī (d. 1143/1731) is probably better known and more detailed. In *al-Ṣulḥ bayna l-ikhwān fī ḥukm ibāḥat al-dukbān*, he argues that tobacco consumption is generally permissible and supports this view with various arguments. At the very beginning of his treatise, he talks about the benefits of tobacco for the human body, such as its ability to remove phlegm or facilitate the digestion of heavy food.⁸ For al-Nāblusī, tobacco is not forbidden per se, but only for those who experience personal harm from smoking.⁹ However, this principle applies to all permitted actions, such as the ban on overeating, even though eating is permitted in itself.¹⁰ From an argumentative point of view, al-Nāblusī addresses the arguments of his opponents in dialectical form and tries to refute them with counterarguments. Notably, the range of his arguments is diverse and

⁶ Abū l-Irshād Nūr al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Ujhūrī, *Ghāyat al-bayān li-ḥill shurb mā lā yughayyib al-‘aql min al-dukbān*, “Ghāyat al-bayān li-ḥill shurb mā lā yughayyib al-‘aql min al-dukbān: dirāsah wa-taḥqīq”, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh Salmān, *Majallat al-Jāmi‘ah al-‘Irāqīyah* 3/42 (2018), 340-344.

⁷ Ḥājī Khalīfah Muṣṭafā ibn ‘Abd Allāh Kātib Chalabī, *Mizān al-ḥaqq fī ikhtiyār al-aḥaqq* (İstanbul: Taswīr-i Afkār Ghazatahkhānasi, 1280 AH), 33-45.

⁸ ‘Abd al-Ghanī ibn Ismā‘īl ibn ‘Abd al-Ghanī ibn Ismā‘īl al-Nāblusī, *al-Ṣulḥ bayna l-ikhwān fī ḥukm ibāḥat al-dukbān* (London: British Library, Nr. 19547), 1a-b.

⁹ Al-Nāblusī, *al-Ṣulḥ bayna l-ikhwān* (British Library Nr. 19547), 1b.

¹⁰ Al-Nāblusī, *al-Ṣulḥ bayna l-ikhwān* (British Library Nr. 19547), 7b.

extends from scientific matters to those on Islamic law from various schools of law.¹¹

Aḥmad al-Rūmī al-Āqḥiṣārī (d. 1041/1632) is an important scholar who was vehemently against smoking and wrote a relatively detailed treatise on the subject, in which he put forward a variety of arguments to support his opinion. In the introduction to *al-Risālah al-dukhāniyyah*, al-Āqḥiṣārī openly advocates for the prohibition of smoking. For him, actions resulting from human free will must have either worldly or afterlife-related benefits. Useless (*ʿabath*), frivolous (*labw*), and distracting (*laʿīb*) actions are forbidden and always abhorred in the Qurʾān. Moreover, the consensus among doctors is that smoking is harmful. The fact that it has sometimes been used as a remedy does not in any way support its general acceptance.¹² Like most treatises, al-Āqḥiṣārī's essay is mostly in dialogical form, typically presenting his arguments in response to the assertions of his opponents. For example, he counters the claim that no *ijtibād* can be made regarding the norm of smoking because there is no *mujtabid* by arguing that an *ijtibād* is always possible in individual cases either by analogical comparison or by extrapolation (*takbrīj*).¹³

Another scholar who classifies smoking as a forbidden act is Abū Saʿīd al-Khādīmī. As mentioned above, al-Khādīmī participated in the vital debate on the Islamic norm of smoking through two short treatises. Despite their brevity, they contain many arguments on the basis of which the author justifies his opinion on the subject. In the following, the arguments are discussed and analyzed to determine how the postclassical Ḥanafī scholar of the eighteenth century substantiates his view on an individual case in which the primary sources of the school of law are silent. Before doing so, it seems appropriate to give a brief overview of the intellectual biography of our scholar to contextualize his approach in the mentioned individual case in his legal thought.

¹¹ Al-Nāblusī, *al-Ṣulḥ bayna l-ikhwān* (British Library Nr. 19547), 42b-117a.

¹² Aḥmad al-Rūmī al-Āqḥiṣārī, “al-Risālah al-dukhāniyyah”, *Tūtün İçmek Haram mıdır? Bir Osmanlı Risalesi*, ed. with an introduction Yahya Michot, trans. Ayşen Anadol (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2015), 95-96.

¹³ Al-Āqḥiṣārī, “al-Risālah al-dukhāniyyah”, 86-87.

There are, of course, many recent treatises that, on the one hand, provide detailed information on discussions between scholars on the legal norm of tobacco consumption and, on the other hand, pursue a similar aim, namely, the legal argumentation of a particular scholar on the basis of a corresponding treatise on the aforementioned subject.¹⁴ However, I will merely refer to some of these works, as the primary aim of this article is to present and analyze the arguments regarding the norm of smoking in al-Khādīmī, and this topic has not yet been addressed. The list of classical treatises on the subject is also much longer.¹⁵ I have, however, limited myself above to two representatives of each of the three categories mentioned because I believe that this provides a sufficient basis for understanding the various positions on the legal norm of smoking among the scholars who preceded or were contemporaries of our author.

1. A Brief Overview of al-Khādīmī's Intellectual Biography and His Legal Thinking

Abū Sa'īd Muḥammad ibn Muṣṭafá ibn 'Uthmān al-Ḥusaynī al-Ḥanafī al-Khādīmī was a versatile provincial Ottoman scholar of the 18th century, a Ḥanafī jurist, mufti, teacher, and Sufi of the Naqshbandiyyah order. He first studied in Khādīm, a district of Konya Province, with his father, then traveled to Konya to study at the Karatay Madrasah with Ibrāhīm Efendī. After several years of study, on the recommendation of his teacher Ibrāhīm Efendī, he moved to Istanbul to complete his studies in Islamic science with Aḥmad al-Qāzābādī (d. 1163/1750).¹⁶

¹⁴ Here are some examples: Kaşif Hamdi Okur, "17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Fıkıhçılarının Nevazile Yönelik Fikhî Argümantasyonu (Mehmed Fikhî el-Aynî ve *Risâletü'd-Dubân ve'l-Kabve* Örneği)", *Sabn-ı Semân'dan Dârülfünûn'a Osmanlı'da İlim ve Fikir Dünyası: Âlimler, Müesseseler ve Fikrî Eserler - XVII. Yüzyıl*, ed. Hidayet Aydar - Ali Fikri Yavuz (İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Yayınları, 2017), 381-393; Taḥa Yasin Tan, "Osmanlı'da Afyon, Kahve ve Tütün Hakkında Bir Usul Tartışması: Câbîzâde Halil Fâiz Efendi ve *el-Kelimâtü'l-Usûliyye*'si", *İslam Araştırmaları Dergisi* 48 (2022), 111-146; Şükrü Özen, "Tütün", *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslâm Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: TDV Yayınları, 2012), 42/5-9; Said Nuri Akgündüz, "Osmanlı Mısır'ında Hanbelî Bir Âlim: Mer'î b. Yûsuf ve Duhân Risalesi", *İslam Hukuku Araştırmaları Dergisi* 40 (December 2022), 211-241.

¹⁵ See Aydemir, *Sigara ile İlgili Yazılmış Risâlelerin İslam Hukuku Açısından Değerlendirilmesi*, 16-62; Özen, "Tütün", 5-7.

¹⁶ Mehmet Önder, *Büyük Âlim Hz. Hadîmî (Hayatı ve Eserleri)* (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1969), 7; Yaşar Sarıkaya, *Abū Sa'īd Muḥammad al-Ḥādīmī (1701-*

In 1725, he returned home to spend the rest of his life there to teach in the madrasah he had built with his father.¹⁷ Except for two trips, he never left his hometown. One such trip was the pilgrimage he made in 1743, and the other was his second trip to Istanbul, to which he was invited by the Sultan (Mahmud I, r. 1730-1754).¹⁸ These are two important journeys as concerns his intellectual biography. Then, al-Khādimī met Ḥayāh al-Sindī in Medina and asked him a number of questions about various cases, which he recorded in two treatises, namely, *Risālat shubuhāt ʿarīḍah fī tariq al-ḥajj* and *Risālat al-shubuhāt al-mūradah ʿalā l-Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥayātī al-Sindī al-Madanī*.¹⁹ While he went to Mecca or while he returned to Khādim, he met some scholars in Damascus. According to his own account, he had a discussion with some of them about the legality of smoking. He stated that these discussions were the reason for composing his two treatises on the subject of smoking.²⁰

Al-Khādimī lived in the eighteenth century, an era in which Islamic theology was not yet practiced under the conditions of colonial societies but rather in a sovereign manner. In this context, this era is also considered to be the last stage in the development of classical theology, which is why it is ascribed a key function in understanding the previous stages. On the other hand, this century has also been described as “an age of intellectual, political, and social ferment and reform movements”. It thus represents a vital period during which, in addition to processes of change in politics and education, new approaches in religion and Islamic disciplines were introduced, the

1762): *Netzwerke, Karriere und Einfluss eines osmanischen Provinzgelehrten* (Hamburg: Verlag Dr. Kovac, 2005), 82.

¹⁷ Yusuf Küçükdağ, “Hadimī Medresesine Dair Bir Vakfiye”, *Vakıflar Dergisi* 27/79 (1998), 79-94.

¹⁸ Sarıkaya, *Abū Saʿīd Muḥammad al-Ḥādimī*, 147, 156.

¹⁹ Abū Saʿīd Muḥammad ibn Muṣṭafā al-Khādimī, “Risālat shubuhāt ʿarīḍah fī tariq al-ḥajj al-sharif wa-maʿrūḍah ʿalā l-ʿālim al-ʿāmil al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ḥayātī al-Sindī”, *Majmūʿat al-rasāʿil*, ed. Qūnawī ʿAbd al-Baṣīr Efendī (İstanbul: Dār al-Ṭibāʿah al-ʿĀmirah, 1302 AH), 211-214; Id., “Risālat al-shubuhāt al-mūradah ʿalā l-Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥayātī al-Sindī al-Madanī”, *Majmūʿat al-rasāʿil*, ed. Qūnawī ʿAbd al-Baṣīr Efendī (İstanbul: Dār al-Ṭibāʿah al-ʿĀmirah, 1302 AH), 220-224.

²⁰ Al-Khādimī, “Risālatān ʿalā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān”, *Majmūʿat al-rasāʿil*, ed. Qūnawī ʿAbd al-Baṣīr Efendī (İstanbul: Dār al-Ṭibāʿah al-ʿĀmirah, 1302 AH), 233-234.

consequences of which are increasingly visible and continue to the present day, especially since the second half of the 19th century.²¹

Although the reformist measures of the eighteenth century were essentially carried out in the industrial, military, and economic fields, and the tradition of knowledge in general remained little affected by the changes –especially outside the Anatolian part of the Ottoman Empire– some pioneers of reformist thinking should be noted. The approaches of some of al-Khādimī’s contemporaries are important here and should be highlighted as reformist ideas, including those of Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792), who advocated a text-based understanding of law that was detached from the tradition of the juridical school, or that of Shāh Walī Allāh al-Dihlawī (d. 1176/1762), who advocated a ḥadīth-based and cross-legal-school approach (*talfiq*).²²

On the other hand, al-Khādimī can be characterized as a more traditional scholar with an orientation toward the school of law. He adheres to tradition and, in principle, provides for the establishment of law within the framework of the associated school of law. Al-Khādimī vehemently rejects recourse to primary sources and ignoring the legacy of the school of jurisprudence. This claim is stated in the following paragraph from his *uṣūl*-work *Majāmi‘ al-ḥaqā’iq*:

The task of the laymen is to adhere to the opinions of the jurists and not to the Qur’ān and Sunnah. It is also not for them to choose between the opinions of earlier scholars, but from those of the trustworthy ones of his time. The laymen also do not weigh up the opinions of the Prophet’s companions. Any verse or Ḥadīth that contradicts the opinion of our jurists is either considered abrogated, reinterpreted, specified or weighed, and is not interpreted as

²¹ Jens Bakker, *Normative Grundstrukturen der Theologie des sunnitischen Islam im 12./18. Jahrhundert* (Berlin: EB-Verlag, 2012), 31, 849.

²² For a more detailed assessment of the beginnings and subsequent impact of the reform movements in the various countries of the Islamic world, see Rudolph Peters, “Erneuerungsbewegungen im Islam vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert und die Rolle des Islams in der neueren Geschichte: Antikolonialismus und Nationalismus”, *Der Islam in der Gegenwart*, ed. Werner Ende - Udo Steinbach (München: C. H. Beck, 2005), 90-127.

not having reached them. Therefore, the opinion of the jurists is preferable to the source texts.²³

This view illustrates al-Khādimī's tradition-bound stance. He also rejects the discourse that favors recourse to the primary sources, the Qur'ān and Sunnah, and the statements of the Prophet's Companions. On the other hand, al-Khādimī strongly favors orientation toward the opinion of the school of law or the opinion of a contemporary scholar who enjoys a certain degree of recognition. The latter is important from the point of view of updating and dynamically engaging with the tradition of the school of law.

For our scholar, tradition is not static; it contains dynamic elements. He was also interested not only in preserving tradition but also in perpetuating it through certain elements that promoted the dynamization of the law; this is an aspect that gives the impression that al-Khādimī, unlike his contemporaries mentioned above and others who also argued against the traditional doctrine of sources and methods and/or the paradigm of the schools of jurisprudence, emphasized dynamic elements from classical jurisprudence that met the challenges of the time.

In this context, it is particularly striking and, when compared with his predecessors, almost exceptional that in the mentioned *uṣūl* work, he cites a relatively large number of derivative sources alongside the usual primary sources such as the Qur'ān, Sunnah, scholarly consensus (*ijmā'*), and analogy (*qiyās*). Thus, he lists an additional seventeen legal sources of a secondary nature. These are *shar' man qablanā* (the law of previous religions), *taḥarrī* (seeking the true answer,), *urf* and *ta'āmul* (custom), *istiṣḥāb* (assumption of continuity), *al-'amal bi-l-ẓāhir aw al-aẓhar* (acting according to the outward or the more obvious), *al-akhdh bi-l-iḥtiyāt* (to act with prudence), *al-qur'ab* (to draw lots', *madhhab al-ṣaḥābī wa-madhhab kibār al-tābi'in* (according to the opinion of the Prophet's Companions or the opinion of the great ones of the following generation, i.e. the Successors), *istiḥsān* (juristic preference), *al-'amal bi-l-aṣl* (act according to the considered opinion), *al-qā'idab al-kulliyyah* (universal principle), *ma'qūl al-naṣṣ* (argumentation with the implication of the text),

²³ Al-Khādimī, *Majāmi' al-ḥaqā'iq wa-l-qawā'id* (Istanbul: Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-ʿĀmirah, 1308 AH), 44.

shabādat al-qalb (conviction of conscience), *taḥkīm al-ḥāl* (arbitration according to a given state), and *‘umūm al-balwā* (comprehensiveness/universality of necessity).²⁴

It is remarkable that al-Khādimī mentions a relatively large number of derivative sources of law and refers to others with *wa-naḥwihā* (meaning “et cetera”),²⁵ an enumeration that is rather unusual in previous works and especially in those of Ḥanafī methodology. Al-Khādimī extends the list of legal sources, which, as mentioned above, were not present to this extent²⁶ on classical legal methodology until modern times, probably to substantiate these functional secondary sources in legal practice in terms of legal methodology.²⁷

Despite his close ties to the Ḥanafī school of law and the fact that he was a follower of this doctrine, al-Khādimī is by no means a mere imitator or deliverer of the legal material produced before him; rather, he was also a *faqīh* who independently argued, weighed opinions, criticized and even presented his own opinion, especially on current issues of his time. He considered an independent judgment on individual cases (*ijtibād fī l-mas’alah*) possible at any time. Based on the principles of legal scholars or methods such as the implication of the text (*dalālat al-naṣṣ*), cases to which no reference was made in the previous literature could be solved.²⁸

²⁴ Al-Khādimī, *Majāmi‘ al-ḥaqā’iq*, 2.

²⁵ For a further list see Muṣṭafā Khulūṣī al-Güzelhişārī, *Manāfi‘ al-daqa’iq fī sbarḥ Majāmi‘ al-ḥaqā’iq* (İstanbul: Dār al-Ṭibā‘ah al-‘Āmirah, 1856), 16.

²⁶ See Mürteza Bedir, “Geleneğin Son Halkası: Hâdimî’nin *Mecâmi’ü’l-Hakâ’ik* Adlı Eseri ve Usul’de Güncel Bilgi Meselesi ya da Bugün Fıkıh Usulünü Hangi Eserlerden Okumalıyız?”, *Sabn-ı Semân’dan Dâvülfünûn’a Osmanlı’da İlim ve Fikir Dünyası: Âlimler, Müesseseler ve Fikrî Eserler - XVIII. Yüzyıl*, ed. Ahmet Hamdi Furat - Nilüfer Kalkan Yorulmaz - Osman Sacid Arı (İstanbul: Zeytinburnu Belediyesi Yayınları, 2018), 1/152-154.

²⁷ For a similar evaluation see Murat Şimşek, “Ebû Said Muhammed Hâdimî (1113/1701-1176/1762)”, *Şebir ve Alimleri*, ed. Ramazan Altıntaş et al. (Konya: Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi Kültür Yayınları, 2017), 417-418.

²⁸ Al-Khādimī, *al-Barīqab al-Maḥmūdiyyah sbarḥ al-Ṭarīqab al-Muḥammadiyyah*, ed. Aḥmad Faṭḥī ‘Abd al-Raḥmān Hījāzī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘İlmiyyah, 2019), 5/80; id., “Risālatān ‘alā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān”, 234. For a detailed elaboration of al-Khādimī’s legal thinking, see Kaşif Hamdi Okur, *Osmanlılarda Fıkıh Usûlü Çalışmaları: Hâdimî Örneği* (İstanbul: Mizan Yayınevi, 2011).

In the following, the extent to which our author realizes the claim to the *ijtibād fī l-mas'alah* will be explained via the example of his normative assessment of smoking.

2. Al-Khādimī's Legal Argumentation for the Smoking Ban

As explained in the introduction, this article addresses al-Khādimī's legal justification for banning smoking. For this purpose, the two aforementioned treatises (*Risālatān 'alā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān*) will be used and evaluated. First, the context of their origin will be explained, and then the content will be analyzed.

The treatises of al-Khādimī are two short writings, each one page in length. Even though both are similar in content and complementary to each other, there is no evidence to explain the reason for writing two treatises on the same issue. Compared with the texts of al-Āqḥiṣārī or al-Nāblusī, they are relatively compact. He wrote them when he met some local scholars in Damascus during his pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. At the end of the second treatise, he mentions the year in which this case was discussed, namely, 1156 (1743). In a marginal note, we learn that they were Shaykh Isma'īl al-Ujduwānī, a ḥadīth scholar, and Aḥmad al-Manīnī (d. 1172/1759), the chief preacher of the Banū Umayyah Mosque, both of whom were students of al-Nāblusī.²⁹

Like some of his predecessors, al-Khādimī writes in the form of a dialog, first presenting the opponent's argument and then his own. His stated position consists of either independent arguments or a response to the opposing opinion. Thus, the content consists of pro- and contra-arguments and the responses of al-Khādimī.

He starts by subordinating smoking to the general texts related to wastage (*isrāf*), distribution (*adbā*), malignancy (*kbubth*), and rejected innovation (*bid'ah mardūdah*). These aspects make it possible for the author to argue for the prohibition of smoking. At this point, he recounts an anecdote, which takes place in passing, in which one of the scholars of Damascus, with whom he was debating this issue, was inclined to abstain because this issue was a duty of *ijtibād* and there was nothing in the texts about smoking. Al-Khādimī replied that even though the *muṭtabidūn* had disappeared, their principles (*qawā'idubum*) had not. The opposing scholar then went on to say

²⁹ Al-Khādimī, "Risālatān 'alā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān", 234.

that his teacher had said that the forbidden innovation in religion (*bid'ah mamnū'ah*) was that which was contrary to the Sunnah and religious wisdom (*ḥikmah*). Al-Khādimī answers him at this point by saying that according to religious wisdom, it is appropriate to clean the mouth and to use the *siwāk* and to remove bad odors, and all of these are aspects of smoking. He ends by noting that the scholar present at the meeting welcomed al-Khādimī's answers and asked him to record them.³⁰

Furthermore, al-Khādimī uses an argument that can be understood as deductive reasoning. As explained above, there have been disagreements among scholars about this case. While some considered it permitted, smoking was frowned upon or forbidden for the majority. In this context, al-Khādimī argues that the differences of opinion suggest that, at the very least, classifying smoking as a doubtful issue and a doubt (*shubḥah*) has an impact on prohibitions.³¹ He supports and justifies this deductive conclusion with the following principles: "Prohibitions are determined by doubts" (*al-ḥurumāt tathbut bi-l-shubḥāt*) and "Whoever falls in a doubt, falls in prohibition" (*man waqa'a fī l-shubḥah waqa'a fī l-ḥarām*).³²

The principles put forward by al-Khādimī aim to prevent actions whose normative purpose is not obvious but are likely to be frowned upon or forbidden. From other texts, we know that al-Khādimī always advised against dubious things (*shubḥāt*) and referred to them as if they were forbidden. He also argued that one should follow the more prudent action or opinion. However, prudence lies in consistency (*al-iḥtiyāt fī l-ittifāq*).³³

Although he himself believes that smoking should be banned, to counter the arguments of his opponents, he first states that smoking should at least be classified as dubious because of the differences in opinion among scientists. Following this statement, he concludes, based on the principles mentioned, that smoking should at least be classified as being discouraged (*makrūb*). Our author is evidently

³⁰ Al-Khādimī, "Risālatān 'alā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān", 233.

³¹ Al-Khādimī, "Risālatān 'alā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān", 233.

³² Al-Khādimī, "Risālatān 'alā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān", 233.

³³ Al-Khādimī, "Risālat al-naṣā'ih wa-l-waṣāyā", *Majmū'at al-rasā'il*, ed. Qūnawī 'Abd al-Baṣīr Efendī (İstanbul: Dār al-Ṭibā'ah al-Āmirah, 1302 AH), 125.

trying to persuade by refuting the counterarguments rather than asserting his own position.

Regarding the objection that an action may not be declared forbidden unless it is explicitly described as such, or some subjective judgments such as the action being a cure for some diseases or a source of energy that gives one strength for further worship, al-Khādimī responds with a similar argument that, in the case of probability, prohibition is, in principle, preferable to permissibility (*tarjih al-ḥaẓr ‘alā l-ibāḥab*). He supports his indirect response to the above counterarguments with a rule from *al-Ṭarīqah al-Muḥammadiyyah* of al-Birgīwī (d. 981/1573), according to which the opinion of a righteous (*al-ṣāliḥ*) and pious (*al-wariʿ*) scholar should be preferred.³⁴

Our scholar’s arguments are not always purely scientific. Some of them can be described as polemical in nature or as a kind of argumentum ad populum and argument from authority. For example, he refers his readers to observe who the smokers are and who is against smoking. For him, those who are more righteous and pious are those who forbid smoking. In addition, most of those who allow smoking would commit to a smoking ban.

For al-Khādimī, the issue of banning smoking seems clear-cut. He relies on the conscience of society, which, if it is judged correctly, would also consider smoking to be forbidden. The fact that the majority of scholars favor prohibition has been confirmed above. What is not so easily confirmed is whether those scholars who say it is permissible are less pious and righteous. This explanation seems to be subjective and emotional.

One of the strongest arguments, and the one most often used by opponents, is the principle of permissibility (*al-ibāḥab al-aṣliyyah*). According to this principle, all actions are considered permissible unless there is a textual source (*nass*) or reference (*dalīl*) to the contrary. Therefore, smoking cannot be declared illegal because there is no explicit evidence for such a decision.³⁵

³⁴ Al-Khādimī, “Risālatān ‘alā ḥaẓriyyat al-dukhān”, 233. I could not find the passage in Birgīwī’s work.

³⁵ See for example, al-Nāblusī, *al-Ṣulḥ bayna l-ikhwān*, 7b.

Our research shows that al-Khādimī's approach to this principle is twofold, rejecting it in principle but not in all of his views. In *Majāmi' al-ḥaqā'iq*, we see that he not only opposes the principle but also asserts the exact opposite, namely, the principle that all actions are initially declared forbidden until their permissibility is proven.³⁶ In this context, he gives the example that the disposal of someone else's property is forbidden by law but is permitted only if the owner authorizes it.³⁷ In response to the question of how one can know which of the two relevant textual sources is the abrogating and which is the abrogated, al-Khādimī answers that the abrogating reference is the one that introduces a prohibition. Since it is the rule that actions are initially permissible, the abrogated reference must be the one that presents a permissible action.³⁸

In the two treatises, however, the tone is somewhat more cautious; instead of criticizing or rejecting the principle, al-Khādimī deviates in the first treatise to the point that even if this principle were to be accepted, insisting on permissible actions would lead to minor sins. Al-Khādimī sees this as opportunism and judges this approach of insisting on unresolved actions as calculation (*ḥisāb*), which would cause destruction (*wa-l-ḥisāb balāk*).³⁹ It seems that at this point, our author is not arguing as an ordinary jurist, but he is expressing his Sufi perspective, guided by the principle of prudence.

Relatively early in the second treatise, al-Khādimī assesses this principle as the strongest argument of those who declare smoking permissible. However, it is not entirely correct for al-Khādimī that there are no obvious indications that would point to a prohibition or that there is no *mujtabid*, no authority that can set the norm. For those who declare smoking prohibited, they argue either based on the principles of malignancy (*adbā*) or viciousness (*kbubth*) or that common sense says that smoking is unhealthy, whereas others argue based on the principle of waste (*isrāf*), contending that smoking represents

³⁶ With this assumption he differs from al-ʿAynī, who advocates the principle according to which abstinence (*tawaqquf*) applies in matters in which it is not clear whether it is permissible or forbidden. See Okur, "17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Fıkıhçılarının Nevazile Yönelik Fıkıhî Argümantasyonu", 384.

³⁷ Al-Khādimī, *Majāmi' al-ḥaqā'iq*, 37.

³⁸ Al-Khādimī, *al-Barıqah al-Maḥmūdiyyah*, 2/189.

³⁹ Al-Khādimī, "Risālatān 'alā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān", 233.

spending money on something that humankind does not need. All these arguments should be understood as specific implications of the relevant textual references (*naṣṣ*) that prohibit torment, harm, and waste. Smoking also goes against the wisdom of using the *siwāk*, or performing mouth cleansing. Al-Khādimī, who shares the view of prohibitive jurisdiction, considers partial *ijtibād* possible, as we have already seen in the context of his legal thinking. It is perfectly legitimate to make individual decisions at any time based on the principles of jurisprudence.⁴⁰

Here, we have a line of reasoning based on the factors of harm and disruption. Like al-Āqḥiṣārī⁴¹ and al-ʿAynī,⁴² al-Khādimī incorporates into his argument the legal conclusion that harmful substances are generally prohibited by the text (*naṣṣ*) and that smoking, which is also harmful, should therefore be avoided. As with almost all justifications, he does not elaborate on this argument and avoids justifying it based on tradition. Therefore, this argument can be understood as an independent analogy based on relevant texts.

The next argument is one of political law (*al-siyāsah al-sharʿiyyah*). For al-Khādimī, the prohibition emanating from the state authority has decisive validity. This normative or authoritative decision of the Sultan banning smoking is binding for our scholar, and this binding force does not expire with his death (*lā yunsakh bi-mawtibī*) but continues to apply. He explains the binding nature of following the Sultan's order by saying that it is related to public concerns (*manūṭ bi-maṣāliḥ al-anām*) because it represents the prevention of destruction of property (*itlāf al-māl*) and from spending on something that neither nourishes nor helps against hunger and thirst; furthermore, it also prevents one from wasting time on useless things.⁴³

In classical Islamic jurisprudence, the political authority, by virtue of his position as the representative of and responsible for society, is assigned the central task of enforcing Islamic law and thus ensuring social order. In this context, the jurists (*fuqabāʾ*) ascribed special

⁴⁰ Al-Khādimī, "Risālatān ʿalā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān", 234.

⁴¹ See al-Āqḥiṣārī, "al-Risālah al-dukhāniyyah", 95-96.

⁴² See Okur, "17. Yüzyıl Osmanlı Fıkıhçılarının Nevzile Yönelik Fıkḥî Argümantasyonu", 385-386.

⁴³ Al-Khādimī, "Risālatān ʿalā ḥazriyyat al-dukhān", 234.

prerogatives to the position of leadership, giving it greater authority than others to implement the law and promote the common good (*maşlahab*).⁴⁴ Al-Khādīmī, who shared this view,⁴⁵ maintains that the decision of the political authority is particularly valid in regard to exempted acts, i.e., those matters that have not been decided upon or prohibited by the Shariah.⁴⁶

Unlike al-‘Aynī, for example, the political ban is binding for al-Khādīmī, and this would not be abolished with the death of the sultan who issued the ban. Interestingly, al-‘Aynī, who actually recognizes the aforementioned principle,⁴⁷ considers the political ban to be nonbinding. However, it seems that he neither rejects the principle nor ignores the political authority per se but recognizes a discrepancy between the political decision and real policy, which involves taxes on tobacco, which is why he refrains from making a political argument in this case. Al-Khādīmī, on the other hand, incorporates the political decision into his arguments against smoking, which seems consistent with his point of view.

The aforementioned generally represent al-Khādīmī’s arguments, which he usually presented in dialog form to consolidate his position as an opponent of smoking. We observed a variety of statements that were either introduced independently or were counterarguments aimed at refuting the opposing position. Another approach was for al-Khādīmī to take up his opponents’ arguments and develop them

⁴⁴ Abū l-‘Abbās Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Idrīs al-Qarāfī, *al-İpkām fī tamyīz al-fatāwā ‘an al-ahkām wa-taşarrufāt al-qāḍī wa-l-imām*, ed. ‘Abd al-Fattāh Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Dār al-Bashā’ir al-Islāmiyyah, 2009), 46. For specific individual cases in which decisions are made according to this principle in the Ḥanafī literature, see Zayn al-Dīn ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Muḥammad Ibn Nujaym al-Miṣrī, *al-Asbbāb wa-l-naẓā’ir ‘alā madbbab Abī Ḥanīfab al-Nu’mān*, ed. Zakariyyā ‘Umayrāt (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 2010), 104-105; Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad al-Zarqā, *Sbarḥ al-qawā’id al-fiḥriyyah*, ed. ‘Abd al-Fattāh Abū Ghuddah - Muşţalāf Aḥmad al-Zarqā (Damascus: Dār al-Qalam, 2012), 309-310. For a detailed discussion of *al-siyāsah al-sbar‘iyyah* among Ḥanafī-Ottoman scholars, see Asım Cüneyd Köksal, *Fıkıh ve Siyaset: Osmanlılarda Siyaset-i Şer’iyye* (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2016), 141-294.

⁴⁵ The aforementioned principle, which grants prerogatives to the political authority in connection with the general interest, can be found in the collection of principles contained in his *uşūl*-work. See al-Khādīmī, *Majāmi‘ al-ḥaqā’iq*, 45.

⁴⁶ Al-Khādīmī, *al-Barīqah al-Maḥmūdiyyah*, 5/365.

⁴⁷ See Abū l-Fayḍ Muḥammad Fiḥhī al-‘Aynī, *Risālah fī adab al-muftī*, ed. Osman Şahin (İstanbul - Beirut: TDV İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi Yayınları, 2018), 57.

further to draw attention to the consequences that worked against them.

Conclusion

Like many of his predecessors and contemporaries, al-Khādimī wrote treatises on the Islamic legal assessment of smoking and contributed two relatively short treatises to the lively debate on the norm of tobacco consumption that had been ongoing for more than a century. He himself was involved in a discussion with two Damascene scholars during his Hajj journey, which also served as the reason for writing the aforementioned treatises. In addition to his argumentation, which will be discussed below, I believe that this factor makes al-Khādimī's treatise special. Al-Khādimī's interest in the subject was not based on a theoretical interest in the discussion of smoking but rather on a personal exchange with the disciples of al-Nāblusī, who, like their master, considered smoking to be permissible.

Most likely because the topic had already been dealt with extensively before him, his writing was relatively brief. Despite its brevity, he first sets out various positions and takes up what are probably the most widespread arguments; this shows that al-Khādimī was aware of relevant treatises.

Clearly, al-Khādimī is against smoking. However, he is cautious when it comes to saying that smoking is *ḥarām*. It must be said that his discourse is dominated by the language of Sufism as well as the language of *fiqh*. Al-Khādimī advised his readers to protect themselves from dubious things (*shububāt*) as if they were forbidden. He also argues that one should be guided by more prudent action or opinions and that prudence lies in consistency. Nevertheless, al-Khādimī cites a variety of legal-hermeneutical arguments. For him, the argument that there are no indications in the primary sources of Islamic law that speak against smoking is untenable; this is because the prohibition of smoking can be subsumed under the implications of the verses and ḥadīths that prohibit waste, distribution, and malignancy. Furthermore, smoking is to be regarded as an innovation in religion that should be rejected, as it contradicts, among other things, the command of oral hygiene and the use of the *siwāk*, which occupies a special place in the Prophetic tradition.

The assertion that there are no *mujtabids* and therefore that a normative decision on smoking is not possible is also untenable for our scholar. Al-Khādimī advocates *ijtibād* to an individual case (*ijtibād fī l-masʿalah*) based on the principles of the school of law or the eponyms.

Another strong argument in favor of al-Khādimī is the political decision, i.e., that the legal prohibition regarding an indeterminate act has a binding character from the perspective of Islamic law; this is because it is aimed at the general interest (*maṣlaḥah*), which is also one of the objectives of Shariah law.

Finally, al-Khādimī does not accept the argument that smoking should be declared legal because there is no evidence against it. On the one hand, one could derive the prohibition from the implications of the implied indications; on the other hand, one could argue that fundamentally, actions are not permitted but either their permissibility is unclear or they are even prohibited. Therefore, an act can be declared permissible only if there are corresponding indications. What is beyond question, however, is that in any case, smoking is not an exempted act and should therefore at least be labeled as being discouraged. As it stands, smoking is definitely not recommended.

Although treatises (*rasāʾil*) are not classical *fatwā*-writings, they demonstrate how a scholar positions himself or herself in a specific case. The aim of this article is to show how a scholar from the postclassical period justifies his view on the prohibition of smoking. Al-Khādimī, who firmly adheres to the Ḥanafī tradition, believes that new cases can be overcome with the tools that the tradition has to offer, which have dynamic elements. He is also a defender of the specific *ijtibād* that is conducted based on school principles. In the course of this, he undertakes an argumentative position on the aforementioned case. He puts forward various arguments that support his position on the one hand and invalidate the arguments of his opponents on the other hand. Interestingly, as a law school-oriented scholar, he makes few references to classical Ḥanafī legal opinions and draws no analogy to judgments on intoxicating, drug-like substances. Instead, he presents various independent arguments, including no direct reference to classical literature or legal school opinions. Nevertheless, al-Khādimī's treatise is an important document on how

“new” individual cases can be approached argumentatively from the perspective of Islamic law.

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Appendix: Al-Khādīmī’s Two Treatises on the Prohibition of Smoking

رسالتان على حظريّة الدخان لأبي سعيد محمد الخادمي

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

بإسمه سبحانه ونسأله إحسانه. أعلم أنه مما يمكن أن يُستدلَّ على حظريّة الدخان أنه داخل تحت عموم نُصوص التّبذير والأذى والخبائث والبدعة المردودة⁴⁸ وأن اختلاف العلماء لا يكون أقلّ من إیراث الشّبّهة ولا شكّ أن إنكاره فسفسطة والشّبّهة مؤثّرة في باب المحرّمات. قال في التلويح والمنح: "الحُرّمات تُنبت بالشّبّهات". وفي شرح المجمع: "مَنْ وَقَعَ فِي الشّبّهة وَقَعَ فِي الْحَرَامِ". كما وقع في الحديث. ولو سلّم أن إيجاب الاختلاف الوهم في المنع من أجلى البديهيات يكاد أن يفهم الصبيان والمجانين. وقد قال في المنح أيضا عن بعض المعتررات الوهميات تكون حجة في الحُرّمات. فإن قيل إن له ما يدلُّ على إباحته كدخوله تحت قوله تعالى: "خَلَقَ لَكُمْ مَا فِي الْأَرْضِ جَمِيعًا"، وكون الأصل في الأشياء الإباحة، وكونه شفاء لبعض الأمراض وموجباً للنشاط الذي يتقوى به العبادة، ولو سلّم صلاحية ما ذكر كله أو بعضه المطلوب هنا بعد تسليم ذواته يعارض بمثل الأدلة السابقة وقد قرّر في

⁴⁸ ومن لطائف ذلك أنه لما بحثنا في ذلك مع واحد من علماء الشام أيضا مال إلى التوقف قائلًا إن ذلك وظيفة الاجتهاد ولم يصل إلى الآن شيء في حق الدخان منهم فقلت إن انقرض أنفس المجتهدين لم ينقض قواعدهم. ولو سلم أن أدلة النافين ليست براجحة فلا شك أنه لا أقلّ من إیراث الشك والوهم وهما حجتان في الحظر وغيره من جنس ما ذكر في الأصل ثم قال حاكيا عن أستاذه إن البدعة الممنوعة ما يكون مخالفا لسنة أو حكمة مشروعية السنة فقلت حكمة مشروعية السواك تطهير الفم وإزالة الرائحة الكريهة ورفع الأذى وكل ذلك موجود في الدخان فاستحسن ذلك من في المجلس من العلماء فالتمسوا مني ضبطه وتحريه ولكون ذلك أمرا حسنا جيدا في نفسه ساعدت التماسهم وحرزته هنا (منه)

الأصول ترجيح الحظر على الإباحة، وفي الطريفة المحمدية: "ترجيح قول العالم الصالح الورع على غيره". وأنت إن أنصفت علمت أن المانعين أروعون وأصلحون من المبيحين بل أكثر الشاربيين مقرّون بحظره. ولو سلم الإباحة الأصلية فإصرار المباح صغيرة كما قرّر في محله. والأصح أن في المباح حساباً، والحساب هلك كما في المصاييح. وإن استعمله في أهل الفسق والفجور أكثر وأدور. فاستعمال غيره تشبّه لهم ومُتَشَبِّه القوم منهم. وقد قرن به نهي السلطان اللازم إبطاءه⁴⁹ ولا ينسخ بموته وإنما الاحتياط هو العمل بالاتفاق. هذا إجمال غاية الإجمال فالعارف يكفيه الإشارة وفيما أبقى دليل على ما ألقى لصاحب الإنصاف وإلا فلا يفيد الأسفار فضلاً عن التفصيل هذا ما حررناه في دمشق الشام لإصرار أهلهم على الإباحة مع مناظرة سبقت لبعض⁵⁰ علمائهم والله تعالى أعلم بالصواب.

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

الحمد لولّيه والصلاة على نبيه وآله. وبعد فإن أمر الدخان كثر فيه الفتاوى والقيل والقال وألف فيه الرسائل القصار والطوال. فافتتن فئد الأنام وتحير الخواص والعوام إذ ذهب بعض إلى إباحته وبعض إلى حظره. فتبين الحق إنما يكون ببيان أدلة الفريقين ثم ترجيح الطرف الذي تقتضي القاعدة ترجيحه. فأقوى أدلة الفرقة الأولى الحظر حكم شرعي وذا إما معلوم بالبدهة أو بالنظر. والأول مُنْتَفٍ بالضرورة وكذا الثاني إذ النظر إما من مجتهد أو من غيره. الأول مُنْتَفٍ لأنه لم يثبت منه رواية ولا دِرَايَة وقد انقرض وكذا الثاني إذ لا اعتبار لنظر الغير في الشرعيات فبقي على الإباحة الأصلية ويُقر به طبع من دفع أدلة النافين أولاً، ثم حكم ببقائه على الإباحة. وأما الفرقة الثانية فبعضهم احتج بالأذى وبعض بالخبث لنتفّر الطبع السليم وبعض بالإسراف لكونه إضاعة مالٍ فيما لا يُحتاج إليه وبعض بالبدعة الممنوعة لمخالفته بحكمة مشروعية السواك من دفع الأذى وإزالة الرائحة الكريهة وتطهير الفم وبعض بالإسكار كما في الابتداء ولو لبعض وقد يستدل بغيرها. ثم أقول لعل الحق مع الفرقة الثانية إذ الظاهر أن المطلب ظني فلو فرض ورود المنع على أفراد هذه الأدلة

⁴⁹ لكونه منوطاً بمصالح الأنام دينية كما ذكر في الأصل أو دنيوية لكونه منعاً عن إتلاف الأموال عن الصرف إلى ما لا يسمن ولا يغني من جوع وعطش وحفظاً عن صرف أوقاته بما لا يعنيه وغيره (منه)

⁵⁰ الشيخ إسماعيل العجّذواني مُحدّث الشام في هذا اليوم له تصنيفات كثيرة منها شرحه على البخاري وأحمد المنيني قطب [خطيب؟] جامع بني أمية (منه)

فالظاهر أنه لا يخرجها عن الظنية.⁵¹ ولو سلّم ذلك فلا شكّ في إفادة مجموعها قوّة صالحة⁵² للمقام. وأمر إنقراض المجتهد خلافه بل المجتهد في المسألة ممكن في عصرهما ولو سلّم ذلك فلا نسلم عدم ثبوته من المجتهد مطلقاً إذ يجوز دخوله في بعض قواعده وأنّ لنظر العلماء العامي مدخلا في بعض النظريات الشرعية كدلالة النصّ. ثم نقول لا شكّ في إیراث هذه الإختلافات شُبّهة فيه وفي المَنَح والتلويح "الحُرّمات تُثبِت بالشُّبّهات" وفي الحديث "مَنْ وَقَعَ فِي الشُّبّهة وَقَعَ فِي الحَرَامِ". وأيضاً يَرَجَح الحَظَر⁵³ على الإباحة ويُقدّم قول الورع والأعلم عند تعارض أقوال العلماء والإستقراء شاهد على أنها في جانب المانعين وأيضاً قالوا بالإصرار على المباح صغيرة⁵⁴ والأصحّ أنّ في المباح حساباً والحسابُ هَلَك وأيضاً لا يخفى في قوّته كثرته في الفسقة فاستعمال غيرهم تشبّه بهم وأيضاً قد قرن به نهى سلطاني وهو فيما يتعلق بالمصنحة⁵⁵ ولا شكّ أنّ الإحتياط في الإتفاق وأمّا ما في بعض المواضع من رواية الحديث عن بعض التفاسير فالظاهر أنه مما لا يعول عليه.⁵⁶ نعم، لو لم يُفطع بوضعه ووقع في إحتياط شيء من الأحكام فيرجح بالحديث الضعيف وإن لم يوجب كما نُقل عن أنكار النووي.

ثمّ من قلم محمد الخادمي هذا تلخيص مُناظرتنا في دِمَشق الشام مع⁵⁷ بعض علمائه في سَنَة سِت وخمسين ومائة وألف.

51 إذ الظاهر أنّ أكثر أسانيد المنوع على مُجرد الإحتمال العقلي والجواز الأصلي (منه)
 52 إذ يحصل في الإجتماع ما لا يحصل في الإنفراد من القوة الى رتبة القطع كما في مواضع المقاصد والتلويح وشرح العقائد تأمل (منه)
 53 عند التعارض كما في الأصول (منه)
 54 بل يُحتمل أن يكون كبيرة عند قصد التلهي (منه)
 55 دينية وهو الظاهر أو دنيوية لكونه منوعاً عن إتلاف مالٍ فيما لا يُعني شيئاً وحفظاً عن صرف الأوقات إلى ما لا يُعنيه (منه)
 56 لا يعول عليه أي لا يُعتمد عليه (منه)
 57 الشيخ إسماعيل العجدواني مُحدّث الشام (منه)

**DISCUSSIONS ON IBN SĪNĀ'S PROOF (ISHĀRAH) THAT
EXISTENCE IS NOT ADDED TO THE NECESSARY:
AL-RĀZĪ, AL-ṬŪSĪ, AND ŞADR AL-SHARĪ'AH**

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Abstract

Later theologians and Peripatetic philosophers concur that existence is added to contingents. However, while philosophers assert that existence is not added to the Necessary, theologians dispute this judgment. According to the argument presented in the fourth *namaʿ* of Ibn Sīnā's (d. 428/1037) *al-Isbārāt wa-l-tanbībāt*, accepting essence as the cause of existence leads to certain issues. The most prominent of these is *taqaddum*, which is the precedence of something over itself. This study explores Ibn Sīnā's argument, al-Rāzī's (d. 606/1210) objections in his *Sharḥ*, al-Ṭūsī's (d. 672/1274) responses to these objections, and Şadr al-Sharī'ah's (d. 747/1346) analysis of al-Ṭūsī's responses. By focusing on these figures, we can understand how the

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acceptance of the concept of *wujūd* (existence), one of the concepts of *al-umūr al-‘āmmah* (general concepts), influenced the course of the debate. Unlike the aforementioned scholars, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah accepts that existence is shared in terms of expression and thus rejects both the distinction between existence and essence and the notion of accidentality. This study will first underscore the critical role of the distinction between existence and essence in the Peripatetic system. After elucidating the position of this distinction within the Peripatetic framework, I will delve into the proof of *al-Ishārāt*, the central focus of this study. This analysis will examine the approaches of al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, and Şadr al-Sharī‘ah in terms of their comparative and interconnected perspectives on the proof. Notably, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah’s approach, which has gained attention in modern scholarship for its methodological significance but has seen less focus on its theological implications, will be particularly emphasized.

Key Words: Kalām, the existence-essence distinction, Necessary being, Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah

Introduction*

According to philosophers, existence is superadded in contingent beings, whereas it is identical in the Necessary Being. Although both theologians and philosophers agree that existence is superadded to contingent beings, they diverge in their views regarding the Necessary Being. Philosophers have demonstrated that the Necessary Being would be contingent if one does not accept the identity of essence and existence in the Necessary Being. The relation between existence and essence is discussed concerning the oneness of the Necessary Being. In this study, I will examine an ongoing debate over one of the remarks (*ishārah*) in Ibn Sīnā’s *al-Ishārāt*. I have chosen three highly representative scholars for this debate. al-Rāzī analyzes the argument in his *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt* and offers some criticisms. al-Ṭūsī, on the other hand, analyzes al-Rāzī’s objections in his *Sharḥ* and provides answers in defense of Ibn Sīnā. In this respect, these two figures represent Ibn Sīnā’s critics and defenders. The next scholar whose approach I will examine is Şadr al-Sharī‘ah. As a theologian aware of Ibn Sīnā’s proof,

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al-Rāzī's objections, and al-Ṭūsī's responses, he questions the strength and validity of al-Ṭūsī's answers. Given his different view on the relationship between existence and essence compared to the aforementioned scholars, Şadr al-Sharī'ah's entry into the debate within the *Ishārāt* tradition is significant. This study aims to illustrate how Şadr al-Sharī'ah contributes to this debate with a distinct ontology while addressing the issue of addition to the Necessary Being.

Studies on Şadr al-Sharī'ah have primarily focused on his methodological stance, with only a few examining his understanding of existence. In this context, two studies are noteworthy. The first is Mahmut Ay's study, which delves into Şadr al-Sharī'ah's philosophy of existence. While this study explores Şadr al-Sharī'ah's view on the addition of existence to the Necessary, it does not address the specific points where he diverges from Ibn Sīnā, al-Rāzī, and al-Ṭūsī. Another study investigates Şadr al-Sharī'ah's philosophy of existence, particularly focusing on his analysis of the necessity of existence in the Necessary and highlighting his divergences from al-Ṭūsī.¹ This article examines Ibn Sīnā's proof and the subsequent discussions by al-Rāzī and al-Ṭūsī. It ultimately reveals Şadr al-Sharī'ah's judgments on these discussions, highlighting the differences in perspective from which the opinions are derived. Through this analysis, the article aims to illustrate how Şadr al-Sharī'ah's unique viewpoint contributes to the ongoing debate about the relationship between existence and essence in the context of the Necessary Being.

First, I will present the philosophical approach to the distinction between existence and essence through Ibn Sīnā's argument. Then, I will demonstrate the relation of this distinction to the oneness of the Necessary Being. Finally, I will examine the evaluations of al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, and Şadr al-Sharī'ah. It is beyond the scope of this study to provide the final conclusions of the aforementioned scholars on the subject, so I have restricted the discussion to Ibn Sīnā's argument (*ishārah*).

¹ See Mahmut Ay, *Sadrüşşer'â'da Varlık: Ta'dîlî'l-ʿulûmü Temelinde Kelam-Felsefe Karşılaşması* (Ankara: İlahiyât Yayınları, 2006); Güvenç Şensoy, *Sadrüşşer'â'nın Kelâmî Ta'dîl Teşebbüsü: Varlık ve Ulûhiyyet Merkezli Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Vakfı Yayınları, 2023).

1. The Philosophical Basis of the Existence-Essence Distinction

While philosophers accept the distinction between existence and essence in contingents, they do not accept this distinction in terms of the Necessary Being. According to them, acknowledging this distinction undermines the necessity of the Necessary. This acceptance is rooted in explaining the nature of things and how they exist. The clear articulation of this distinction first emerged with Ibn Sīnā,² and al-Rāzī utilized it as an analytical tool to scrutinize the nature of existence and knowledge.³

It is possible to say that this distinction was also present in al-Fārābī. His distinction is based on the difference between what exists and what is true (*ṣādiq*). When something is conceived (*taṣawwur*), it is

² For the theses that this distinction takes place as a theory in al-Fārābī, see Toshihiko Izutsu, *The Concept and Reality of Existence* (Kuala Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust, 2007), 133 pp; Alparslan Açıkgenç, “İslam Felsefesinde Varlık Öğretilerinin Öncüleri”, *Felsefe Dünyası* 13 (1994), 11-16; Robert Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), 179. For an example of a situation in which the distinction was not clarified before Ibn Sīnā, cf. Peter Adamson, “Before Essence and Existence: al-Kindī's Conception of Being”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 40/3 (July 2002), 297-312. See also Ibn Rushd's comments on the distinction between existence and essence. Catarina Belo, “Essence and Existence in Avicenna and Averroes”, *al-Qantara* 30/2 (Julio-Diciembre 2009), 403-426; Fehrullah Terkan, *Recurrence of the Perennial Encounter? Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd on God's Knowledge* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, PhD Dissertation, 2004), 230, etc. Although the distinction is generally thought to be derived from ancient Greek philosophy, some studies claim that this is not true, but instead that the source of the distinction is the debates between the thing and the existent in early theology; see Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, 145; Robert Wisnovsky, “Notes on Avicenna's Concept of Thingness (Ṣay'iyya)”, *Arabic Sciences and Philosophy* 10/2 (September 2000), 181-187; Ömer Mahir Alper, “İbn Sīnâ'da Tanrı'nın Kanıtlanması Sorunu: O Gerçekten Kelâmcılardan Etkilendi mi?”, *İstanbul Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 7 (2003), 62.

³ Before Ibn Sīnā, the discussions of the thing and the present were made in terms of coherence and meaning. Ibn Sīnā made a synthesis between Mâturīdism and Ash'arism and between Mu'tazilism and al-Fārābī (d. 339/950). Although he, like the Ash'arīs and Mâturīdīs, stated that the thing and the existent are the same in terms of scope, he also continued to argue that “the thing and the existent are different in terms of meaning,” just like the Mu'tazilīs and al-Fārābī; see Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, 153; For an analysis of the concepts of “thing” and “existence” through Ibn Sīnā's texts, see Amos Bertolacci, “The Distinction of Essence and Existence in Avicenna's Metaphysics: The Text and Its Context”, *Islamic Philosophy, Science, Culture, and Religion*, ed. Felicitas Opwis - David Reisman (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 271 ff.

possible to say it has an essence. However, whether this essence exists is another matter. He presents the concept of “emptiness” as an example. When emptiness is conceived (*taṣawwūr*), that is, when its essence is considered, it has no external reality. This shows that the existence of a thing and its essence are distinct.⁴ The reason al-Fārābī makes such a distinction, i.e., between the essence of a thing and its existence, is to identify the cause of the addition of existence to essence and the cause of the existence of a thing, i.e., the addition of *wujūd*, as seen in Ibn Sīnā. By doing so, the idea of necessary existence, which is self-caused and not dependent on something external, is grounded; that is, it is impossible for something to be the cause of its own existence.⁵

Ibn Sīnā applied the concepts of necessity and contingency to this distinction. Unlike God, who lacks essence, other existents possess essences and, consequently, compositions. This relationship between a concept and its realization in the external world holds true regardless of whether external beings are singular or multiple. Thus, the concept of existence links essence with external objects beyond the Necessary Being.⁶ The existence-essence distinction entails accepting that existence enables essences to unite and constitute an object.⁷ In this way, one arrives at the Necessary Being and the absence of a distinction between existence and essence within it, implying the impossibility of attributing essence to the Necessary Being. This is because the distinction leads to the idea that every being with an

⁴ Abū Naṣr Muhammad al-Fārābī, *Harfler Kitabı: Kitābu'l-Hurūf*, ed. and trans. Ömer Türker (İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2008), 57.

⁵ Abū Naṣr Muhammad al-Fārābī, *Kitāb al-Fuṣūṣ* (Hyderabad: Maṭba'at Majlis Dā'irat al-Ma'ārif al-'Uthmāniyyah, 1926), 3-5. Also see Mehmet Sait Reçber, “Fārābī ve Tanrı'nın Basitliği Meselesi”, *Uluslararası Fārābî Sempozyumu Bildirileri*, ed. Gürbüz Deniz - Hayrani Altuntaş (Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2005), 213-227.

⁶ Ömer Türker, “Metafizik: Varlık ve Tanrı”, *İslam Felsefesi: Tarih ve Problemler*, ed. M. Cüneyt Kaya (Ankara: İSAM Yayınları, 2013), 628. Also see Ömer Türker, *İslam Felsefesine Konusal Giriş* (Ankara: Bilimsel Araştırma Yayınları, 2020), 156-157; Ömer Türker, “Mahiyet Teorisi”, *Metafizik*, ed. Ömer Türker (İstanbul: Ketebe Yayınları, 2021), 2/675.

⁷ Fazlur Rahman Malik, “Essence and Existence in Avicenna”, *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958), 12-13; İbrahim Halil Üçer, *İbn Sînâ Felsefesinde Suret, Ceber ve Varlık* (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2017), 321; Michael E. Marmura, “Avicenna and the Kalam”, *Probing in Islamic Philosophy-Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sina, al-Ghazali and Other Major Muslim Thinkers* (New York: Global Academic Publishing, 2005), 103.

essence, separate from its existence due to causality, must have an external cause for its realization. Since contingency is directly linked to essence, there exists a distinction between existence and essence for contingent beings. In contrast, such a distinction does not apply to the Necessary Being.⁸ This is precisely the role of the existence-essence distinction in Ibn Sînâ's system. According to him, "If something is brought into existence by an agent, its essence and the existence it receives from its agent can be distinguished. If something is necessary, meaning it exists without any agent causing it, its essence and existence must be identical."⁹ In Ibn Sînâ's system, the distinction between existence and essence serves primarily to differentiate between God and other existents, and to uphold the unity and simplicity of God.¹⁰ Essentially, Ibn Sînâ asserts God's uncausality while recognizing that all beings other than God possess essences in addition to their existence.¹¹ According to Ibn Sînâ, the contingent being is characterized by the distinction between existence and essence. In contrast, the Necessary Being lacks essence and is solely

⁸ Üçer, *İbn Sînâ Felsefesinde Suret, Cevher ve Varlık*, 323; Amos Bertolacci, "Necessary' as Primary Concept in Avicenna's Metaphysics", *Conoscenza e Contingenza Nella Tradizione Aristotelica Medievale*, ed. G. Fioravanti - S. Perfetti (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2008), 31-51. Moreover, Davidson states that Ibn Sînâ was the first philosopher to use the concept of "necessary existence" to prove God's existence. Herbert A. Davidson, "Avicenna's Proof of the Existence of God as a Necessarily Existent Being", *Islamic Philosophical Theology*, ed. Parviz Morewedge (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1979), 169. cf. Michael E. Marmura, "Avicenna's Proof from Contingency for God's Existence in the *Metaphysics* of the *Shifâ'*", *Mediaeval Studies* 42/1 (1980), 337-352.

⁹ Türker, "Metafizik: Varlık ve Tanrı", 640; Eşref Altaş, *Fabreddin er-Râzî'nin İbn Sînâ Yorumu ve Eleştirisi* (İstanbul: Marmara University, Institute of Social Science, PhD Dissertation, 2009), 223; Peter Adamson, "From the Necessary Existent to God", *Interpreting Avicenna: Critical Essays*, ed. Peter Adamson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 170-189.

¹⁰ For detailed information, see. Ömer Mahir Alper, "İbn Sînâ ve İbn Sînâ Okulu", *İslam Felsefesi: Tarih ve Problemler*, ed. M. Cüneyt Kaya (Ankara: İSAM Yayınları, 2013), 270; Wisnovsky, *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*, 162. For criticisms of the distinction between existence and essence, see Tuncay Akgün, "Meşşâi Filozoflar ve Gazâlî'nin Ontolojisinde Varlık-Mâhiyet Tartışmaları", *Çukurova Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 16/2 (2016), 235-258. For the proof of necessary existence based on this distinction, see. Fadıl Ayğın, "Zorunlu Varlığı İspat Bağlamında İbn Sînâ'da Varlık-Mahiyet İlişkisi: Ontolojiden Teolojiye", *İslâmî İlimler Dergisi* 10/1 (2015), 111-131; Alper, "İbn Sînâ ve İbn Sînâ Okulu", 273; M. Cüneyt Kaya, *Varlık ve İmkân: Aristoteles'ten İbn Sînâ'ya İmkânın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2011), 200, 206.

¹¹ Kaya, *Varlık ve İmkân*, 201.

characterized by existence. Contingency, in this context, signifies that essence depends on a cause of existence. When this relationship between possibility and essence is established, it becomes evident that the existence of contingent essences derives solely from the Necessary Being, which itself requires no external cause for its existence.¹²

The concepts of *wujūb* (necessity) and contingency create space for the notion of causality, and the distinction between existence and essence elucidates the reasons for the existence of a thing at any level of reality. In other words, this distinction has strengthened the metaphysical explanation based on necessity and contingency. Consequently, it became possible to justify the emanation from God to subsequent levels. The significance of this distinction lies in its role in grounding the idea of the universe's eternity and addressing issues that were previously attempted to be resolved and explained in terms of the essences of existence originating from the active intellect before Ibn Sīnā.¹³ Moreover, the eternity of the universe in temporal terms, albeit not in terms of essence, based on the concept of *imkān*, became an issue that theologians in later periods, who accepted the distinction between existence and essence, placed on their agenda.

Accepting that existence is essential to essence hinges on the acceptance of the separation between existence and essence. Conversely, later theologians argue that existence is added precisely because they acknowledge this distinction. The distinction itself, and the implications of this addition, are central to the debates between theologians and philosophers concerning the existence of the Necessary Being and contingent beings. Both theologians and philosophers agree that existence is added to contingent essences. Their disagreement regarding the Necessary Being stems from differing interpretations of divine attributes.¹⁴ According to Sunnī theologians, God's attributes are distinct from His essence. Because

¹² Üçer, *İbn Sīnâ Felsefesinde Suret, Cevher ve Varlık*, 23-24; cf. Ibn Sīnā, *İşaretler ve Tembihler: al-İshārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*, ed. and trans. Ali Durusoy et al. (İstanbul: Litera Yayıncılık, 2005), 131-132.

¹³ For objections to understanding this distinction regarding existence's being contingent on essence, see Parviz Morewedge, "Philosophical Analysis and Ibn Sīnā's 'Essence-Existence' Distinction", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 92/3 (September 1972), 425-435.

¹⁴ Bilal Taşkın, *İslâm Düşüncesinde Varlık Tartışmaları: Sadeddin et-Teftâzânî Merkezli Bir İnceleme* (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2020), 260.

they do not accept the unity between attributes and essence, they do not argue that the Necessary Being is simply existence itself.

2. The Negation of the Addition of Existence in Necessary Existence: Ibn Sīnā's Proof of *Ishārāt*

The sign that is mentioned in the fourth *namat* of *al-Ishārāt*, "existence and its causes," is as follows:

"It is conceivable for the essence of a thing to cause one of its attributes, and for that attribute to subsequently cause another attribute, such as a specific quality (*hāṣṣa*) causing a differentiating feature (*faṣl*). However, it is impossible for an attribute, which possesses existence, to cause its essence, which lacks existence. This is because the cause precedes in terms of existence, and what precedes in terms of existence cannot itself be caused by existence."¹⁵

The focus of discussion here is not the initial aspect of Ibn Sīnā's argument, where it's possible for the essence of an existing thing to cause one of its properties, and for one of these properties to cause another. Rather, the crux of al-Rāzī's critique centers on the subsequent conclusion. According to Ibn Sīnā, the existence of a thing cannot be caused by its essence alone; the essence must first exist in order to cause something else. In other words, for an essence to function as a cause, it must already exist prior to the thing it causes. However, the existence of an essence implies that anything attributed to it is contingent upon its existence. Since existence cannot be preceded by anything in terms of existence itself, it cannot be caused by any nonexistent essence or anything else.

In his subsequent argument, Ibn Sīnā analyses the relationship between existence and essence in terms of the realization of the Necessary and *tauhīd*. Nevertheless, since this study analyzes only al-Rāzī, al-Ṭūsī, and Ṣadr al-Sharī'a's interpretations of the above argument, the subsequent arguments will not be discussed.

3. al-Rāzī's Objections

In *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, al-Rāzī's method begins by elucidating Ibn Sīnā's argument and subsequently offering his interpretations of it. Initially, al-Rāzī introduces Ibn Sīnā's proof by highlighting two key

¹⁵ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Ishārāt*, 129.

impossibilities that are not explicitly addressed in the final part of the demonstration. The first impossibility is that something can precede itself, and the second is the notion of infinite regress (*tasalsul*). According to al-Rāzī, the essence of the argument can be summarized as follows:

"It is impossible for the essence of a thing or one of its attributes to be the cause of its existence. This impossibility arises because the cause precedes the effect in terms of existence. If the essence were to cause its own existence, it would imply that it existed before its existence existed, which leads to a contradiction -either the thing would precede its own existence, or it would imply a double existence, both of which are untenable. Such reasoning would necessitate an infinite regress (*tasalsul*) or return us to the discussion of the primary entity, which would then require an infinite series of causes—a situation that cannot logically hold."¹⁶

In his commentary, al-Rāzī closely adheres to Ibn Sīnā's concepts, making almost identical use of them. However, towards the conclusion of his commentary, al-Rāzī substitutes the term 'cause' (*'illa*) with reason (*sabab*). Despite this linguistic difference, as noted earlier, al-Rāzī's commentary is significant for explicitly addressing the impossibilities that Ibn Sīnā implicitly presents. Although Ibn Sīnā does not directly mention issues such as "the thing's precedence of itself" and "infinite regress," these concerns are inferred from the structure of his argument. Conversely, al-Rāzī explicitly articulates these problems, thereby providing a clearer exposition of the underlying implications in Ibn Sīnā's reasoning.

For al-Rāzī, this issue is one of the most fundamental topics in metaphysics (*mabāḥith al-ilāhiyyāt*). He emphasizes that "Minds and understandings are often perplexed by this issue."¹⁷ This idea expressed by al-Rāzī is later referenced by al-Ṭūsī. I will make a note of it now and address it in the next part of this chapter.

¹⁶ Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa't-tanbīhāt*, ed. Ali Rıza Necefzâde (Tahran: Encümen-i Asar ve Mefâhîr-i Ferhengî, 2005), 2/355-356.

¹⁷ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 2/356. Since this study focuses only on al-Rāzī's explanations in *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, al-Rāzī's claim should be accepted as valid only within this focus. For al-Rāzī's final view, it is necessary to refer to his late works.

After establishing that there is no doubt or dispute in the statement "God exists," al-Rāzī proceeds to discuss how the term "exists" is attributed to God. He distinguishes between two ways in which the term "exists" is attributed: literal and meaning-based. al-Rāzī explains that philosophers and theologians agree on the commonality of these ways of attribution with respect to this expression, despite certain skilled and respected theologians accepting differing views.¹⁸ After presenting the philosophers' arguments against this perspective, al-Rāzī proceeds to critique Ibn Sīnā's argument. This study refrains from analyzing the comparison between literal and semantic commonality views, thus omitting an examination of the evidence al-Rāzī provides on behalf of the philosophers.¹⁹

Before advancing his objections, al-Rāzī offers a detailed exposition of Ibn Sīnā's argument, emphasizing key aspects that will be subject to critique. According to al-Rāzī's explanation, several implications arise if God's existence and the existence of contingents are considered equal in terms of their existence without any conditions. First, following the theologians' perspective, it could be posited that God's existence is intrinsic to His essence and constitutes one of His actual attributes. The second perspective aligns with the philosophers' view, asserting that there is no distinction between God's existence and His essence—this is encapsulated in the statement that "His essence is His existence." The rationale behind this philosophical stance, as previously mentioned, contends that if God's essence and existence are viewed as separate, it would necessitate God's existence depending on His essence. This implication would categorize God as contingent rather than necessary, as His existence, separate yet essential to His essence, would then be considered an attribute contingent upon His essence. Since an attribute requires a subject (*mauṣūf*), it would logically follow that God's existence depends on His essence, rendering Him contingent. al-Rāzī argues that anything contingent requires a cause, and he explores the potential causes within this framework. If this cause lies outside of God's essence, it would imply that God's existence is caused by something external, which al-Rāzī deems incorrect. Alternatively, if the cause is attributed to God's essence itself, it leads to the aforementioned impossibility: the

¹⁸ al-Rāzī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/356.

¹⁹ For the evidence, see. al-Rāzī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/356-358.

cause precedes the effect in terms of existence. If, according to one possibility, God's essence is accepted as the cause, then God's essence must precede His existence, which contradicts the idea that God's existence is necessary. This elucidates the foundation of Ibn Sīnā's argument refuting the proposition that "God's existence is distinct from His essence." Subsequently, al-Rāzī proceeds to present his objections, which form the core focus of the study.²⁰

In discussing the addition of existence to essence, according to al-Rāzī's presentation of Ibn Sīnā's view, Ibn Sīnā asserts that "God's existence is equivalent to the existence of contingents in terms of being. This existence is not added to any essence, and His existence is self-subsistent." In his initial objection, al-Rāzī addresses the relationship of this existence to essence. He outlines that concerning the relationship of existence to essence in the Necessary Being and contingent beings, it can be categorized into three perspectives:

1. **Existence must be added to essence:** This view suggests that existence is not intrinsic to essence but is superadded to it. This perspective is typically applied to contingent beings.
2. **Existence must not be added to essence:** This perspective posits that existence is inherent in essence, such that essence and existence are indistinguishable or identical. This perspective aligns with Ibn Sīnā's position regarding God.
3. **Neither of the two is necessary:** This view allows for the possibility that existence and essence can be understood in ways that do not strictly adhere to the first two perspectives, suggesting a broader interpretation or different metaphysical framework.

These three perspectives frame al-Rāzī's examination of the relationship between existence and essence, forming the basis for his critique of Ibn Sīnā's argument on this matter.²¹

According to al-Rāzī, the first option leads to a correct conclusion that must be substantiated, while the other two options result in impossibilities:

First Possibility: In this view, since existence is common to both the Necessary Being and contingent beings, it must be actualized in both. This is because the necessity of existence's truth is realized

²⁰ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/358.

²¹ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/359.

whenever that truth exists. Therefore, to assert that the reality of existence is actualized in contingent essences but not in the Necessary Being implies that while existence exists in reality, its necessity does not exist. This stance contradicts the foundational principle that existence necessitates itself wherever it exists.

Second Possibility: This perspective presents the converse reasoning of the first option. If existence does not entail any form of contingency, then it should not be contingent upon any essence. Here, the necessity of existence's truth is nullified. While this scenario explains the absence of essence in the Necessary Being, it precludes assuming nonexistence in contingent beings.

Third Possibility: According to this view, the reality of existence does not entail either of the above states. Instead, what determines its existence or nonexistence is an external cause. In this case, the essence of the Necessary Being does not come into existence through its own intrinsic existence but rather through an external cause, suggesting contingency rather than necessity.

These perspectives outline al-Rāzī's critique of Ibn Sīnā's argument concerning the relationship between existence and essence. al-Rāzī argues that only the first possibility, where existence is inherent and necessary for both the Necessary Being and contingents, leads to a coherent and defensible position.²²

al-Rāzī's first criticism revolves around scrutinizing the relationship between the reality of existence and its addition to essence. This critique can also be framed as a challenge to the assertion that existence, which is added to contingent beings, is not similarly added to the Necessary Being. He questions and ultimately rejects Ibn Sīnā's distinction between the two categories of existence -necessary and contingent- highlighting the inconsistency in treating the addition of existence differently in the Necessary Being compared to contingent beings.

This critique underscores al-Rāzī's contention that if existence is acknowledged as added to contingent essences, then by the same logic, it should also be recognized as added to the essence of the Necessary Being. al-Rāzī argues against Ibn Sīnā's position that posits a fundamental difference between the Necessary Being, whose

²² al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/359.

existence is considered inherent and essential to its essence, and contingent beings, whose existence is added or contingent upon external factors. al-Rāzī asserts that this distinction leads to logical inconsistencies and challenges the philosophical basis for treating existence differently in these two categories. Thus, he aims to demonstrate the untenability of Ibn Sīnā's framework regarding the addition of existence to essence in metaphysical terms.

al-Rāzī's second criticism centers on the distinction between God's existence and His reality, which he argues cannot be perceived in the same manner. He posits that while God's existence can be perceived, His essence remains beyond perception. This distinction leads al-Rāzī to assert that God's absolute existence is understood through prior conception, whereas His essence cannot be directly perceived. Philosophers, according to al-Rāzī, maintain that the existence of contingent beings is added to their essence, supporting this with the analogy that "we know the essence of a triangle even if we doubt its existence," thereby illustrating the difference between what is known and what is unknown. al-Rāzī applies this reasoning to the case of God: despite knowing that God exists, His essence remains unknown. This disparity, according to al-Rāzī, implies that God's reality must differ from His existence. In essence, al-Rāzī's second criticism challenges the philosophical assertion that God's existence and essence can be understood in the same way as contingent beings, arguing instead that the nature of God's existence and the limitations of human perception necessitate a distinction between God's perceived existence and His fundamentally unknowable essence.²³

The question arises whether the pure *wujūd*, characterized by negations, can exert influence on the existence of contingent beings. Philosophers assert that God's reality consists fundamentally of pure existence alongside negational attributes. Moreover, they contend that God is the primary cause of contingent beings' existence. al-Rāzī, however, identifies an inherent contradiction between these assertions. If God's reality is indeed pure *wujūd* devoid of positive attributes, then these negations, which denote nonexistence, cannot logically function as causal factors for contingent existence. Nonexistence, by definition, cannot be a cause of existence. On the

²³ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/360.

other hand, if the residual existence that remains after negating these attributes serves as the cause of contingent existence, and if this existence is equated with the existence of contingent beings, then the implication follows that contingent beings share equivalently in God's essence, attributes, and actions. This proposition challenges traditional theological doctrines that uphold a distinct separation between God and His creation. In essence, al-Rāzī's critique highlights the philosophical dilemma of reconciling God's transcendental essence, characterized by pure wujūd and negations, with His role as the cause of contingent existence. This discussion prompts deeper exploration into the metaphysical underpinnings of existence and causation within philosophical and theological frameworks.²⁴

In this objection, al-Rāzī delves into the philosophical assertions regarding God as the cause of contingent existence and raises fundamental questions about the nature of this causal relationship. He begins by asserting that since existence is integral to contingent beings, if this existence is understood as a shared entity, then it logically follows that this shared existence between God and contingent beings must be linked to God's own existence, given that He is posited as their cause. Thus, al-Rāzī's objection revolves around scrutinizing the coherence and implications of attributing causality to God concerning contingent entities.

In his fourth objection, al-Rāzī contends that existence, viewed as a species nature, necessitates uniformity across all its instances. This assertion draws upon philosophical principles that uphold the consistency of what is entailed by the nature of a species. al-Rāzī applies this reasoning to the concept of existence itself, arguing that since existence is fundamentally what every essence requires, it must exhibit uniform characteristics across all beings. Just as philosophers maintain the uniformity of principles in other contexts, such as the celestial spheres and the rejection of Democritus's theory of indivisible parts, al-Rāzī extends this principle to the realm of existence. Therefore, he argues that this uniformity should also apply when considering the nature of God.²⁵

In his analysis of the statement that "the cause precedes the caused in terms of existence," al-Rāzī offers objections to Ibn Sīnā's argument.

²⁴ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/360.

²⁵ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/360-361.

He challenges the notion that if essence were the cause of its existence, it would precede itself in terms of existence. This objection delves into the causal relationship between essence and existence, questioning whether essence can logically precede itself in the act of causing its own existence. Al-Rāzī's objections likely focus on the philosophical implications of such a proposition. He might argue that if essence were indeed the cause of its own existence, it would imply a temporal and logical priority of essence over existence, which contradicts the accepted metaphysical principles regarding causality. Causality typically implies that the cause must precede its effect, but applying this directly to the relationship between essence and existence raises complex metaphysical questions. Moreover, al-Rāzī may argue against Ibn Sīnā's position by suggesting that existence is not something that can be caused by essence in the traditional sense of causality. Essence and existence, in the classical philosophical framework, are treated as distinct metaphysical categories, and the idea that essence could cause its own existence blurs these distinctions and introduces ambiguities into the concept of causality itself. Therefore, al-Rāzī's objections likely aim to clarify and challenge the coherence of Ibn Sīnā's argument regarding the relationship between essence and existence, particularly in terms of how causality operates within metaphysical inquiry.²⁶

In his analysis of the concept of "precedence" as used in philosophical discourse, al-Rāzī contends that if the term implies "the causal priority of the cause over its effect in terms of existence," it universally signifies efficient causation. However, if it denotes "the temporal priority of the cause over the effect in terms of existence," this directly addresses the crux of the philosophical debate. Here, the focus lies on establishing that God's existence is efficacious through His essence, without presupposing His existence as prior. Asserting that causation entails the effect's existence following the cause's existence shifts the discussion to different terminology while addressing the same fundamental issue. This interpretation rejects any alternative meaning of priority that does not involve agenthood.²⁷

In this objection, al-Rāzī scrutinizes the notion of the cause preceding its effect in terms of existence. He distinguishes between two interpretations: first, that precedence implies efficient causation,

²⁶ Ibn Sīnā, *al-Isbārāt*, 129.

²⁷ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/361.

and second, that it signifies a temporal priority of existence. According to al-Rāzī, if precedence in terms of existence is understood as efficient causation, it aligns with established philosophical principles. However, if it suggests a temporal priority of existence, it directly addresses the ongoing debate about whether essence is implicated in God's existence. Therefore, al-Rāzī argues that merely stating that the cause precedes in terms of existence does not significantly advance the discussion regarding God's existence.

According to al-Rāzī, the proposition that every cause precedes its effect in terms of existence warrants further exploration. al-Rāzī's analysis delves into the relationship between the essences of contingents and their potential for existence. He argues that while contingent essences possess the potential for existence, they also require causes for their actual existence. In this context, it is not necessary for the cause of this potential to precede its effect in terms of existence. The same principle applies to the efficient cause. In contrast, Ibn Sīnā posited that the essence of a thing can be the cause of one of its attributes. If the essence acts as an agent in producing an attribute, it must do so without preceding the attribute in terms of existence. This perspective suggests that attributing precedence in terms of existence to the essence indicates that the essence alone is insufficient as the cause, and instead, it is the existing essence itself that acts as the cause. Ibn Sīnā maintains that the essence itself is the cause, not something prior to it in terms of existence.²⁸

In this context, adhering to Ibn Sīnā's premises can lead to conclusions that appear contradictory to his initial assumptions. Therefore, the priority of the agent over the effect does not necessarily need to be understood in terms of existence alone.²⁹ According to al-Rāzī, the contention arises that if essence is not acknowledged to exist in its function as an agent, it could be argued that its non-existence necessitates its role as a cause. al-Rāzī responds as follows:

"The assertion that 'the cause of an essence does not depend on the existence of an essence' does not imply the validity of the proposition that 'an essence can cause existence when it does not exist'. Similarly, stating that 'the potential for a contingent essence to exist does not rely on the existence of

²⁸ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/361.

²⁹ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/362.

that essence' does not affirm the idea that 'an essence is capable of existence when it does not exist'. Rather, it underscores that essence and its existence or non-existence are distinct aspects of being. We assert that only the essence itself, in terms of its inherent nature, has influence over existence, and this assertion does not exclude the possibility of its non-existence."³⁰

al-Rāzī unequivocally rejects the notion that essence could function as a cause regardless of whether it is actualized. Whether essence is considered a cause, the debate over whether its precedence over the effect pertains to its essence or existence becomes irrelevant given the impossibility of essence functioning as a cause when it does not exist. al-Rāzī explicitly refutes any inference that "essence can be a cause while it does not exist" or "essence can be capable of existence while it does not exist". His rationale hinges on the understanding that essence, as a causal factor in existence, pertains fundamentally to its own intrinsic nature, independent of its actual existence. Therefore, according to al-Rāzī, acknowledging essence as a causal agent based on its inherent nature does not preclude its potential as a cause even in its absence. In essence, objections asserting the impossibility of essence acting as a cause in its non-existence are deemed invalid by al-Rāzī.

Another objection that can be raised against this assertion is whether an essence can influence its own existence when it does not yet exist. If such a scenario were plausible, it would imply that the essence could potentially impact the existence of the world before even coming into existence itself. This raises a critical distinction: the necessity to differentiate between the essence's theoretical potential to influence existence and the actual causal relationship observed in the world. Without this distinction, one might erroneously infer the existence of an agent responsible for bringing things into being solely based on the existence of entities in the world.³¹ The objection posits that al-Rāzī's assertion renders *ithbāt al-wājib* (the proof of the Necessary) untenable. If essences can exert influence on their existence even when they do not exist, then there is theoretically no barrier to them exerting influence on the world when they themselves

³⁰ al-Rāzī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/362.

³¹ al-Rāzī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/362.

do not exist. Consequently, it becomes problematic to assert the existence of an efficient agent solely based on the existence of entities in the world. al-Rāzī distinguishes between “existing *li-zātibī*” (existing in itself) and “being the cause of something else when it does not exist.” It is a fundamental principle that something cannot act as a cause unless it exists; this is self-evident. However, the concept of existing “*li-zātibī*” implies that its essence inherently necessitates its existence.³² It would be inaccurate to assert that because essence can potentially cause its own existence, it can also be the cause of external things like the world. The distinction lies in the nature of causation: while essence influencing its own existence might be conceivable under certain philosophical frameworks, extending this to external entities such as the world involves a fundamentally different level of causative relationship and ontological status.

4. al-Ṭūsī’s Defense of Ibn Sīnā

In delineating al-Ṭūsī’s analysis, it can be compartmentalized into two principal segments. Initially, he elucidates the rationale behind al-Rāzī’s purported misconceptions, followed by a systematic presentation of objections to al-Rāzī, substantiated with precise arguments. Central to al-Ṭūsī’s critique is the contention that al-Rāzī, having initially demonstrated the impossibility of a direct commonality of *wujūd* in a literal sense, proceeds to posit an equivalence among all existents on a uniform plane.³³ According to al-Ṭūsī, al-Rāzī’s misunderstanding leads him to equate the existence of the necessary with that of the contingent. Seeing that existence is attributed to essence in contingent beings, al-Rāzī mistakenly concludes that the same attribution must apply to necessary beings. al-Ṭūsī explicitly argues that al-Rāzī lacks a proper understanding of predication by *tashkīk*.³⁴ Attribution by *tashkīk* involves assigning a concept with the same meaning but at varying levels across all individuals to whom it applies. For instance, *wujūd* (existence) is attributed in the forms of precedence-subsequence in cause and effect relationships, universality-absence of universality in substance and accidents, and

³² al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 2/362.

³³ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 2/356. cf. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbihāt*, ed. Sulaymān Dunyā (Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘ārif, 1960), 3/30.

³⁴ al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 3/31.

intensity-weakness in qualities like blackness and whiteness. In both necessary and contingent beings, *wujūd* is predicated in these three distinct manners.³⁵ According to al-Ṭūsī, comprehending *tashkīk* resolves all of al-Rāzī's inquiries because it attributes existence, as philosophers accept it, uniformly across all instances under its purview. However, this uniform attribution does not imply equivalence among necessities. Various truths can concur under a single necessity without necessitating equality.³⁶ Here, al-Ṭūsī refers to "the *malzūms* of existence" as encompassing both the existence of the necessary and the contingent. While these entities share a commonality in their existence (*lāzim*), which is a unified concept, their *malzūms*, or what is intended by that existence, do not necessarily align at the same level. This *lāzim*, or existence, is predicated diversely across different levels. Therefore, the existence attributed to the necessary being and that attributed to contingent beings differ in their *malzūm*, despite sharing a singular conceptual meaning.

In responding to al-Rāzī's first objection regarding the addition of existence to essence, the following points can be addressed: al-Rāzī posits three possibilities regarding the relationship between existence and essence; that existence must be added to essence, that it must not be added, or that neither addition nor non-addition is necessary. According to al-Rāzī, in the first and second possibilities, where existence could either be necessarily added to essence or not, there arises an implication that the necessary being and the contingent being should be treated equally in terms of this addition. However, in the third scenario where an external cause determines whether existence is added or not, it suggests a need for an external factor to dictate this condition.³⁷ In addressing this objection, al-Ṭūsī's response draws upon the concept of *tashkīk*, as previously discussed. He illustrates this with examples such as sunlight and other light sources, and heat from different sources. Despite both being instances of light or heat, their effects and attributes differ based on their specific characteristics. For instance, sunlight may clear vision while other sources do not, and different types of heat may or may not sustain life or affect different

³⁵ al-Ṭūsī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/31.

³⁶ al-Ṭūsī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/32.

³⁷ al-Rāzī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/359.

species equally. This distinction arises because the *malzūm*, or the essence and attributes associated with light or heat, varies depending on the specific nature and source of each instance. Thus, while existence may be predicated universally, the specific qualities and effects attributed to it can differ significantly based on the context and nature of the entities involved.³⁸ That is, al-Rāzī argues that the concept of existence yields diverse outcomes among entities that share it due to variations in their *malzūm*, or underlying essence and attributes. Consequently, he contends that uniform effects cannot be universally expected across all individuals to whom the concept of existence is applied.

“If *wujūd* were universally uniform, as al-Rāzī posits, it would necessitate a causal mechanism that mandates addition, analogous to contingents. However, in the Necessary, *wujūd* does not require a causal mechanism that mandates addition. The absence of addition is not contingent upon a cause; the mere absence of a cause for addition suffices to explain its absence.”³⁹

The response to al-Rāzī’s second objection concerning the distinction between God’s existence and His reality, where he argues that God’s existence is perceivable but His reality is not, is as follows: al-Rāzī contends that acknowledging the knowability of God’s existence while asserting the unknowability of His reality necessitates a differentiation between the concepts of existence and reality.⁴⁰ In response to this objection, al-Ṭūsī posits that while God’s existence is singular, what is apprehended a priori is absolute existence. The intellect can grasp absolute existence but not God’s singular existence itself. Among unique entities, some are comprehensible while others are not. The particular existence of God remains inscrutable to the intellect. The apprehension of absolute existence does not necessitate the direct apprehension of singular entities; otherwise, apprehending existence would entail apprehending all unique entities. Thus, al-Ṭūsī concludes, “The distinction between the apprehension of existence and the apprehension of God’s reality indicates that God’s reality is distinct from absolute existence.” In addition, he asserts that “There is

³⁸ al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/32.

³⁹ al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/32.

⁴⁰ al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/360.

no intrinsic necessity for God's reality to coincide with His singular existence."⁴¹

The response to al-Rāzī's third objection, concerning whether the mere *wujūd*, characterized by negatives, can influence the existence of contingents, follows this line of reasoning: According to the philosophers, God's reality consists of pure *wujūd* along with negative attributes. al-Ṭūsī counters al-Rāzī by asserting that what impacts the existence of contingents is not the negative attributes, which denote non-existence, but rather the *wujūd* itself. This *wujūd* is equivalent to their existence. Furthermore, al-Ṭūsī underscores the distinction between God's existence and that of contingents. God's existence is not universal but rather an individual and specific existence belonging uniquely to Him. This substantial existence, unlike that of contingents, is self-subsistent.⁴² In al-Ṭūsī's view, al-Rāzī's objection stems from a misunderstanding of the concept of existence, which is predicated with a unified meaning but exists at various levels.

In response to al-Rāzī's fourth objection regarding the uniformity of a species' nature, the philosophers contend that a species' nature necessitates uniformity across all its instances. This principle extends to existence, which is considered part of a species' nature. Therefore, the effects or attributes related to existence should not vary among different instances. For instance, the judgment concerning the existence or nonexistence of an essence should remain consistent and not subject to variability.⁴³ In response to this objection, al-Ṭūsī rejects the premise that existence is a nature of species, which he posits as the only viable response to al-Rāzī's criticism. According to al-Ṭūsī, philosophers cannot be faulted on this basis because existence is not uniformly attributed across all members of a species, unlike other attributes that are inherently part of a species' nature.⁴⁴ According to al-Ṭūsī, existence, being predicated through *tashkīk*, cannot be considered a species' nature. Therefore, objections claiming that existence entails the same characteristics across all individuals to which it is attributed are invalid. *Tashkīk* allows for different levels of

⁴¹ al-Ṭūsī, *Sbarḥ al-Ishārāt*, 3/33.

⁴² al-Ṭūsī, *Sbarḥ al-Ishārāt*, 3/33.

⁴³ al-Rāzī, *Sbarḥ al-Ishārāt*, 2/360-361.

⁴⁴ al-Ṭūsī, *Sbarḥ al-Ishārāt*, 3/34.

predication of existence, indicating that it is not uniformly applicable in the same manner across different entities.

According to al-Ṭūsī, the assertion that “the cause precedes the caused in terms of existence” implies that the effect’s existence depends on the cause’s prior existence. However, if the essence is considered a cause only when it exists externally, this implies a circular conditionality where “the essence must exist for it to exist,” which al-Ṭūsī deems impossible. This highlights the logical contradiction inherent in a thing being conditioned by itself.

al-Rāzī’s objection centers on the notion that while essence does not precede existence in terms of its actual existence, it can still function as an agent in bringing about existence, particularly in its potentiality for existence. This distinction underscores his critique of the philosophical position that attributes causal efficacy to essence without necessitating its prior existence in a substantial sense.⁴⁵ al-Ṭūsī counters al-Rāzī’s assertion regarding essence having an external existence apart from its actual existence by positing that essence primarily exists within the intellect as a conceptual or mental existence. This mental existence allows the intellect to contemplate essence independently of existence (*wujūd*). Importantly, the absence of recognition of a thing does not imply the recognition of its non-existence.⁴⁶

5. Şadr al-Sharī‘ah’s Perspective on the Issue

Şadr al-Sharī‘ah diverges from previous thinkers in his view that the commonality of existence among existents is not merely conceptual or in terms of meaning, but is realized literally. This stance contrasts with the approach of other philosophers who attribute existence in a qualified manner or with distinctions.⁴⁷ Accepting that *wujūd* (existence) is common in meaning entails elucidating the differentiation between what exists in terms of essence, thereby implying the addition of *wujūd* to these essences. Conversely, when commonality in terms of lexis (expression) is accepted, there is no

⁴⁵ al-Rāzī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/362.

⁴⁶ al-Ṭūsī, *Sbarḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/34.

⁴⁷ ‘Ubayd Allāh Ibn Mas‘ūd Şadr al-Sharī‘ah, *Sbarḥ Ta’dīl al-‘ulūm* (İstanbul: Süleymaniye Library, Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 143a. For an analysis of Şadr al-Sharī‘ah’s thought, see Şensoy, *Sadrüşşer‘a’nın Kelâmı Ta’dīl Teşebbüsü*, 94 ff.

addition of *wujūd*. This distinction arises because acceptance of commonality in meaning acknowledges the differentiation between *wujūd* and essence, thereby affirming addition.⁴⁸ According to Şadr al-Sharī'ah, the distinction drawn by those who differentiate between existence and essence, as well as between the contingent and the Necessary, lacks justification. This stance arises from the philosophical perspective where in the contingent realm, existence is intrinsic to essence, whereas in the Necessary realm, no such distinction exists due to its inherent causality requirement.⁴⁹

Şadr al-Sharī'ah critically examines the philosophers' concept of addition through the lens of al-Ṭūsī. He critiques this notion by highlighting the potential for a vicious circle between essence, which is considered the cause, and *wujūd*, its effect. This critique underscores Şadr al-Sharī'ah's broader skepticism toward the philosophical framework, particularly concerning the relationship between essence and existence.⁵⁰ However, the denial of essentiality he articulates here pertains not exclusively to the Necessary but also extends to the contingent. The article's focus excludes an analysis of the rejection of addition in contingents.

As previously discussed, al-Ṭūsī argued that the objections raised by al-Rāzī could be resolved through the principle of *tashkīk*.⁵¹ Şadr al-Sharī'ah, in his critique, argues that merely invoking the principle of *tashkīk* is insufficient. He contends that the analogy drawn between expressions like "man being a thinking creature" and "triangle being a shape" is flawed because they do not share a single meaning; rather, they share the expression of existence (*kawn*). Furthermore, according to Şadr al-Sharī'ah, the crux of the matter lies not in determining the form of commonality but rather in understanding why certain entities, which are considered to have a unified existence, are self-subsistent while others are not.⁵² Since al-Ṭūsī was aware of this, as will be remembered, he argued that absolute *wujūd* remains unchanged, but its *malzūms* vary. While *wujūd* is predicated uniformly across individuals as a single meaning, the specifics of what it entails (its

⁴⁸ Murat Kaş, *Seyyid Şerîf Cürçânî'de Zibnî Varlık* (İstanbul: Marmara University, Institute of Social Sciences, PhD Dissertation, 2017), 151.

⁴⁹ Şadr al-Sharī'ah, *Şarḥ Ta'dîl al-'ulûm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 143a-144a.

⁵⁰ Şadr al-Sharī'ah, *Şarḥ Ta'dîl al-'ulûm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 146b.

⁵¹ al-Ṭūsī, *Şarḥ al-Isbārât*, 3/31 ff. cf. al-Rāzī, *Şarḥ al-Isbārât*, 2/356 ff.

⁵² Şadr al-Sharī'ah, *Şarḥ Ta'dîl al-'ulûm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 147a.

malzūms) need not be identical. al-Ṭūsī clarified that while *wujūd* is attributed uniformly to both necessary and contingent beings, this does not necessitate an equivalence in the existence of necessary and contingent entities.⁵³ Şadr al-Sharī‘ah’s argument posits that the notion of “*malzūms* change” does not adequately address the underlying issue. He illustrates this by highlighting that certain attributions cannot be equated directly in the form of “it is that”. For instance, one cannot assert that “thinking (*nutaq*) is laughing (*dihk*)” or that “heat (*ḥarārah*) is attraction (*jadhb*)”. Such direct identifications are only permissible in derived terms (*musbtāq*). Instead, one can appropriately say “*nāfiq* is genius” or “*ḥārr* is attractive”. In essence, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah contends that while Ṭūsī’s argument about the variability of *malzūms* attempts to reconcile the uniform attribution of *wujūd* with the diversity in what it entails, this approach fails to fully resolve the issue because the relationships between entities cannot be reduced to mere interchangeable terms without considering their distinct essences and attributes.⁵⁴

In his analysis, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah adopts a language-centric approach to predication. He challenges the conventional distinction between existence and essence, and consequently rejects the idea of *wujūd* being added -specifically, he does not accept the predication of *wujūd* that is not derived from language. According to Şadr al-Sharī‘ah, the accuracy of predication hinges on whether the derivative of the predicate coexists with the subject. If this coexistence, termed *qiyām*, is not present, meaning if there is no inherent relation where one essence necessitates another, then the predication is deemed incorrect in his view. Thus, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah’s approach emphasizes linguistic coherence and the interplay of derived meanings in validating philosophical assertions about existence and essence.

Regarding the addition of existence to essence, al-Rāzī contends that existence should entail uniform implications across all entities regarding its presence or absence. This stance reflects his insistence on a consistent understanding of existence across philosophical discourse.⁵⁵ al-Ṭūsī responded to this objection by invoking the concept of *tashkīk*, which posits that existence is attributed in a

⁵³ al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/32.

⁵⁴ Şadr al-Sharī‘ah, *Sharḥ Ta‘dīl al-‘ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 147a.

⁵⁵ al-Rāzī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 2/359.

nuanced manner across different entities. This approach allows for distinctions in how existence manifests within various contexts, thereby addressing al-Rāzī's concerns about uniformity in the implications of existence.⁵⁶ Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah critiques al-Ṭūsī's response, arguing that it inadequately addresses the objection raised. He disputes al-Ṭūsī's differentiation concerning what is necessitated, particularly rejecting the notion that beings are necessitated by an absolute *wujūd*. According to Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah, this distinction does not sufficiently resolve the philosophical issue at hand.⁵⁷ In Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah's critique, he contends that attributing differentiation to what is required does not adequately resolve the philosophical issue. He challenges al-Ṭūsī's assertion that no justification is necessary for nonaddition, arguing that this response fails to address the core of the matter. According to Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah, nonaddition signifies that existence subsists with its essence. al-Ṭūsī's statement, "It is either subsistent with its own essence, or with something else, or neither of these," suggests that substance and accident predicate existence either due to their intrinsic nature or due to some external factor. If it arises from their essence, then existence must universally manifest as substance or accident across all instances. Conversely, if it stems from an external cause, then the necessary existence deriving from its essence must trace back to an external agent. Nonaddition implies that existence originates from itself, a concept distinct from nonexistence. Therefore, claiming "the absence of the cause of being added is sufficient" is inappropriate because it does not pertain to absence. Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah contrasts this with self-subsistence, where existence possesses an inherent power to be independent of a specific locus. This characteristic, seen in substances and accidents, signifies their capacity to exist autonomously, not as an absence but as a manifestation of strength absent in accidents. The independence of existence from nonexistence does not necessitate independence from another entity in existence itself.⁵⁸

From this perspective, according to Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah, if we were to accept al-Ṭūsī's explanation that justifies the situation based on the absence of something, it would invalidate our ability to discuss the

⁵⁶ al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, 3/32.

⁵⁷ Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 148a.

⁵⁸ Ṣadr al-Sharī'ah, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 148a.

Necessary being independently. In other words, attributing the Necessary being's independence solely to the absence of a causal factor related to nonexistence implies a problematic stance. It suggests that the Necessary being's independence hinges on the non-existence of a cause rather than on its inherent essence or self-subsistence. This contradicts the notion that the Necessary being exists independently, without reliance on external causes or conditions.

In addressing the question of whether the mere *wujūd*, categorized with negatives, can have an effect on the existence of contingents, Şadr al-Sharī'ah critiques the philosophical views on this matter, which he finds to be both erroneous and contradictory. Central to his critique is the discrepancy he identifies in how philosophers understand *wujūb* (necessity) and *wujūd* (existence). According to Şadr al-Sharī'ah, philosophers hold the view that God's reality is *wujūd* subjected to negation (*salbī limits*), yet they also equate *wujūb* with *wujūd* by asserting that necessity strengthens existence. This perceived contradiction arises from the philosophical stance that *wujūb*, being a subjunctive concept indicating necessity, is treated as equivalent to *wujūd*, which is described using a form associated with negation (*salbī*). Şadr al-Sharī'ah argues that *wujūb* and *wujūd* cannot be equated in this manner because *wujūb* implies a state of necessity, while *wujūd*, when described in a *salbī* form, indicates a negated or limited existence. Equating the two would thus imply treating something that signifies existence with something that signifies non-existence or limitation, which he finds logically untenable. Therefore, Şadr al-Sharī'ah's criticism centers on the philosophical inconsistency of equating *wujūb* with *wujūd*, highlighting the need for a more precise understanding of these terms and their implications for theological and metaphysical discourse. His analysis underscores the importance of clarity in defining concepts like *wujūb* and *wujūd* to avoid conceptual confusions and contradictions in philosophical reasoning.⁵⁹

In philosophical discourse, the proposition that *wujūd* (existence) represents both God's reality and the essence of existent entities poses a significant theoretical challenge when juxtaposed with the notion of *wujūd* being subject to *salbī* (negation) limits. If philosophers maintain

⁵⁹ Şadr al-Sharī'ah, *Sbarḥ Ta'dil al-'ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 170a.

that *wujūd* constitutes God's reality and encompasses all existent entities, the implication that God's reality could also be subject to *salbī* limits necessitates equating *wujūd* with a form of negation or limitation. This proposition leads to a logical contradiction: *wujūd* inherently signifies affirmation and existence, while *salbī* denotes negation or restriction. Therefore, suggesting that God's reality, which is understood as *wujūd*, could be subject to *salbī* limits introduces an inconsistency in philosophical reasoning, challenging the coherence of metaphysical assertions concerning the nature of existence and the divine.⁶⁰

In addressing the objection that "the existence itself is not substance and accident, but some of its members, i.e., *wujūdāt*, are substance and some are accident," Şadr al-Sharī'ah argues against the differentiation of entities required by a single nature. He asserts that if something is attributed to a single nature, such as existence (*wujūd*), it cannot simultaneously exhibit qualities of both substantiality and accidentality. According to Şadr al-Sharī'ah, the inherent nature of *wujūd* implies uniformity among its constituents; therefore, positing that some *wujūdāt* (existents) are substantial while others are accidental contradicts the unified essence of *wujūd*. This argument challenges the notion that *wujūd*, as a fundamental concept, can manifest in diverse forms that fundamentally differ in their ontological status.⁶¹ As recalled, al-Ṭūsī contends that *wujūd* (existence) does not constitute the essential nature of a species.⁶² This is due to the species' nature being uniformly attributed to its individuals on an equal level (*ṭawāṭu*³), not through differentiation (*tasbkīk*) as with *wujūd*.⁶³ According to Şadr al-Sharī'ah, this response remains insufficient. He critiques the assertion that "essence and its parts do not differentiate." If this statement implies that existence is attributed with conditions like strength and weakness, as Şadr al-Sharī'ah argues, then absolute existence itself becomes differentiated. What undergoes differentiation, not essence per se, must be present universally. Furthermore, *wujūd*, delimited by factors such as strength and

⁶⁰ Şadr al-Sharī'ah, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 170a.

⁶¹ Şadr al-Sharī'ah, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 148a; al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/33.

⁶² Şadr al-Sharī'ah, *Sharḥ Ta'dīl al-'ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 148a; al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/34.

⁶³ al-Ṭūsī, *Sharḥ al-Isbārāt*, 3/34.

weakness, cannot be considered a component of existence. Thus, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah queries, “Why cannot it be asserted that what differentiates is absolute *wujūd*”⁶⁴ According to Şadr al-Sharī‘ah, al-Ṭūsī’s concept of differentiation does not pertain to distinctions among externally differentiated individuals. This perspective, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah argues, is flawed. For instance, when examining heat and posing the question “What is it?”, despite its manifestation in various forms, the response remains consistent that each instance is indeed heat. Attributes such as heat, motion, growth, weight, and lightness apply universally, with variations in their degrees among different entities; this does not align with the claimed notion of differentiation.⁶⁵

Conclusion

The distinction between existence and essence, a cornerstone in philosophical discourse distinguishing the Necessary from the contingent, has evolved into a principle advocating the nonaddition of existence to the Necessary being. Ibn Sīnā critically examined this issue in his *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*, particularly in his fourth *namaṭ*, addressing the inherent contradictions when essence is posited as a causal factor in the Necessary. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, in his *Sharḥ al-Ishārāt*, scrutinized Ibn Sīnā’s argument, prompting responses from al-Ṭūsī who suggested that al-Rāzī’s objections could be resolved through a nuanced understanding of *tasbīk* and addition.

Şadr al-Sharī‘ah, however, offered a distinct critique, analyzing al-Ṭūsī’s responses and challenging the broader philosophical tradition, especially the perspectives of Ibn Sīnā and al-Ṭūsī. al-Rāzī’s criticisms spanned various dimensions, questioning whether accidental existence constitutes a fundamental property, the justification for distinguishing the known existence of the Necessary from its unknown reality, the implications of mere existence on contingents, the universal manifestation of species nature, and the causal precedence of cause over effect.

al-Ṭūsī countered al-Rāzī across these fronts, defending Ibn Sīnā’s concept of essentiality. In contrast, Şadr al-Sharī‘ah departed from traditional views by positing that existence is not merely common in

⁶⁴ Şadr al-Sharī‘ah, *Sharḥ Ta’dīl al-‘ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 148b.

⁶⁵ Şadr al-Sharī‘ah, *Sharḥ Ta’dīl al-‘ulūm* (Antalya-Tekelioğlu, 798), fl. 148b.

meaning but rather in a literal sense, thereby engaging al-Ṭūsī's arguments from his unique perspective on existence.

The accepted stance on *wujūd*, a pivotal concept in *al-umūr al-āmmah*, significantly shapes discussions on related issues. This perspective influences the trajectory of debates depending on whether existence is viewed as common in meaning or wording, thereby impacting the direction and outcome of philosophical discourse. Ultimately, this intellectual evolution can be seen as Şadr al-Sharī'ah's integration into the *al-Ishārāt* tradition, albeit through a specific argumentative lens.

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PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL FINDINGS ON THE ADAPTED FAITH DEVELOPMENT MODEL FOR A MUSLIM CONTEXT

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Abstract

The theory of faith development was criticized from a Muslim perspective, and a modified bipolar orthogonal dimensional version of the model (low-to-high level of cognitive development vs. low-to-high level of commitment) with eight dimensions was subsequently proposed in two previous studies. The aim of this third study is to provide empirical findings to support the proposed model of religiosity styles (content and structure) in a Muslim context. To this end, two sets of data were employed using a group comparison design. In Study 1, the sample (n = 934) was conveniently selected from the campuses of three different Turkish state universities (454 men and 480 women,

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with a mean age of 22). The instruments used for data collection were adapted from items of previously developed scales aimed at measuring Muslim religiosity. In Study 2, a second mixed sample of 165 participants was selected, comprising university students and members of the general public (54 men and 111 women, with a mean age of 28). The instrument for data collection was constructed by transforming the Likert response format of previously employed scales into a semantic differential format and adding several new items to the battery to measure areas in the proposed model that the available data did not cover. Data were analysed using factor analysis, item analysis, and correlation analyses. The findings from the two studies broadly supported the theoretically proposed eight concepts of religiosity represented in a circumplex model of religiosity styles with the two bipolar dimensions of “High vs. Low Differentiation” and “High commitment vs. High non-commitment”.

Key Words: faith development, stage, style, religiosity, scale, Muslim, adaptation

Introduction¹

Religious commitment (and non-commitment)² is a complex variable in psychological research. Developing a practical, comprehensive theory and a set of instruments to examine it could provide valuable tools for both practitioners and researchers. The theory of faith development is among the most comprehensive approaches to explaining variations in religiosity from a cognitive perspective, comparable to studies by Perry (1970), Kegan (1982), and Kohlberg (1987). While the theory has a robust qualitative foundation,

¹ This study is the international and extended version of the paper published in Turkish (Ok, 2021). It has been revised, modified, supplemented with additional data set, and aligned with the study's objectives. The paper also constitutes the third (and the final) paper in the series of 3 papers on criticism, new model offer and empirical evidence regarding the theory of faith development (see the text).

² The terms *religiosity*, *faith*, *spirituality*, and *worldview* will be used interchangeably and intentionally throughout the text, depending on the contextual requirements. This approach is justified for two reasons. First, the original faith development theory was later revised into a framework of religious styles. Second, the theory encompasses both religious and non-religious forms of 'faith,' defined as a commitment to a set of core values or value centers.

quantitative methods continue to face challenges in effectively measuring the developmental trajectories of faith.

The theory of faith development and the instruments used to measure it in both Christian and Muslim contexts were critically evaluated in a previous study (Ok – Gennerich, 2024a). Building on this critique and drawing on empirical observations conducted in a Muslim context, a new proposal for religiosity styles was introduced (Ok – Gennerich, 2024b). This culturally sensitive, adapted theoretical model incorporates both religious and non-religious content while preserving the emphasis on cognitive structure. It was argued that the theory of faith development neglects the content of religiosity—specifically, levels of commitment and non-commitment—by overemphasizing cognitive structural development. Consequently, critical or even hostile orientations toward religiosity were excluded from the scope of the theory.

It has been argued that the theory of faith development adopts a predominantly secular approach to religious development, with the “developed” styles it promotes tending to favor an uncommitted, secular, and rational perspective on religiosity. However, there is a potential to introduce more sophisticated and developed, yet simultaneously committed, versions of religiosity that evolve from conventional forms of faith. This possibility is supported by observations from the biographies of renowned historical Muslim figures. Furthermore, a new and more comprehensive framework for the theory of religious and anti-religious development has been proposed. This framework offers a more detailed exploration of each religious style identified in earlier studies. The current third study aims to provide empirical evidence supporting this proposed model of religiosity styles within Islam (Ok – Gennerich, 2024b) by presenting the results of quantitative analyses conducted on two sets of empirical data.

Among the hypotheses is the idea that what is referred to as conjunctive faith in the theory of faith development represents a relatively secularized approach to religiosity, emphasizing openness to

diversity and interreligious tolerance. It is also hypothesized that a ‘religious/spiritual’ version of conjunctive faith can be introduced. Conversely, fundamentalism is described in the theory as a characteristic primarily associated with mythic-literal religious individuals. However, an inflexible and aggressive attitude toward religiosity is a widely observed phenomenon in modern times (see Ok, 2023) and should be addressed within an adapted version of the theory of faith development.

This study is partly based on the premise that previous scales developed to measure faith development (see Harris – Leak, 2013; Leak et al., 1999; Leak, 2003, 2008, 2009; Streib et al., 2010; Ok, 2007a, 2009, 2012) have been only partially successful. These scales tend to emphasize certain dimensions of faith development while exhibiting a bias toward committed, conventional religiosity. Moreover, the schema of conventional religiosity—the most prevalent style among religious populations (Fowler, 1981)—has not been independently represented in empirical studies.

Additionally, instruments designed to measure religious styles or faith development often lack specificity, making it difficult to assess each style independently. This has led to controversial findings regarding their validity. In response to these critiques, a new model was proposed in Ok – Gennerich (2024b). This model represents two primary dimensions of religiosity within a bipolar, two-dimensional orthogonal circumplex framework, as follows:




Figure 1. The adapted model of Muslim religiosity styles (cited from Ok – Gennerich, 2024b)

It was proposed that two main dimensions of religiosity—commitment vs. non-commitment and high cognitive differentiation vs. low cognitive differentiation—intersect to form four overarching religiosity quadrants, each containing two distinct styles. These quadrants collectively represent eight primary religiosity constructs: *Seekers* (dialectical and enlightened), *Unifiers* (compassionate and apologetic), *Conservers* (conforming and particularistic), and *Objectors* (dissenting and antagonistic).

Each of these eight constructs also has two non-hierarchical variations. For example, conforming religiosity can manifest as either *conscious* or *imitative*. However, these variations are less critical for inclusion in quantitative measurement.

Given that the newly adapted model is assumed to comprehensively explain variations in Islamic religiosity, it is expected that existing religiosity scales developed within Islamic cultural contexts could be utilized to test the model. Several constructs have been developed to measure various dimensions of Muslim religiosity (see Ok, 2016; 2012; 2011; 2009; 2007a; 2024). These constructs have been validated through exploratory factor analyses and assessments of criterion validity. Theoretically and hypothetically, these scales can be associated with the eight constructs proposed above as follows:

<i>8 Main Dimensions of Religiosity Styles</i>	<i>Detailed two sub dimensions of 8 main religiosity styles</i>	<i>Constructs/measures that are assumed to measure main religiosity styles</i>
<i>Enlightened</i>	Religious openness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Openness in religiosity • Religious pluralism • Religious relativism • Quest religious orientation (Ok, 2008; 2012)
	Quest religious orientation	

<i>Dialectical</i>	Deconversion	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious conflict and uncertainty • Deconversion • Atheism • Religious autonomy • Historical reduction (Ok, 2006)
	Anti-religiosity	
<i>Compassionate</i>	Compassionate-united	(not developed so far but introduced in this study)
	Enlightened religiosity	
<i>Apologetic</i>	Reformative-critical	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Historicist hermeneutics (reformative) (Ok, 2009)
	Systemic-orthodoxy	
<i>Conforming</i>	Conscious religiosity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious attitude (Ok, 2011) • Religious saliency (Ok, 2008) • Conservatism (Ok – Goren, 2018) • Conventionalism (Ok, 2008)
	Imitative religiosity	
<i>Dissent</i>	Conscious reaction to religiosity (i.e. anti-religiosity)	(No scale available)
	Imitative reaction to religiosity	
<i>Particularistic</i>	Hard mythic-literal religiosity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Absolutism (rigidity) and literalism • Mythic thinking • Closed-mindedness (or need for closure) • Proselytising tendency and particularism (Ok, 2012). • Right-wing authoritarianism (Ok – Goren, 2018)
	Soft mythic-literal religiosity	
<i>Antagonistic</i>	Hard mythic-literal reaction to religiosity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Left-wing authoritarianism (Ok Goren, 2018)
	Soft mythic-literal reaction to religiosity	

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unquestioned obedience to secular authority (Ok, 2008)
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Table 2. Religiosity scales and their theoretical associations with the dimensions of proposed religious styles in Islam

It can be seen in the table that different aspects of Hard Mythic religiosity can be measured by constructs such as absolutism (rigidity), literalism, mythic thinking, need for closure, proselytizing tendency, and particularism. The concepts of dogmatism, closed-mindedness, authoritarianism, and radical conservatism can also be related to this religious thinking style (see Hogg – Vaughan, 2014; Kruglanski et al., 2006).

Additionally, the Conforming Religiosity style can be measured by the Religious Attitude Scale (Ok, 2016) and the Religious Saliency Scale in overall. The constructs of Conservatism, as one of the dimensions of value orientation (Schwartz, 1992), and Conventionalism, as one of the sub-dimensions of authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1981; Altemeyer – Hunsberger, 1992), may also serve as representative schemas of this type.

Furthermore, as questioning and doubt require a high level of reflectiveness, need for cognition, and rationality, it could be argued that these traits are integral components of the *Individuative-Reflective* (Dialectical) religious style. While religious conflict and questioning have been acknowledged in the theory (i.e., transitions between stages) and have played an important role in the lives of college students (Parks, 1986) and adults (Batson et al., 1993), they have not been sufficiently emphasized, particularly in quantitative measurements.

Experiences such as questioning, reacting to, or protesting against conventional public religiosity are represented in empirical measurements by constructs like (cognitive) uncertainty, deconversion, atheism, and questioning. These can be considered indicators of the Individuative-Reflective religiosity style, at least in its initial stages. Similarly, the constructs of Autonomous religiosity (Ok,

2006) and Historicity in hermeneutics (*Tarihseçlilik* in Turkish) (Ok, 2009) may represent more established or committed versions of dialectical religiosity.

Another form of the Individuative-Reflective religiosity style, Deconverted spirituality, is exemplified by individuals who deconvert from committed Synthetic-Conventional religiosity to a secular domain. They deconvert, in a sense, to a new life orientation and religious interpretation as a result of experiencing deep questioning and conflict with their traditional faith. They feel completely spiritually autonomous in their thinking, with idiosyncratic ways of understanding established religions, without concern for whether their perceptions align with the orthodox teachings of traditional religion.

It is assumed that the Enlightened religiosity style has been measured so far by scales such as Religious Openness, Religious Pluralism, Religious Relativism, and Quest religious orientation (see Ok, 2012; 2009). This group of constructs can also be studied using the personality trait of Openness (Costa – McCrae, 1985), Personal Growth, one of the aspects of wellbeing (Ryff Singer, 1996), and the concept of Open-mindedness (Rokeach, 1960).

It appears that no instrument has yet been developed to measure what is referred to in the proposed model as Compassionate (a component of conjunctive faith) religiosity—a committed but simultaneously highly cognitively sophisticated version of religiosity. Similarly, the main constructs of Apologetic, Dissent, and Antagonistic religiosity styles need further scale studies. It is hypothesized that these aspects could be measured using newly formulated, purpose-driven items.

It should be emphasized that the main constructs of religiosity styles and their corresponding scales are not entirely independent of each other. They may overlap significantly within an individual, with one becoming more dominant at a certain period. For instance, people with a strong mythic-literal religiosity may also exhibit a high level of Conforming Religiosity and vice versa.

Below are the results of two empirical studies on validating the multi-dimensional proposed model of religiosity styles, adapted to Islamic culture (Ok – Gennerich, 2024b).

Study 1³

The aim of this first study is to determine whether the religiosity constructs previously developed in the Muslim context align well with the content of the proposed bipolar orthogonal model of religiosity styles.

Method

Participants

In Study 1, participants were selected from college students. This group is well-suited to test the model because many fundamental changes in religiosity often occur during these critical years (Parks, 1986). A total of 934 students from two different Turkish state university campuses participated in the study (age range = 18–45; $M = 22.08$), including 454 men and 480 women. The sample was conveniently selected using purposive quota sampling to ensure a diverse representation in terms of year of study, gender, age, and academic department.

Instruments

Overview: In 2007 study (Ok, 2007b), based on observations from a previous qualitative study on faith development theory in Turkey, a pool of 63 items was created by collecting items from previously published scales to measure various aspects of religious styles. Second, to allign expressions with the theory of faith development, the word “religion” was replaced with the phrase “faith or worldview” in the wording of items, except for those related to religious commitment. This change was made because, according to Fowler, faith is broader than religion, encompassing both religious and non-religious faith or worldviews.

³ The data from Study 1 were published in Turkish (Ok, 2012) solely for the purpose of scale development to measure religiosity and faith development, not for testing a model as it is done here.

All variables were rated on a 5-point Likert scale: Not at all agree, agree slightly, agree moderately, agree much, and agree very much. The Cronbach's alpha values reported for the scales ranged from .79 to .88, with one relatively low score of .62.

The scales developed in that study, along with the number of items they contain, are presented in Table 2 below.

Scales	Item Numbers
Religious commitment	10
Absolute & literal faith	14
Need for closure	4
Cognitive conflict and uncertainty (past and present)	4
Deconversion	4
Individuative religiosity	8
Plural Faith	9
Quest religion (originally by Batson, Schoenrade, and Ventis, 1991)	12
Religious attitude (originally by Ok, 2011)	8
Total	83

Table 2. Scales Developed in the Measurement of Religiosity in Muslim Context

To be more specific the developed scales are briefly explained below.

The *Religious Commitment* scale measures individuals' positive attitudes toward religion in general and reflects a commitment to conventional religious values (see Ok, 2016). Example item is "I believe in the fundamental thoughts and values of Islam". As indicated above, it is assumed to be primarily related to the synthetic-conventional (conscious or imitative) religiosity style. However, because it represents a broad and generic attitude toward religion, individuals affirming various commitment styles (compassionate, apologetic, conforming, and particularistic) may agree with the items to varying degrees. In contrast, a total negative attitude toward these items reflects all forms of secular non-commitment faith styles.

Absolute & Literal Religiosity Scale: The schema of absolute faith measures one's interpretation of religion as irreplaceable, firm, and unchangeable. Example items include "The values of my faith or

worldview are correct word by word” and “values underlying my faith or worldview is stable and cannot be changed”. Additionally, a literal interpretation of texts is preferred over symbolic or open interpretations. This faith schema primarily represents the rigid form of mythic-literal religiosity (particularistic conservers).

Need for Closure in Faith Scale: The scale measures an individual’s tendency to avoid incorporating new ideas into their existing faith (or neophobia and closure). In psychological literature, it is related to the concept of the Need for Closure, defined as “a desire for a definite answer to a question, as opposed to uncertainty, confusion, or ambiguity” (Kruglanski – Fishman, 2009). Example items included “Hearing new comments constantly on my faith and worldview disturbs me” and “I do not enjoy adding new comments on what I knew about my faith or worldviews”. It is assumed that the Need for Closure in Faith Scale reflects the rigid mythic-literal stage (both religious and non-religious), as it aligns with the characteristics described in faith development theory.

Deconversion in Faith Scale: The construct of deconversion aims to measure the extent of individuals’ experience of disconnecting from their parents’ conventional faith. Example items include “I gradually disconnected from my previous faith or worldview” and “I think I drifted away from the faith or worldviews that I once learned in my family”. The scale represents the transition from conventional faith to individuated-reflective faith. Therefore, it could be considered part of the Individuated-Reflective style, such as dialectical spirituality/religiosity.

Uncertainty in Faith Scale: The scale aims to measure cognitive discord regarding religion at two points in time: in the past and at present. To achieve this, participants were asked to express the degree of uncertainty, doubt, contradiction, and questioning they have experienced regarding their faith by responding to the leading question, “To what extent have you experienced/do you experience the following conditions regarding your religion in the past and at the present time?” Example items included “Contradiction (past) in faith or

worldview” and “Doubt (present) in faith or worldview”. Similar to the concept of deconversion, the scale is intended to capture a transitional period from conventional faith to post-conventional stages, reflecting the onset of Individuative-Reflective (Dialectical) religiosity.

Quest-Faith Scale: The *Quest* concept of religiosity, initially developed by Batson, represents openness to change in religious thinking, valuing doubt as positive or valuable rather than avoiding it, and living with existential questions concerning religion and life (Batson – Schoenrade, 1991). People with a Quest orientation are inclined to search for the mysteries of life and existential matters, without being satisfied with ready responses provided by religious authorities. Example items “Questions are far more central to my faith or worldview experience than are answers”, “It might be said that I value doubts and uncertainties in my faith or worldview”. Despite it overlaps overwhelmingly with transitory faith (i.e. doubt, conflict etc.), which is evaluated as a schema of individuative-reflective reasoning, as discussed above, it is assumed that the scale primarily measures Conjunctive faith, in both its committed (the *enlightened religiosity* of Compassion) and uncommitted (*Quest Spirituality* and *Open Attitude* of Enlightined) forms.

Plural Faith Scale: The scale aims to measure individuals’ level of agreement with religious pluralism in their society. In other words, it assesses their openness to living alongside people from other faith traditions or cultures. Example items include “There is no problem with the diversity of faith or worldviews” and “People who have such different faith or worldviews as Judaism, Christianity, atheism, Islam can live together in this country”. It is assumed that this construct represents all four dimensions of Conjunctive Faith: open attitude, quest spirituality, compassionate religiosity, and enlightened religiosity, overall. However, dialectical and apologetic religiosity styles may accept religious openness and pluralism conditionally.

Data Collection Procedure

The survey, covering the items of the scales mentioned above along with information sheet and consent form, was distributed to

Note: Expansion of some of the abbreviations: ncAntinewcomment=Need for closure being against new comments; Qdoubt=doubt item of questioning; doubtPast=bad doubt experienced in the past; openGoodman=there could be good people among atheists, agnostics; RAcogn=cognitive component of religious attitude; AbsAnswer=You can find answers to any question in my religion (Absolute religiosity); Muslum=I am a Muslim

Figure 2. Plotted factor component loadings after varimax rotation of the items constituting the religious schema scales

It can be observed that the items and schemas are distributed in a logically meaningful way on the surface of an orthogonal, bipolar two-dimensional model. The horizontal axis represents commitment versus non-commitment, while the vertical axis represents high cognitive differentiation (i.e., openness) versus low cognitive differentiation (i.e., the need for closure and absolute faith). Furthermore, the way the items and schemas are spread across the space confirms four types of religiosity orientations (domains): seekers, unifiers, conservers, and objectors. In this way, the model aligns well in overall with the theoretical expectations outlined above. The descriptive features and intercorrelations of religiosity constructs are presented in Table 3.

Correlational Results						
	Absolute faith	Need for closure	Religious commitment	Uncertainty	Deconversion	Quest
Mythic-Literal Faith Schemas						
Absolute faith						
Need for Closure	.25***					
Conventional Faith Schema						
Religious commit.	.31***	-.05				
Transitional Faith Schemas						
Uncertainty in Faith	-.32***	-.08 *	-.35***			
Deconversion in faith	-.20 ***	-.01	-.46***	.37***		
Conjunctive Faith Schemas						
Quest in faith	-.28***	-.10**	-.36***	.54***	.47***	
Openness in Faith	-.15***	.17***	.02	.15***	.09**	.23***

***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05

Table 3. Inter-Correlations of Religious Schemas

It is observed that variables related to committed mythic-literal and synthetic-conventional religiosity styles (Conservers), such as absolute faith, need for closure, and religious commitment, are positively interconnected with each other, except for the variable of need for closure, which has no link with religious commitment. The reason for this disconnection could be that the need for closure, due to its content, could be, as discussed above, an asset of both committed and uncommitted versions of mythic-literal religiosity (or anti-religiosity). These three variables—absolute faith, need for closure, and religious commitment—are altogether negatively connected with uncertainty, deconversion, and the Quest, except for the connection between need for closure and deconversion, likely due to the aforementioned reasons. The latter three variables are assumed to be related to individuative-reflective and conjunctive faith styles. They are also negatively connected with the schema of openness in faith in the conjunctive faith domain, except for the connection between religious

commitment and openness. The reason these two variables have no correlation could be that people with conventional faith may show a type of ‘artificial’ openness, largely due to social desirability, towards ‘others’ in discourse, but this may not hold true in real-life decisions and circumstances. Another possibility is that, as discussed above, conventional committed faith is a rather broad term under which people with particularistic, conforming, apologetic, and compassionate religiosity styles may show varying levels of agreement with openness.

Finally, openness in faith correlates positively with cognitive tension variables (Dialectical faith), i.e., uncertainty, deconversion, and Quest. In this way, the argument that open religiosity styles address the perspective of secularized individuals is confirmed.

To sum up, it is evident that while the religiosity constructs confirm the proposed model, it was also found that the constructed scales are not specific enough to provide a clearer picture of religiosity styles.

Study 2

Study 2 is a pilot project focused on developing a new response format for the instruments previously used to measure religiosity/faith styles. In earlier works, religious schemas were assessed using Likert-type instruments with five options. In the current study, this has been replaced with a semantic-differential scale. Additionally, the previous term “faith/worldview” has been replaced with “religiosity,” which is more appropriate for studying religiosity in a relatively homogeneous society with respect to its religious culture, Islam, and for the theoretical model presented above. With these changes, the aim of Study 2 is to replicate the findings of Study 1 by providing evidence to support the proposed model of religiosity styles in Islam.

Methods

Participants and Procedure:

The sample consisted of 165 non-random participants, including 54 men and 111 women. Their ages ranged from 17 to 64, with a mean age of 28.27 (SD = 10.12). The majority held either a secondary school

diploma (n = 63) or a bachelor’s degree (n = 70). The questionnaire was distributed in 2023 via email or other electronic devices to voluntary participants (convenience sampling). Participants completed the questionnaire by marking their chosen options with an (X) or by coloring the selected option in the Word document.

Instruments

Religiosity Styles-Islam: The new instrument includes 61 items in a Semantic Differential format. The items were adapted from the Ok-Religious Attitude Scale (Ok, 2011) and the previously constructed Ok-Faith Development Scale (Ok, 2012). Additionally, in line with the theoretical framework and suggestions presented in the literature section of Study 1 (see also Ok – Gennerich, 2024b), which emphasized the need to extend the measurement of faith development to encompass non-commitment to religion, Sufism, anti-religion attitudes, conjunctive/symbolic religious faith, and absolute religiosity, new items were added to the inventory. The resulting scale is relatively comprehensive, covering various aspects of religiosity (content) and cognitive schemas associated with different religiosity styles.

The adaptation process involved increasing the number of options from 5 to 7, transforming the Likert scale into a Semantic Differential format by creating new statements for the opposite poles of each previous scale item. Additionally, each of the 9 options in the scale was presented in written form. Finally, the items were constructed as if expressed in the third person. An example of the question format can be seen in Figure 3:

	Completely harmful and needless	Mostly harmful and needless	Rarely harmful and needless	No answer, neuter, does not know, does not suit me	Rarely beneficial and needed	Mostly beneficial and needed	Completely beneficial and needed	
Sees religion as harmful and needless for people	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	Sees religion as beneficial and a need for people

Table 3. Scaling format of the Religiosity Styles-Islam

After gathering the data, the items were exposed to exploratory factor analysis, followed by item analyses.

Findings

The factor analysis of 61 items initially yielded six factors, each with two dimensions. However, one factor was discarded due to very low internal consistency. The remaining factors were named, along with their opposite poles, as:

Committed/Religious vs Secular-Atheistic Religiosity/faith: This dimension is assumed to primarily measure conforming vs. dialectical religiosity/spirituality. Example items include: “Does not care whether his/her life aligns with religious values” vs. “Cares whether his/her life aligns with religiosity”; and “Sees himself/herself as a person with no connection to any religion” vs. “Sees himself/herself as connected to a particular religion”.

Questioning vs. Intact-Pure (Unquestioned) or Authentic-Original Religiosity/Faith: This dimension is assumed to measure dialectical or enlightened styles versus conforming or particularistic styles. Example items include: “There was a period in the past when his/her religiosity was seriously questioned” versus “He/She has remained committed to his/her pure and intact faith”. “At one point in his/her life, he/she experienced a period of serious doubt” versus “He/She has remained committed to his/her pure and intact faith”.

Symbolic vs. Literal Religiosity: This dimension is assumed to measure primarily conjunctive-enlightened religiosity versus hard mythic-literal religiosity. Example items include: “The verse of the poet, ‘It is natural to sin in this world, and there is no life without sin,’ does not contradict vs. contradict with the spirit of religiosity” and “The verse in the Quran about ‘cutting off the hands of a thief’ should be taken symbolically vs. literally”.

Mythic vs. Rational-Realistic Religiosity: This construct represents dimensions of particularistic religiosity (including both hard-mythic-literal and soft-mythic-literal forms) versus two forms of dialectical religiosity. Example items include: “S/he believes that religious miracles actually occurred vs. did not occur in reality” and “S/he believes that prayer causes rain vs. does not cause rain”.

Sufism vs Individualistic-Rational/Critical Religiosity: This dimension is assumed to primarily measure religiosity as *Unifiers* vs *Objectors*. Example items include: “S/he contemplates religious matters in a gnostic (irfanî) manner, far beyond a rational approach,” vs. “S/he approaches religious matters in an autonomous and rational way”. Another example is: “The ideal form of religiosity is the one modeled by Jalal al-Din Rumi or Yunus Emre, prominent figures in Islamic mysticism,” vs. “The ideal way of practicing religion is to live according to the principles derived from the Qur’an or Hadith”.

The number of items in each scale, the Cronbach’s Alpha scores concerning the internal consistency of scale items, the mean and standard deviations and inter-correlations of these scales can be seen in Table 5 below. Additionally, with these five scales a new component analysis was conducted. The eigenvalues of 1.28, 1.28, .86, .58, .45 clearly indicate a two-dimensional solution, which explained 62.1% of the variance. The Varimax-rotated component loadings are presented in Figure 4:




Figure 4. Component loadings of the religiosity style scales in the two-dimensional space

As shown in Figure 4, the new conceptualization of the items worked well by providing constructs that align with the theoretical expectations, fitting harmoniously into two bipolar orthogonal dimensions of religiosity: Symbolic vs. Literal and Committed vs. Uncommitted. Additionally, two more diagonal bipolar dimensions—Sufism vs. Individualistic-rational religiosity and Quest vs. Intact-pure (synthetic-conventional) religiosity—emerged as additional components of the model.

Descriptive Results	Correlational Results
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Dimensions	Item numbers	Alpha	M	SD	Committed	Questioning	Symbolic	Mythic
Committed-religious vs secular-atheistic	20	.93	4.94	1.45				
Questioning vs intact-unquestioned	15	.94	3.02	1.46	-.41***			
Symbolic vs literal	6	.74	2.80	1.62	-.08	.36***		
Mythic vs rational-realistic	6	.76	3.86	1.91	.43***	-.27***	.01	
Sufism vs rational-critical	4	.49	2.26	1.58	.11	.17*	.13†	.06

***p < .001, *p < .05, †p < .10.

Table 5. Descriptive characteristics and inter-correlations of Religiosity Styles-Islam

It is observed that, based on their item numbers, the internal consistency of the items in the scale is at an ideal level, except for the Sufism schema, which has a low consistency of .49. The mean score indicates that the religious commitment of the sample is above average, while the level of mythical thinking is moderate. The levels of symbolic thinking and Sufism are low, at 2.80 and 2.26, respectively.

The inter-correlations between variables align with theoretical expectations: religious commitment and mythic religiosity are positively correlated, while both are negatively correlated with questioning. Additionally, there is no significant correlation between these variables and symbolic religiosity.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results of two empirical studies support the theory (and hypothesis) of a two-dimensional orthogonal model of religiosity styles, namely, high non-commitment vs. high commitment to

conventional religiosity, and low vs. high cognitive differentiation (see also Ok – Gennerich, 2024a, 2024b). This model provides a rich framework for explaining Islamic religiosity in future research. Derived from the theory of faith development, it is comprehensive and valid within the Muslim context with this adaptation. The instrument can be used for individual assessment in clinical settings and to conduct more in-depth research on faith development.

The study first presented the construct validity of several religiosity scales (schemas) assumed to be representing some aspects of religiosity styles. These can be classified as follows:

(a) *Particularistic religiosity schemas* (Hard and soft mythic-literal religiosity): Absolute faith (vs. symbolic faith); need for closure (vs. need for cognition); mythic (vs. non-mythic-rational).

(b) *Conforming religiosity schemas* (Synthetic-conventional): Religious commitment (vs. secular, irreligious, or atheistic).

(c) *Dialectical religiosity schemas* (Individuative-reflective): Conflict/uncertainty (vs. certainty); deconversion (vs. intact/unquestioned belief).

(d) *Enlightened and compassionate schemas* (Conjunctive religiosity): Openness/pluralism (vs. particularism); Quest (vs. intact/pure faith); symbolic (vs. literal); Sufism (vs. individualistic-rational/critical perspectives).

Considering the dimensions of the theoretical model (see Figure 1), to achieve greater accuracy, additional instruments (schemas) need to be incorporated into the Religiosity Styles-Islam battery to measure the following religiosity/spirituality styles: (a) Hard mythic-literal anti-religiosity; (b) Synthetic-conventional – Conscious anti-religiosity; Synthetic-conventional – Imitative anti-religiosity; Synthetic-conventional – Conscious religiosity; (c) Individuative-Reflective – Systemic-orthodoxy religiosity; Individuative-Reflective – Reformative-critical religiosity; Individuative-Reflective – Anti-religiosity; and (d) Conjunctive – Open attitude toward religiosity; Conjunctive – Compassionate – united religiosity.

It has been confirmed for the second time that Compassionate-Unifier's religiosity, which is assumed to represent an advanced form of Sufi faith, can be identified when studied within a highly sophisticated religious Sufi sample. Additionally, the two forms of conventional religiosity—Conscious religiosity and Imitative religiosity—can be distinguished in future empirical studies.

The proposed model has several advantages. In terms of breadth, it combines both religious (committed) and non-religious (uncommitted) reactions to religion, as well as symbolic and mythic-literal forms of religiosity, similar to the post-critical religiosity theory (Hutsebaut, 1996; 1997). Accordingly, all religiosity schemas fall within one of the four main areas mentioned above. Additionally, the model accounts for extreme forms of religiosity, including both religious and non-religious aggressive forms of religiosity/spirituality.

Regarding the concept of 'religious maturity,' considering that open faith lacks a positive correlation with committed religiosity and has positive correlations with Quest and uncertainty, it appears to be more of an asset in secular or secularized orientations than part of a more mature form of committed "religiosity". The schemas of advanced Sufism (as opposed to lay Sufism) and religious pluralism could be indicators of a committed form of maturity, though they do not show positive correlations with a committed conventional faith orientation. Thus, it could be argued that religiosity, in its traditional sense, does not have a typical 'mature form'—a construct that is both 'religious' and 'mature or conjunctive' at the same time. Alternatively, it may not have been shown yet, due to the lack of representative samples and instruments. In line with the hypothesis of the study, whatever has been considered a 'mature' form of religiosity in studies conducted so far, including the present one, has turned out to be correlated with aspects of secularism or indifference to religion, rather than being part of a more sophisticated form of 'religiosity' in its traditional sense.

Our solution, which involves two different developmental goals in the religious field, aligns well with the life-span theory of development. According to Baltes et al. (1998), life-span development

cannot be understood from a single endpoint. Rather, different developmental goals are meaningful in different contexts. Therefore, the plurality of Islamic theological approaches, as outlined in Ok and Gennerich (2024b), could be considered valuable resources for an individual's pursuit of maturity.

However, the results of this correlational study do not allow religious schemas to be placed on a developmental continuum. Accordingly, longitudinal designs are needed to predict the trajectory of faith development. In this context, it is possible to speculate that transitions may occur diagonally, i.e., from a conventional religiosity style to a highly differentiated questioning faith (i.e., deconversion), or from a lower-differentiated, critical-reflective, rational anti-religiosity to a highly committed and differentiated or sophisticated form of religiosity, i.e., Compassionate faith. The latter is referred to as conversion to religion. Transitions could also occur vertically, e.g., from conforming religiosity or critical-reflective anti-religiosity styles to their corresponding higher levels, or horizontally, e.g., from Rationally Enlightened to Religiously Compassionate, and vice versa (conversion and deconversion without the experience of a transitional period, and thus without experiencing cognitive dissonance).

Another point is that the revised instrument, *Religiosity Styles-Islam* in Study 2, is quite useful in clinical settings for those familiar with the theory of faith development. It allows clinicians to empirically observe the current state of an individual's faith style by examining individual difference scores based on these religious schemas. For instance, a person who scores low on the conforming and dialectical scales (e.g., doubt) as well as on the compassionate and enlightened faith schemas may be profiled as critical or absolutist anti-religious (see also Ok, 2012, for an application of determining faith stages for individual assessment). However, such measurements should be confirmed through follow-up faith development interviews. Additionally, the *Religiosity Styles-Islam* instrument could be standardized with further research.

Finally, regarding how common these religiosity styles are, it seems plausible to argue that the religiosity styles model and its instruments, particularly those that are on the side of commitment dimension, could be considered more meaningfully if they were put on a normal distribution curve, or a bell-shaped curve. This could be substantiated by examining the nature and characteristics of religious groups that have historically emerged in Islam, with the assumption that social religious movements in the history of Islamic thought naturally represent different religiosity styles, and that their size dispersion follows a normal distribution (Figure 5).




Figure 5. Theoretical distribution of faith stages on a normal distribution curve

Although the validity of the normal distribution in social behaviors and attitudes, such as religious schemas or religiosity styles, remains debatable, many statistical operations are predicated on this assumption. Theoretically, it is possible to propose that 68% of religious populations may fall within the categories of conventional and individuative religiosity. Conversely, mythic-literal faith and conjunctive faith together might occupy approximately 27% of this distribution at opposite ends. It should be noted that the group and individual names presented in Figure 5 were drawn from Islamic thought schools as illustrative examples. This approach is based on the assumption that differentiations or schisms within mainstream religious groups throughout history tend to follow a normal distribution. This pattern reflects their representation across varying

levels of cognitive differentiation and commitment within a well-established religious tradition in society.

Although an advanced and sophisticated form of religiosity, characterized by symbolic thinking, emerged as a construct in the present study, Sufism was not fully represented within the identified religiosity styles. Therefore, the instrument measuring these styles can be further refined. Future studies might focus on specific sample groups that hypothetically represent such styles and provide illustrative examples of “mature religiosity”.

In addition, it is worth exploring whether an imitative, conformist form of uncommitted secular faith exists, a question that future studies could address. In other words, do Objectors construct their identity solely through criticism of established faith traditions or authorities, or do they also demonstrate a commitment to their chosen set of non-religious values? This study identified distinct religiosity styles based on several related variables, aligning with the Muslim adaptation of the theory of faith styles. In subsequent research, the instruments developed for Study 2—namely, the religiosity style scales—can be further refined and improved.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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DECLARATION OF ETHICS

In this study, all the rules specified under the "Higher Education Institutions Scientific Research and Publication Ethics Regulation" have been followed. None of the actions listed under the second section of the regulation, titled "Actions Contrary to Scientific Research and

Publication Ethics," have been carried out. Ethical approval information for a previous study with the same topic, religiosity, is provided below.

Ethical approval information:

Ethical review board name: Cumhuriyet University Social Research Ethics Committee

Date of ethical review decision: 27.08.2013

Ethical review decision document number: 2013/4

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BOOK REVIEW



Spiritual Ends: Religion and the Heart of Dying in Japan by Timothy
O. Benedict

Mohammad Thalgi



Spiritual Ends: Religion and the Heart of Dying in Japan by Timothy O. Benedict (Oakland: University of California Press, 2023), viii + 191 pp., €36.00. DOI: [10.1525/luminos.136](https://doi.org/10.1525/luminos.136)

Timothy O. Benedict's *Spiritual Ends: Religion and the Heart of Dying in Japan* discusses the significance of spirituality and religion in hospice care for terminally ill patients in Japan. He surveys where and how spiritual care is practiced in Japan through broader anthropological research and interviews. The book also examines various sociocultural, historical, and religious factors influencing spiritual care and end-of-life care practices. It presents valuable data regarding the interactions among religion, spirituality, and medicine. The concept of spiritual care is put forth, which is revealed as a somewhat nebulous notion in Japan – such as how patients' eyes glaze over in relation to words such as “chaplain” or “spiritual”. Although Benedict's body of work is dedicated to this task, the impressions and experiences he shares also bring to life the everyday aspects of working in the hospice setting. He explains how his perspective on providing spiritual care changed such that he no longer feared making statements that might inflict emotional pain on people. One of the leading figures who inspired the modern hospital/hospice movement, Cicely Saunders, is credited with popularizing the neologism “spiritual anguish” introduced in this chapter. This term encapsulates the unique spiritual pain experienced by many patients. As Benedict argues, spiritual distress in Japan is often experienced as a void within oneself or as boringness. It is also difficult to confront this kind of pain in a culture where most people do not talk openly about religion.

Many of the implications of this emotional work and the routinization of dying are described in Chapter II, which offers an ethnographic portrayal of the work of hospice care. At the micro level,

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Benedict provides a step-by-step account of patients' early morning rounds, reporting of shifts, and all-around services that medical doctors, nurses, and chaplains deliver. He emphasizes strong communication that highlights the homeliness of hospices, which makes patients feel valued and wanted. The type of care discussed in this chapter is Kokoro care, a concept central to Japanese palliative care. Itsuko Emoto's work has significantly influenced its development, showing that without Kokoro care, Japanese palliative care would lack its unique dimension; Japanese palliative care would not have developed in the form seen today. Through the concept of presence, Benedict explains how hospice workers deal with emotional contact with patients and how they deal with their job in particular. The chapter also examines the emotions that individuals experience as a result of working in hospice, particularly those about patients (pp. 16-30).

Benedict's ethnography captures everything readers need to know about the typical procedures and processes of hospice. He describes the patient rounds conducted by doctors and nurses, the conference in the morning involving patient cases, and the emotional strain in the case of end-life care. The chapter also discusses how patients require small things such as caring gestures, touch, and cleanliness to feel valued and loved daily. From the essay, we can see Benedict's realistic views about how hospice caregivers support both the body and the mind. The ambiance they must create is very complex, medical but warm, and psychological but professional. Therefore, the audience is enlightened.

Chapter III presents various approaches that Japanese hospices use to incorporate spiritual values into patients' care, which can be separated into verbal, sonant, and supporting approaches. Benedict explains the concept of spiritual care, indicating that it focuses on how caregivers engage with patients, not the practice of a particular religion. The chapter stresses that even though one has no control over one's life, a little empathy, decency, and concern can make a patient feel important in his or her last days. He also describes the difficulties of chaplains in a postatheist culture and their function as religious care officials. Hales explains how chaplains must pay attention to what their patients need from them, and while they may indeed offer prayer and scripture reading to their patients, they mainly provide

companionship. Regarding the goal of helping the audience feel more competent, this chapter offers a practical orientation to the range of components of spiritual care.

Through Benedict's work, it becomes possible to understand several elements of spiritual care, given that Benedict divides care into vocal, resonant, and support care. Embracement, talking with patients, listening to them, comforting them, and tending to their spiritual and soul issues are examples of vocal care. Caring involves a firm belief in dwelling with the patient and letting their suffering inform the carer. Through transitions and other small motions, compassionate patient care promotes a patient's dignity and valued presence. In Benedict's view, many methods are equally important in providing holistic spiritual care to patients.

Chapter IV of Benedict's monastic guide delves into grief, which is seen primarily as an existential experience of the loss of meaning. He discusses the role of culture in Japanese patients' perceptions of death and how they manage to convey their fears. Acknowledging that many patients feel threatened by becoming a burden to others, the chapter underlines the need for addressing spiritual pain at the cognitive–affective level. Benedict rightly underscores the necessity of integrating approaches to resolve the conflict between the clinical/technical and the spiritual aspects of therapy. He shares the meaning of the patient's spiritual suffering, for example, through the use of stories and examples, and how caregivers can provide companionship to mitigate this suffering. This chapter helps the audience realize the need to embrace the cultural impact of spiritual distress, making them more sympathetic and culturally oriented.

The author presents a rather philosophical and compassionate approach to spiritual suffering, providing a striking and highly intellectualized example of how it affects Japanese patients constrained by cultural paradigms and codes. As in the previous chapter, this chapter provides real-life cases describing how patients suffer because of spiritual pain and how caregivers address it. The cases elaborate practical assessments of patients' spiritual distress and carers' care strategies. A unique aspect of Benedict's approach to spiritual suffering and spiritual care, in general, is the proper recognition of this context as a foundational component of assessment and subsequent holistically infused interventions.

Chapter V is devoted to discussing spirituality in Japan, starting with a review of Suzuki's *Daisetz* and concluding with the spiritual world movement of the 1970s-1980s. Benedict explains how "spirituality" is used and abused in the fields of medicine: most often, it is a refuge for "religion". This chapter further discusses the role of spirituality in the hospice context and the role of spirituality with reference to the numerous opinions of Japanese scholars and practitioners. Being acquainted with Clements through his study, Benedict demonstrates how Japanese thinking has been influenced by Western views on spirituality and to what extent the latter has influenced the provision of spiritual care. To familiarize readers with Japanese spirituality, this chapter describes the historical and cultural context of the "spiritual world" movement and cultural shift that defined spirituality in Japan (pp. 77-107).

Benedict offers a detailed and thought-provoking historical analysis of Japanese spirituality. The author then traces the term from its origins in the writings of D. T. Suzuki, who sought to explain a new Japanese spirit, to its modern forms in the religious movement known as the Spiritual World movement. Benedict also discusses how the term "spirituality" has been refashioned in therapeutic terms to make people feel more at ease handling the issues of life. In addition, the chapter examines Western influences on Japanese spirituality and how some concepts have been altered to fit Japanese standards. Again, Benedict's method shows how Japanese spirituality, encompassing guests and hospice care, is flexible and diverse in contemporary applications.

Chapter VI examines the history of religious involvement in medical contexts in Japan, focusing on medical missions that were either Buddhist or Christian. Benedict describes how religious groups set up medical clinics and hospitals in the last quarter of the nineteenth and the first quarter of the twentieth centuries to create a healthy society. This chapter also discusses the early development of hospices in Japan, including the involvement of early Christian hospitals and, subsequently, the emergence of *Vihāra*. By taking a more in-depth look, Benedict provides insight into the experiences and achievements of religious groups regarding the introduction of spiritual attention to medical practice and its influence on the current state of end-of-life care in Japan. This chapter is critical, as it seeks to establish the

institutional and historical foundation of two sets of literature (pp. 108-131).

Benedict provides details on the history of religious affiliation in Japan's medical sector. He tracks the activities of medical missionaries, Christians, and Buddhists, stressing their endeavors to set up clinics and pharmacies, ensuring that they benefit society. The chapter also explores the history of the hospice movement in Japan, associated with the initial activity of Christian hospitals and the subsequent Vihāra movement. Benedict explains the challenges and successes these religious organizations experienced in integrating spiritual support into medicinal practices and how those endeavors have shaped end-of-life support services in Japan today.

The purpose of the methodological reflection at the end of the final chapter (Chapter VII) is to help the reader speculate on how Benedict's overall study may generate further implications for understanding the religious or spiritual self and care practices in Japan. Benedict argues that the Japanese method critically explains global religion, spirituality, and medicine discourse. He discovers the importance of referencing the religious and cultural contexts that constitute spiritual care. This chapter concludes by praying for more profound knowledge of how spiritual care supports the delivery of comprehensive palliative care. In his view, the Japanese model of spiritual care is concerned with the Kokoro, and the proper merging of both emotional and spiritual aspects can be used as a blueprint for developing better end-of-life care at the global level.

A fascinating and perceptive examination of spiritual care in Japanese hospices is provided in *Spiritual Ends: Religion and the Heart of Dying in Japan*. Through Benedict's ethnographic approach, the reader obtains an overall and complex perception of how caretakers navigate the interaction between religion, spirituality, and medicine at the end of life. In addition to offering a rich perspective on end-of-life care that spans East Asia to a more global context, the book pays special attention to the importance of the Kokoro in spiritual care. Benedict's work proves the importance of an integrated approach to end-of-life care and its contribution to religious studies, medical anthropology, and hospice care. In the book, Benedict provides a historically accurate and culturally explicit analysis of the relics of spiritual care in Japan's sociological dimension. This research will be

of particular value to scholars, practitioners, and anyone with questions about religion and medicine.

One of the book's important assets is its ethnographically immersive account of spirituality in Japanese hospice. By and large, Benedict effectively demonstrates that spiritual care practices boil down to the *Kokoro*, concerning the spirit, the heart, and the mind. Nonetheless, the book could arguably provide an even more robust critical analysis of institutional constraints and the potential consequences of such care models for a society. Although observations such as those captured by this type of study offer variability that enriches the literature, this research approach lacks the depth that may be captured in a single setting, highlighting other patterns and, perhaps, conflicts. Benedict's use of "spirituality" as a relatively "empty signifier" sometimes comes across as undertheorized; some critical implications for secularization and cultural translation processes are underplayed. In general, the author's notes contribute to the story but may also shape the reader's view of Western and Japanese approaches. However, these features are only minor drawbacks of what is otherwise a valuable tool for understanding the processes of constructing and managing religious and nonreligious subjectivities in the context of end-of-life care. Importantly, this book shows how spiritual care can be closely related to cultural specifics and how the experiences of other societies, for example, Islamic societies, can differ and thus require different approaches to end-of-life care.

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