

# THE MU‘TAZILISM OF AL-ZAMAKHSHARĪ: A BAHSHAMĪ OR A ҲUSAYNĪ?

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## Abstract

Al-Zamakhsharī’s Mu‘tazilī identity is undisputed, aside from a few isolated assertions or inquiries to the contrary. In fact, alongside historical records that depict him as a loyal Mu‘tazilī and even a propagandist for his madhhab, the opinions he expressed and the approaches he employed in his works serve as evidence for this claim. The two Mu‘tazilī schools that operated during his time in the Muslim world, in particular in his own region of Khwārazm, were the Bahshamiyyah and the Ҳusayniyyah. Considering this fact, in terms of his theological identity, it could be asserted either that he is a member of one of the Bahshamī or Ҳusaynī schools or that he positions himself “in search of a broadly based, catholic Mu‘tazilism” instead of taking a clear stand. This study, while providing partial evidence for the latter claim, argues that his Ҳusaynī identity is rather evident from his ideological stance and opinions.

*Key Words:* Kalām (Islamic theology), al-Mu‘tazilah, al-Ҳusayniyyah, al-Bahshamiyyah, al-Zamakhsharī

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### Introduction: Mu‘tazilism in Khwārazm and al-Zamakhsharī

Abū l-Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn ‘Umar al-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) was a Mu‘tazilī scholar mostly known for his competence in Arabic language and literature and especially his Qur’ānic commentary *al-Kashshāf*, whose influence transcends sectarian boundaries. He hailed from Khwārazm, where Mu‘tazilah was still alive and had been, in a sense, reborn at a time when it had largely been destroyed in the rest of the Islamic world. It is highly probable that Khwārazm, where the presence of Mu‘tazilah was observed until the end of the 8<sup>th</sup>/14<sup>th</sup> or the beginning of the 9<sup>th</sup>/15<sup>th</sup> century, was systematically introduced to Mu‘tazilī thought and therefore, that a serious effort to spread the Mu‘tazilī perspective was made in the region for the first time by Abū Muḍar Maḥmūd ibn Jarīr al-Ḍabbī al-Iṣfahānī (d. 507/1114), who was also al-Zamakhsharī’s teacher.<sup>1</sup> In fact, Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī (d. 626/1229) reports that he introduced Mu‘tazilī ideas to Khwārazm and spread them there and that many people, including al-Zamakhsharī, gathered around him and became members of his sect under the influence of

<sup>1</sup> Although figures bearing the *nisbah* “al-Khwārazmī” such as Abū Muḥammad al-Khwārazmī were also recorded during an earlier period in the history of Mu‘tazilah, i.e., in the 12<sup>th</sup> generation (*ṭabaqah*), which consisted of the students of al-Qādī ‘Abd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), there is no evidence that these people taught or spread the Mu‘tazilī perspective in Khwārazm; see al-Mahdī li-Dīn Allāh Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyá Ibn al-Murtaḍá, *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazilah*, ed. Susanna Diwald-Wilzer (Beirut: Manshūrāt Dār Maktabat al-Ḥayāh, 1961), 118; Abū Sa‘d al-Muḥassin ibn Muḥammad ibn Karrāmah al-Ḥākīm al-Jushamī, *al-Ṭabaqātān al-ḥādīyah ‘asharab wa-l-tbānīyah ‘asharab min Sharḥ ‘Uyūn al-masā’il*, ed. Fu‘ād Sayyid and Ayman Fu‘ād Sayyid (in *Faḍl al-i‘tizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Mu‘tazilah*; Beirut: Orient-Institut Beirut, 2017), 401. Therefore, although it can be said – by reference to the example of al-Zamakhsharī – that the introduction of Mu‘tazilī thought to the Khwārazm region began in the 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century, this fact does not provide sufficient evidence that Mu‘tazilī thought was spread in any systematic way at that time; see Orhan Ş. Koloğlu, *Mutezile’nin Felsefe Eleştirisi: Harezmlî Mutezilî İbnü’l-Melâbimî’nin Felsefeye Reddiyesi* (Bursa: Emin Yayınları, 2010), 42-43. Additionally, Madelung states that there are indications that Mu‘tazilī thought became entrenched in Khwārazm before al-Ḍabbī but does not provide any concrete evidence for this claim; see Wilferd Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” in *Actas del XII Congreso de la U.E.A.I. (Malaga, 1984)* (Madrid: Union Européenne d’Arabisants et d’Islamisants, 1986), 486.

his scholarly and moral competence.<sup>2</sup>

Within this historical and sociological context, it cannot be denied that the first Muʿtazilī scholar who achieved great and widespread fame in Khwārazm was al-Zamakhsharī. During the three centuries after al-Zamakhsharī, aside from Ibn al-Malāḥimī (d. 536/1141), who was his contemporary and with whom he exchanged religious knowledge, the Muʿtazilah, of which figures such as Abū l-Faḍl Muḥammad ibn Abī l-Qāsim ibn Bāyjūq al-Baqqālī al-Khwārazmī (d. 576/1180), Abū l-Ḥasan ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad al-ʿImrānī al-Khwārazmī (d. 560/1165), and Abū l-Faṭḥ Nāṣir ibn ʿAbd al-Sayyid ibn ʿAlī al-Muṭarrizī (d. 610/1213), who were his disciples, and Abū Yaʿqūb Sirāj al-Dīn Yūsuf ibn Abī Bakr al-Khwārazmī al-Sakkākī (d. 626/1229), who was known as a groundbreaking scholar in Arabic rhetoric, and his disciple in theology, Abū l-Rajāʿ Najm al-Dīn Mukhtār ibn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad al-Zāhidī al-Ghazmīnī (d. 658/1260) could be counted as important representatives in the region, established absolute dominance in Khwārazm. According to information and narratives drawn from classical sources, the facts that the people had adopted the idea of *iʿtizāl* during the period in which al-Zamakhsharī lived,<sup>3</sup> all the people of Khwārazm were Ḥanafīs and Muʿtazilīs,<sup>4</sup> and that in the following centuries, all the people of al-Jurjāniyyah (which was one of the administrative and economic centers of Khwārazm) had accepted Muʿtazilism and engaged in *kalām* (theology) to the point of having theological discussions in the bazaars and streets<sup>5</sup> significantly confirm this point. The claim of Ibn Baṭṭūṭah (d. 770/1368-1369) that “the

<sup>2</sup> Abū ʿAbd Allāh Shihāb al-Dīn Yāqūt ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Ḥamawī, *Muʿjam al-udabāʾ (Irsbād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb)*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1993), VI, 2685-2686. Madelung, in line with the opinion mentioned above, says that this determination of Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī cannot be certain and should be viewed with suspicion; see Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung, Introduction to *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī uṣūl al-dīn* by Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī, ed. Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung (London: Al-Hoda, 1991), h-v.

<sup>3</sup> ʿAbd al-Salām ibn Muḥammad al-Andarabānī, *Fī sirat al-Zamakhsharī Jār Allāh*, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Yāfī, in *Majallat Majmaʿ al-Lughab al-ʿArabiyyah bi-Dimashq* 57/3 (August 1982), 369.

<sup>4</sup> Sayyid Murtaḍā Ḥasanī Ibn Dāʿī, *Tabṣirat al-ʿawām fī maʿrifat maqālāt al-anām*, ed. ʿAbbās Iqbāl Āshtiyānī (Tehran: Sharikat-i Intishārāt-i Asāṭir, 1364 HS), 91.

<sup>5</sup> Abū Yaḥyá Jamāl al-Dīn Zakariyyā ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Qazwīnī, *Āthār al-bilād wa-akbbār al-ibād* (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, n.d.), 520.

intellectual part of the people of Khwārazm had the Mu‘tazilī belief, but they refrained from revealing this because the sultan was a member of the Ahl al-sunnah”<sup>6</sup> indicate that this dominance continued until the end of the 8<sup>th</sup>/14<sup>th</sup> century. Given all this evidence, the following determinations have been made: In the 12<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> centuries, Khwārazm was the sheltered home of Mu‘tazilah,<sup>7</sup> it was rare to encounter a non-Mu‘tazilī person in Khwārazm, and it was well known that everyone was accepted as Mu‘tazilī without questioning; if an individual was not a Mu‘tazilī, the only way to let people know about this sectarian identity was to deny being a Mu‘tazilī.<sup>8</sup> It has also been noted that in locations other than Khwārazm, the nisbah “al-Khwārazmī” became identical to “al-Mu‘tazilī.”<sup>9</sup>

However, the Mu‘tazilī scholars of the region excelled in philology/linguistics rather than theology, which is noteworthy. These scholars, of whom al-Baqqālī, also referred to as “al-Naḥwī,” as well as al-Sakkākī are exemplary, were also interested in fiqh as well as language, but kalām was either overlooked or not their area of interest.<sup>10</sup> In light of his own interest and the impact he had on the next generation, it is important to mention al-Zamakhsharī’s role in the construction of this scholarly identity.

Aside from the exceptional claims made by certain Shī‘ī authors that al-Zamakhsharī had a tendency toward Shiism (*al-tashayyu*),<sup>11</sup> the following claims have typically been argued: that al-Zamakhsharī’s seminal masterpiece, *al-Kashshāf*, cannot be an indicator of Mu‘tazilī identity or at least cannot be considered to be a sectarian

<sup>6</sup> Abū ‘Abd Allāh Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn Muḥammad Ibn Baṭṭūṭah al-Ṭanjī, *Rihlat Ibn Baṭṭūṭah: Tuḥfat al-nuẓẓār fī gharā’ib al-amṣār wa-‘ajā’ib al-aṣfār*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Mun‘im al-Aryān and Muṣṭafā al-Qaṣṣās (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-‘Ulūm, 1987), I, 367.

<sup>7</sup> Ignaz Goldziher, “Aus der Theologie des Fachr al-dīn al-Rāzī,” *Der Islam* 3 (1912), 222.

<sup>8</sup> Lutpi Ibrahim, “az-Zamakhsharī: His Life and Works,” *Islamic Studies* 19/2 (Summer 1980), 101.

<sup>9</sup> Daniel Gimaret, “Mu‘tazila,” in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, VII, 785.

<sup>10</sup> Koloğlu, *Mutezile’nin Felsefe Eleştirisi*, 49.

<sup>11</sup> Muḥammad Bāqir ibn Zayn al-‘ābidīn ibn Ja‘far al-Mūsawī al-Kh‘ānsārī, *Rawḍāt al-jannāt fī aḥwāl al-‘ulamā’ wa-l-sādāt*, ed. Asad Allāh Ismā‘īliyyān (Qom: Maktabat Ismā‘īliyyān, 1390-1392 H), VIII, 120-123.

commentary,<sup>12</sup> that the commentaries of the Shī‘ī authors Abū Ja‘far al-Ṭūsī (d. 460/1067) and al-Ṭabarsī (d. 548/1154) are much closer to being Mu‘tazilī works than is *al-Kashshāf*,<sup>13</sup> that this commentary is largely based on the Sunnī tafsīr tradition, and that Mu‘tazilī beliefs were hardly mentioned in the commentary, as if they were ignored, or that such beliefs are even indistinguishable from a typical Sunnī approach.<sup>14</sup> Despite these claims, which are mostly found in the recent literature, based on *al-Kashshāf*'s apparent account and mode of expression, in the tradition, there is the perception that al-Zamakhsarī secretly included innovative (*bid‘ī*) Mu‘tazilī ideas in his work in a way that would constitute a basis for the work to be appreciated by Sunnī circles who were not aware of them.<sup>15</sup> Essentially, “the fact that he made interpretations that are out of context in *al-Kashshāf* in order to base innovative Mu‘tazilī ideas on the Qur‘ān (...) and considered the verses in accordance with the basic principles of Mu‘tazilah as ‘clear (*muḥkam*)’ and the others as ‘ambiguous (*mutashābih*)’ (...) and the fact that he implicitly made heavy accusations to Ahl al-sunnah by affording adjectives such as Mujbirah (Predestinarians) and Ḥashwiyyah to the Ash‘arīs in particular,”<sup>16</sup> are sufficient to invalidate the claims of an “ambiguous Mu‘tazilism.” Beyond this evidence, the facts that – in the introduction to *al-Kashshāf* – he mentioned certain features of the Qur‘ān (its being divided into sūrahs and verses, which are separated from each other by intervals and ultimate boundaries [*bi-*

<sup>12</sup> J. J. G. Jansen, *The Interpretation of the Koran in Modern Egypt* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1980), 63.

<sup>13</sup> Gimaret, “Mu‘tazila,” 786.

<sup>14</sup> Walid A. Saleh, *The Formation of the Classical Tafsīr Tradition: The Qur‘ān Commentary of al-Tha‘labī (d. 427/1035)* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 22, fn. 40; cf. W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology: An Extended Survey* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1985), 108.

<sup>15</sup> Abū l-‘Abbās Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm Ibn Taymiyyah al-Ḥarrānī, *Majmū‘ fatāwā*, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad ibn Qāsim (Medina: Muḥamma‘ al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭibā‘at al-Muṣṣhaf al-Sharīf, 2004), XIII, 357, 358-359; id., *Muqaddimah fī uṣūl al-tafsīr*, ed. ‘Adnān Zarzūr (Kuwait: Dār al-Qur‘ān al-Karīm & Beirut: Mu‘assasat al-Risālah, 1972), 82, 86; Abū l-Faḍl Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad Ibn Ḥajar al-‘Asqalānī, *Lisān al-Mizān*, ed. ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah and Salmān ‘Abd al-Fattāḥ Abū Ghuddah (Beirut: Maktab al-Maṭbū‘at al-Islāmiyyah, 2002), VIII, 8.

<sup>16</sup> Mustafa Öztürk and Mehmet Suat Mertoğlu, “Zemahşerî,” *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslām Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, XLIV, 236.

*fuṣūl wa-ghāyāt*, etc.) and that he said that these features are qualities only applicable to something that is created (*mubtada'*, *mubtada*’, *munsba'*, *mukhtara*’; it is obvious that the use of these many concepts expressing createdness together highlights the strength of this emphasis) as well as the fact that he exempted Allah, who reserved the attribute of being eternal only for himself and mandated the attribute of being created out of nothing for everything else, specifically emphasizing the createdness of the Qurʾān with this expression,<sup>17</sup> are clear proofs that al-Zamakhsharī had a Muʿtazilī identity.<sup>18</sup>

Although largely considered to be spurious (actually, this was not the case) based on a great deal of data and presumptions in the manuscripts and commentaries,<sup>19</sup> the anecdote expressed by Ibn

<sup>17</sup> Abū l-Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Khwārazmī al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf ʿan ḥaqāʾiq ghawāmiḍ al-tanzīl wa-ʿuyūn al-aqāwīl fī wucūb al-taʾwīl*, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ (Riyadh: Maktabat al-ʿUbaykān, 1998), I, 95.

<sup>18</sup> For examples of interpretations of these expressions as an indication of Muʿtazilī beliefs, see Abū Muḥammad Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad al-Ṭībī, *Futūḥ al-ghayb fī l-kashf ʿan qināʿ al-rayb wa-buwa Ḥāshiyat al-Ṭībī ʿalā l-Kashshāf*, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Raḥīm et al. (Dubai: Jāʾizat Dubay al-Dawliyyah li-l-Qurʾān al-Karīm, 2013), I, 617, 628; Sirāj al-Dīn ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿUmar al-Qazwīnī al-Bahbahānī al-Fārisī, *al-Kashf ʿan mushkilāt al-Kashshāf*, ed. ʿAmmār Yūnus ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Ṭāʾī (in “Ḥāshiyat al-Kashf ʿan mushkilāt al-Kashshāf li-l-Imām ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Qazwīnī al-mutawaffā 745 H min awwalihī ilā nihāyat al-āyah 23 min sūrat al-Baqarah -Dirāsah wa-tahqīq-” [PhD diss.], Baghdad: Dīwān al-Waqf al-Sunnī Kulliyat al-Imām al-Aʿzam, 2010), 86; Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd ibn ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Taftāzānī, *Ḥāshiyah ʿalā l-Kashshāf*, ed. ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ ʿĪsā al-Barbarī (in “Taḥqīq al-juzʾ al-awwal min Ḥāshiyat al-ʿAllāmah Saʿd al-Taftāzānī ʿalā l-Kashshāf li-l-Zamakhsharī” [PhD diss.], Cairo: Jāmiʿat al-Azhar, 1978), 11, 12; Abū l-Ṭāhir Majd al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Yaʿqūb ibn Muḥammad al-Firūzābādī, *Nughbat al-rashshāf min kbuḥbat al-Kashshāf*, ed. ʿUmar ʿUlwī ibn Shihāb (Shāriqah: Dār al-Thaqāfah al-ʿArabiyah li-l-Nashr, 2001), 112. For the opinions and detailed evaluations of *al-Kashshāf* commentators and *ḥāshiyah* writers concerning the introduction to the work, see Mesut Kaya, “el-Keşşâfta Gizli İttizâl: ez-Zemaḥşerî'nin Tefsir Mukaddimesi Üzerinden *Ḥalku'l-Kurʾān* Tartışmaları,” *Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 56/1 (June 2015), 107-135.

<sup>19</sup> Andrew J. Lane, “You Can’t Tell a Book by Its Author: A Study of Muʿtazilite Theology in al-Zamakhsharī’s (d. 548/1144) *Kashshāf*,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 75/1 (2012), 75-82.

Khallikān and cited by many later ṭabaqāt authors by reference to him, which claims that “When al-Zamakhsharī wrote *al-Kashshāf* for the first time, he started with the phrase ‘Praise be to Allah, the Creator of the Qurʾān (*kbalaqa l-Qurʾān*),’ but later on, he was worried that this beginning would not be accepted by the people, and he transformed this expression into ‘Allah, who made the Qurʾān (*jaʿala l-Qurʾān*) a ... word,’”<sup>20</sup> shows that al-Zamakhsharī’s devotion to the Muʿtazilī belief is indisputable and unquestionable, at least in the collective imagination of scholarly circles.<sup>21</sup> The widespread circulation of these

<sup>20</sup> Ibn Khallikān says here that, in terms of Muʿtazilī thought, the verbs “create (*kbalaqa*)” and “make (*jaʿala*)” actually express the same meaning, namely, the createdness of the Qurʾān, and he adds that the phrase “... who sent down the Qurʾān (*anzala l-Qurʾān*)” [which is also included in contemporary printed copies] is a correction (*iṣlāḥ*) included by other people, not the author; see Abū l-ʿAbbās Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm ibn Abī Bakr Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-aʿyān wa-anbāʾ abnāʾ al-zamān*, ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Beirut: Dār Ṣādir, 1977), V, 170. cf. Abū ʿAbd Allāh Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿUthmān al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām wa-wafayāt al-mashāhīr wa-l-aʿlām*, ed. ʿUmar ʿAbd al-Salām Tadmurī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1995), XXXVI, 489; Abū l-Ṭayyib Taqī al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAlī al-Ḥasanī al-Fāsī, *al-ʿIqd al-thamīn fī tārikh al-balad al-amīn*, ed. Fuʿād Sayyid (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Risālah, 1986), VII, 141; Abū l-Falāḥ ʿAbd al-Ḥayy ibn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-ʿImād al-Ṣāliḥī al-Ḥanbalī, *Shadbarāt al-dhabab fī akhbār man dhabab*, ed. Maḥmūd al-Arnāʾūṭ and ʿAbd al-Qādir al-Arnāʾūṭ (Damascus & Beirut: Dār Ibn Kathīr, 1989), VI, 196-197.

<sup>21</sup> In the tradition, some individuals did not accept this narrative, which claimed that al-Zamakhsharī changed the phrase. For example, according to al-Ṭībī (d. 743/1343), it was unnecessary and meaningless for al-Zamakhsharī to write “khalaqa” at the beginning, since he made it clear in his continuing statements that the Qurʾān was created; al-Ṭībī, *Futūḥ al-ghayb*, I, 617. Al-Firūzābādī (d. 817/1415) also agrees with this view, claiming that al-Zamakhsharī did not have any concerns about concealing his Muʿtazilī identity and even boasted of it, and so this author does not consider it possible that al-Zamakhsharī deliberately changed this phrase; al-Firūzābādī, *Nughbat al-rashshāf*, 104. On the other hand, al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) is of the opinion that if the narration of the change reflects the truth, there are certain reasons that this change is correct and wise. However, according to this author, this change cannot be interpreted as an effort to completely conceal Muʿtazilī ideas, given the fact that, since al-Zamakhsharī later states a definite opinion that the Qurʾān is created (*ḥādith*), he only avoids repetition by doing so; Abū l-Ḥasan al-Sayyid al-Sharīf ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Jurjānī, *al-Ḥāshiyah*

narrations should be understood as “an effort to combat Mu‘tazilism, which is thought to be revived.”<sup>22</sup> In fact, Sunnī biographical works generally describe al-Zamakhsharī as an Arabic linguist or the author of *al-Kashshāf* (*ṣāhib al-Kashshāf*) but do not discuss him as a scholar of kalām (or *uṣūl*; i.e., the fundamentals of religion).<sup>23</sup> A possible reason for this omission is that al-Zamakhsharī’s theological views are seen as innovative (*bid‘ah*) by the authors in question. Consequently, although they praise al-Zamakhsharī by saying that he was virtuous with respect to many matters and knowledgeable in various religious fields, they also note that he was a Mu‘tazilī and that he clearly expressed this fact without hiding it (*yatazāhar bi-l-i‘tizāl, yatajāhar bi-dbālik*),<sup>24</sup> that he was uncompromisingly devoted to his sect ([*kāna*] *Mu‘taziliyy<sup>am</sup> qawīyy<sup>am</sup> fī madhhabihī*),<sup>25</sup> that he was entrenched in Mu‘tazilī opinions ([*kāna*] *mutaḥaqiq<sup>am</sup> bi-l-i‘tizāl*),<sup>26</sup> and furthermore, that he assumed the duties of a spokesman/propagandist in order to spread Mu‘tazilī and bid‘ah views (*kāna dā‘iy<sup>am</sup> ilā l-i‘tizāl*

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*‘alā Kitāb al-Kashshāf* (Cairo: Sharikat Maktabat wa-Maṭba‘at Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī wa-Awladihī, 1966), 3.

<sup>22</sup> Lane, “You Can’t Tell a Book by Its Author,” 83.

<sup>23</sup> Lane, *A Traditional Mu‘tazilite Qur’ān Commentary: The Kashshāf of Jār Allāh al-Zamakhsarī* (d. 538/1144) (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2006), xvi.

<sup>24</sup> Abū l-Faraj Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Jawzī, *al-Muntazam fī tārikh al-umam wa-l-mulūk*, ed. Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Qādir ‘Aṭā and Muṣṭafā ‘Abd al-Qādir ‘Aṭā (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1992), XVIII, 38; Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu‘jam al-udabā’*, VI, 2688. The narratives suggesting that when al-Zamakhsharī visited someone and appeared before him, he preferred to be presented as “Abū l-Qāsīm al-Mu‘tazilī is at the door,” are also a clear indication that he adopted Mu‘tazilism as a defining identity and believed that this identity was even a reason for pride; see Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-a‘yān*, V, 170; Taqī al-Dīn al-Fāsī, *al-Iqd al-tamīm*, VII, 141; Ibn al-‘Imād, *Shadharāt al-dhabab*, VI, 196.

<sup>25</sup> Abū l-Faḍl Jalāl al-Dīn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Bakr ibn Muḥammad al-Suyūṭī, *Bughyat al-wu‘āb fī ṭabaqāt al-lughawiyyīn wa-l-nuḥāb*, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1979), II, 279.

<sup>26</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan Jamāl al-Dīn ‘Alī ibn Yūsuf ibn Ibrāhīm ibn ‘Abd al-Wāḥid Ibn al-Qiṭī al-Shaybānī, *Inbāh al-ruwāb ‘alā anbāh al-nuḥāb*, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī & Beirut: Mu‘assasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah, 1986), III, 270.

*wa-l-bidʿab*);<sup>27</sup> therefore, they wish that Allah would forgive him<sup>28</sup> and keep them away from his views and beliefs.<sup>29</sup> The statement by al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, (d. 544/1149), who was a Mālikī qāḍī (judge), ḥadīth, fiqh, and language scholar, “Praise be to Allah, who prevented a bidʿah follower or *fāsiq* (venial sinner) from choosing me as his heir by giving me his hand, and who thus kept me away from spiritual debt to him,”<sup>30</sup> is an important example of this tendency, even if it is an expression of personal resentment.

In light of the aforementioned data, although it can be clearly seen that there is no doubt regarding al-Zamakhsharī’s affiliation with the Muʿtazilah, the main point that remains unclear concerning his theological identity is which sect he followed within the scope of the Muʿtazilī belief.

### 1. Intra-Muʿtazilī Separation/Factionalism before al-Zamakhsharī

In addition to the ongoing separation into the Basrah and Baghdad schools, after Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbāʿī (d. 303/916), a conflict arose within the Basran Muʿtazilah, most likely arising from intrasectarian leadership conflicts between Abū ʿAlī’s disciple Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar al-Ṣaymarī (d. 315/927) and Abū Hāshim (d. 321/933).<sup>31</sup> As Abū Hāshim began to gain a dominant position in the

<sup>27</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Tārīkh al-Islām*, XXXVI, 490; id., *al-ʿIbar fī khabar man ghabar*, ed. Abū Hājar Muḥammad Saʿīd ibn Basyūnī Zaghūl (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1985), II, 455; al-Suyūṭī, *Ṭabaqāt al-mufasssīrīn*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad ʿUmar (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1976), 121; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad al-Miṣrī al-Dāwūdī, *Ṭabaqāt al-mufasssīrīn* (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1983), 315.

<sup>28</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Sīyar aʿlām al-nubalāʾ*, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnaʿūṭ et al. (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Risālah, 1981-1988), XX, 156 (*Allāh yusāmihubū*).

<sup>29</sup> Al-Dhahabī, *Mizān al-iʿtidāl fī naqd al-rijāl*, ed. ʿAlī Muḥammad al-Bijāwī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1963), IV, 78 (possibly referring to al-Zamakhsharī’s pseudonym “Jār Allāh:” *ajāranāʾllāh*).

<sup>30</sup> Abū I-ʿAbbās Shihāb al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad al-Qurashī al-Maqqarī, *Azbār al-riyāḍ fī akbbār ʿIyāḍ*, ed. Muṣṭafā al-Saqqā et al. (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat Lajnat al-Taʿlīf wa-l-Tarjamah wa-l-Nashr, 1942), III, 383.

<sup>31</sup> Later Muʿtazilī sources emphasized that the differences of opinion between Abū ʿAlī and his son Abū Hāshim did not pertain to the essence of the issue, that similar differences existed among different sectarian authorities and their disciples in the past, and that these differences should not necessarily be interpreted as malicious;

sect, al-Şaymarī's disciple Abū Bakr Ibn al-Ikshīd (d. 326/938) emerged as a new rival. This new faction, which developed under his leadership and gained visibility due to the opposition of Abū Hāshim to a degree that would result in excommunication (*takfīr*), was accepted as a new school under the name al-Ikshīdiyyah.<sup>32</sup> The fact that Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456/1064) mentions Ibn al-Ikshīd as one of the three great Muʿtazilī imāms of the period alongside Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī (d. 319/931) and Abū Hāshim is essentially an indication of a triple school situation that can be divided into the Baghdad school, Bahshamiyyah, and Ikshīdiyyah.<sup>33</sup> However, at the end of a century-long process, the influence of Ikshīdiyyah was broken, and only Bahshamiyyah remained on the stage as the sole representative of the Basrah school.<sup>34</sup>

The last important divergence within the Muʿtazilah was arose due to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044), a student of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār (d. 415/1025), one of the most important scholars of Bahshamiyyah. Although al-Shahrastānī (d. 548/1153) portrays Abū l-Ḥusayn as a representative of Bahshamiyyah who held different views,<sup>35</sup> his followers formed a separate school under the name of Ḥusayniyyah due to methodological divergences arising from his

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for this reason, on the one hand, sources attempt to make the current situation of Abū Hāshim more moderate, while on the other hand, they implicitly point out that the separation was due to a leadership struggle rather than a serious doctrinal conflict; Abū l-Ḥasan Qāḍī l-quḍāt ʿAbd al-Jabbār ibn Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadānī, *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah wa-mubāyanatubum li-sāʾir al-mukhbālifīn*, ed. Fuʾād Sayyid and Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid (in *Faḍl al-iʿtizāl wa-ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah*, Beirut: Orient-Institut Beirut, 2017), 303; Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah*, 95.

<sup>32</sup> Abū ʿAbd Allāh Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿUmar ibn Ḥusayn al-Rāzī, *Iʿtiqādāt firaq al-Muslimīn wa-l-mushrikīn*, ed. Muḥammad al-Muʿtaṣim bi-llāh al-Baghdādī (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1986), 46.

<sup>33</sup> Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī ibn Aḥmad ibn Saʿd Ibn Ḥazm al-Andalusī al-Zāhirī, *al-Faṣl fī l-milal wa-l-abwāʾ wa-l-niḥal*, ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Naṣr and ʿAbd al-Rahmān ʿUmayrah (Beirut: Dār al-Jil, 1996), V, 70-71.

<sup>34</sup> For the events of the Bahshamiyyah-Ikshīdiyyah conflict, see Koloğlu, *Cübbâüler'in Kelâm Sistemi* (Istanbul: İSAM Yayınları, 2017), 108-118; id., "Behşemiyye-İkshīdiyye Çekişmesi: Kısa Bir Tarihsel İnceleme," *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 18/2 (June 2009), 286-296.

<sup>35</sup> Abū l-Fatḥ Tāj al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Shahrastānī, *al-Milal wa-l-niḥal*, ed. Muḥammad Sayyid Kilānī (Beirut: Dār al-Maʿrifah, 1975), I, 85.

intense use of philosophy and doctrinal differences with respect to the fact that he expressed views that were incompatible with those of his predecessors. One of the most important representatives of Ḥusayniyyah, who transmitted Abū l-Ḥusayn’s views, is Ibn al-Malāḥimī, a contemporary of al-Zamakhsharī.

Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah disagreed concerning different issues both with respect to the methods of proof used in judgments (even if they agreed on the judgments reached) and concerning determinations and judgments directly related to the issues. Al-Shahrastānī mentions that Abū l-Ḥusayn’s opposition to Bahshamiyyah were as follows: denial of states (*aḥwāl*) and certain related points, denial of colors’ being “accidents” and the reality of the nonexistent (*shay’iyyat al-ma‘dūm*), and the reduction of all attributes of God to being all-knowing (‘*ālim*), capable (*qādir*), and perceiving (*mudrik*).<sup>36</sup> On the other hand, Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī (d. the first half of the 7<sup>th</sup>/13<sup>th</sup> century), one of the important representatives of Ḥusayniyyah, lists sixteen issues,<sup>37</sup> while Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) increases this number to fifty by reference to subtopics.<sup>38</sup>

## 2. Al-Zamakhsharī in the Context of the Bahshamiyyah - Ḥusayniyyah Distinction

From the perspective of the Basrah and Baghdad schools, which were the main divisions among the Mu‘tazilah, it would be appropriate to argue that the Baghdad school was not operative in Khwārazm at the time of al-Zamakhsharī, since no representative or diffused view could be identified. However, according to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, who is known to have engaged in debate with the Mu‘tazilī-Ḥanafī disciples of al-Zamakhsharī, “the two Mu‘tazilī schools still in existence at that time in the region are the followers of Abū Hāshim [al-Jubbā’ī] and Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.”<sup>39</sup> Therefore, the question that must be asked regarding al-Zamakhsharī becomes clear: Should he be considered a

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> Taqī al-Dīn Mukhtār ibn Maḥmūd al-‘Ujālī al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil fī l-istiṣā’ fī mā balagħanā min kalām al-quḍamā’*, ed. al-Sayyid Muḥammad al-Shāhid (Cairo: Wizārat al-Awqāf al-Majlis al-‘Alā li-l-Shu’ūn al-Islāmiyyah, 1999), 60.

<sup>38</sup> Al-Rāzī, *al-Riḥāḍ al-mūniqab fī ārā’ abl al-‘ilm*, ed. As‘ad Jum‘ah (Kairouan: Kulliyat al-Ādāb wa-l-‘Ulūm al-Insāniyyah bi-l-Qayrawān & Markaz al-Nashr al-Jāmi‘ī, 2004), 287-295.

<sup>39</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Iṭiqādāt*, 48.

member of Bahshamiyyah or of Ḥusayniyyah?

Late Zaydī sources consider al-Zamakhsharī to be included among the students of al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī (d. 494/1101),<sup>40</sup> who was a staunch defender of Bahshamiyyah.<sup>41</sup> Although it cannot be definitively proven that he was a direct student of al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī, it can be said that he visited Jusham after al-Jushamī's death and studied there with al-Jushamī's disciple Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ishāq al-Khwārazmī (d. after 525/1130-31). In any case, there is no doubt concerning the fact that he was knowledgeable of al-Jushamī's works and views.<sup>42</sup>

On the other hand, his close teacher al-Ḍabbī was a Ḥusaynī, and Ibn al-Malāḥimī, to whom he taught tafsīr and from whom he learned kalām (as mentioned above),<sup>43</sup> was the last important representative of the Ḥusayniyyah and even of the pure Mu'tazilah, which is incompatible with Shiism.<sup>44</sup> It is obvious that another of al-Zamakhsharī's kalām teachers, Shaykh al-Islām Abū Manṣūr Naṣr al-Ḥārithī,<sup>45</sup> was a Mu'tazilī, but aside from that point, no information can be found to indicate his school affiliation. It should be noted, however, that al-Zamakhsharī did not consider himself to be a "professional

<sup>40</sup> Al-Jushamī states that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was not welcomed by his [al-Jushamī] sectarians [Bahshamīs] because he "contaminated his soul by getting involved in philosophy and opposed some of the evidences of previous scholars in his works;" see al-Jushamī, *al-Ṭabaqāt al-ḥādīyah 'asbarah wa-l-thānīyah 'asbarah*, 402. Ibn al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437) also expresses al-Jushamī's opinions in exactly the same way and states that Bahshamīs did not like Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī for these two reasons; however, he adds that this approach is a kind of bigotry, because Allah made Abū l-Ḥusayn's knowledge useful for people; see Ibn al-Murtaḍā, *Kitāb Ṭabaqāt al-Mu'tazilah*, 119.

<sup>41</sup> Ibrāhīm ibn al-Qāsim ibn al-Imām al-Mu'ayyad bi-llāh, *Ṭabaqāt al-Zaydiyyah al-kubrā (Bulūgh al-murād ilā ma'rifat al-isnād)*, ed. 'Abd al-Salām ibn 'Abbās al-Wajīh (Amman: Mu'assasat al-Imām Zayd ibn 'Alī al-Thaqāfiyyah, 2001), II, 892; cf. 'Adnān Zarzūr, *al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī wa-manbaḥubū fī tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Risālah, 1971), 80.

<sup>42</sup> Madelung, "The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī," 487.

<sup>43</sup> Al-Andarabānī, *Fī sirat al-Zamakhsbarī Jār Allāb*, 368.

<sup>44</sup> According to Koloğlu's determination, Ibn al-Malāḥimī became acquainted with Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī's theology through Abū Muḍar al-Ḍabbī. Koloğlu, "İbnü'l-Melāhimī," in *Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslām Ansiklopedisi (DİA)*, EK I, 616.

<sup>45</sup> Al-Andarabānī, *Fī sirat al-Zamakhsbarī Jār Allāb*, 368, 379.

theologian” even after his spiritual partnership with Ibn al-Malāḥimī.<sup>46</sup> Another interesting point is that although he uses the expression “the two masters (*al-shaykhān*)” in *al-Minbāj*, which is his only known work on kalām, as in the usual practice of the Basra school, and that although he referred many times to Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, the founder of Bahshamiyyah, and even once to al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, who was the most important name in Bahshamiyyah after its founder, none of the names of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī or his followers were mentioned.<sup>47</sup>

Even though al-Zamakhsharī’s work *al-Minbāj* is Muʿtazilī, it seems difficult at first glance to answer the question of which school lies at its heart, since it is a fact that this text is not a complete work of kalām in which any sectarian line is defended in this context and that it refrains from discussing deep theological issues and intra-Muʿtazilah polemics. Furthermore, it is also a factor that the text is content to convey controversial views from time to time without expressing al-Zamakhsharī’s own opinion concerning issues that are the subject of dispute between Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah. However, the facts that no section of *al-Minbāj* contains an attitude supporting the Bahshamī views criticized by Abū l-Ḥusayn and that there is no mention of the theory of modes (*aḥwāl*) and the thingness of nonexistent (*shayʿiyyat al-maʿdūm*), which are the distinguishing features of Abū Hāshim and Bahshamiyyah, can be interpreted as an indication that al-Zamakhsharī was mostly under the influence of Ḥusayniyyah. Madelung also analyzes his sectarian position, especially in light of his approaches to proving the existence of God and divine attributes, and concludes that he is close to the Ḥusayniyyah side (in particular, as might be expected, as established by Ibn al-Malāḥimī).<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” 488.

<sup>47</sup> Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” 489; Koloğlu, *Mutezile’nin Felsefe Eleştirisi*, 49.

<sup>48</sup> Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” 489-492. By reference to Madelung, Schmidtke emphasizes the influence of Ḥusayniyyah and Ibn al-Malāḥimī on al-Zamakhsharī. However, it is understood that she had a more definite opinion than did Madelung on this matter; see Sabine Schmidtke, Introduction to *A Muʿtazilite Creed of az-Zamakhsharī (d. 538/1144) (al-Minbāj fī uṣūl ad-dīn)* by Abū l-Qāsim Maḥmūd ibn ʿUmar ibn Muḥammad al-Khwārazmī al-Zamakhsharī, ed. and trans. Sabine Schmidtke (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1997), 9.

On the other hand, it has been suggested that al-Zamakhsharī is not Ḥusaynī but Bahshamī based on certain statements in *al-Kashshāf* in addition to those in *al-Minbāj*. This argument has been grounded on the basis of issues such as the acceptance of the thingness of the nonexistent<sup>49</sup> and the rejection of saintly miracles (*karāmāt*),<sup>50</sup> which are characteristics of the Bahshamī school.<sup>51</sup>

Due to the aforementioned features of al-Zamakhsharī's works, it does not seem possible to determine his views concerning all the points of disagreement between Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah. Although more specific information can be known regarding some of these issues, it is essential to fill in the gaps and to engage in a form of mind reading (interpretation) based on the indicators regarding others. Therefore, at this stage, it is possible to propose approaches to certain issues and to make determinations based on the data that can be accessed.

### 2.1. The Thingness of the Nonexistent

It can be said that the issue of whether the nonexistent (*ma'dūm*) can be evaluated as a "thing (*shay'*)" or an "entity (*dhāt*)" arises in the context of the encompassing aspect of God's knowledge. In fact, it is reported that figures such as Jahm ibn Ṣafwān (d. 128/745-746) and Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam (d. 179/795) say that God's knowledge deals with what has originated (*ḥādith*) and that he could not know something before it came into existence.<sup>52</sup> Bahshamīs first pointed out

<sup>49</sup> Hilmi Kemal Altun, "Behşemiyye ve Hüseyiniyye Arasında Zemahşerî'nin Yerinin Değerlendirilmesi," *Kilis 7 Aralık Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 6/11 (December 2019), 721.

<sup>50</sup> Altun, "Behşemiyye ve Hüseyiniyye Arasında Zemahşerî," 723.

<sup>51</sup> For the claim that al-Zamakhsharī is closer to the Bahshamī sect, see also Fethi Ahmet Polat, *İslâm Tefsir Geleneğinde Akılcı Söyleme Yöneltilen Eleştiriler: Mu'tezilî Zemahşerî'ye Eş'arî İbnü'l-Müneyyir'in Eleştirileri* (Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2007), 84-85.

<sup>52</sup> Abū l-Ḥasan 'Alī ibn Ismā'īl Ibn Abī Bishr al-Ash'arī, *Maqālāt al-Islāmiyyīn wa-ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn*, ed. Hellmut Ritter (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980), 36, 280; Abū l-Qāsim 'Abd Allāh ibn Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-Balkhī al-Ka'fī, *Kitāb al-Maqālāt wa-ma'ahū 'Uyūn al-masā'il wa-l-jawābāt*, ed. Hüseyin Hansu et al. (Istanbul: İstanbul 29 Mayıs Üniversitesi Kur'an Araştırmaları Merkezi [KURAMER] & Amman: Dār al-Fatḥ, 2018), 251, 254; Abū Maṣṣūr 'Abd al-Qāhir ibn Ṭāhir al-Baghdādī, *al-Farq bayna l-firaq*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn 'Abd al-Ḥamīd (Beirut: al-Maktabah al-'Aşriyyah, 1995), 67, 211.

the distinction between “essence (*dhāt*)” and “existence (*wujūd*)” in order to justify the claim that beings are subject to God’s knowledge before they come into being, and they claimed that a thing had reality before its existence, and from this point of view, they argued that the nonexistent is a “thing.” According to them, both the “existent (*mawjūd*)” and the “nonexistent (*ma‘dūm*)” are essence (*dhāt*).<sup>53</sup> Their definition of the nonexistent as “that is known which is nonexistent (*al-ma‘lūm alladhī laysa bi-mawjūd*)”<sup>54</sup> is an expression of the aforementioned concern. Later, the issue was also discussed in the context of God’s omnipotence by al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār.<sup>55</sup> On the other hand, beginning with Abū l-Ḥusayn, the Ḥusaynīs defended the identity of essence and existence,<sup>56</sup> thus rejecting the idea that a thing can have reality before its existence and therefore that the nonexistent is a “thing.”<sup>57</sup>

<sup>53</sup> Abū l-Ḥusayn Qiwām al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Abī Hāshim Muḥammad Mānakdīm Shashdīw al-Ḥusaynī, *Ta‘līq ‘alā Sbarḥ al-Uṣūl al-kbamsab*, ed. ‘Abd al-Karīm ‘Uthmān (with the name *Sbarḥ al-Uṣūl al-kbamsab*, wrongly attributed to al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār; Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1965), 51.

<sup>54</sup> Mānakdīm Shashdīw, *Ta‘līq*, 176; Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Malāḥimī al-Khwārazmī, *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung (London: Al-Hoda, 1991), 543.

<sup>55</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī expresses the Bahshamīs’ concern as follows: “It is known that God is omnipotent and He is related to what is subject to efficient causality, and there could not be a relation to absolute non-existence,” that is, when “thingness” is not attributed to the *ma‘dūm*, the omnipotence of God may become dysfunctional; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Martin McDermott (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy & Institute of Islamic Studies Free University of Berlin, 2007), 47. For Bahshamiyyah’s approaches to the nature of the *ma‘dūm*, see Richard M. Frank, “al-Ma‘dūm wal-mawjūd: The Non-existent, the Existent and the Possible, in the Teaching of Abū Hāshim and His Followers,” *Mélanges de l’Institut dominicain d’études orientales du Caire* 14 (1980), 185-210.

<sup>56</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī states that Abū l-Ḥusayn himself defended the view that “the existence of one thing is its essence” in *Taşaffuḥ* and put forward evidences in this regard; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, 254.

<sup>57</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 46-47, 91. For a description and analysis of the Bahshamī-Ḥusaynī dispute with respect to the issue of the thingness of *ma‘dūm*, see Mehmet Fatih Özerol, “Hüseyniye ve Behşemiye’ye Göre Ma‘dūm’un Şeyiyyeti,” *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 29/1 (June 2020), 167-187.

Al-Zamakhsharī says that the term “thing” can also be used for the “impossible (*muḥāl*)” and the “nonexistent (*ma’dūm*);”<sup>58</sup> however, he defines “thing” as “that which can be known and informed about (*mā ṣaḥḥa an yu‘lam wa-yukhbbar ‘anhu*).”<sup>59</sup> In light of this information, there are some findings that indicate that “al-Zamakhsharī follows the Bahshamī tradition by naming *ma’dūm* as “thing,” that is, with a form of being, and that he thinks differently from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī in this regard.”<sup>60</sup> However, at this point, it should be noted that the definition in question is used jointly by Ḥusaynīs and Bahshamīs,<sup>61</sup> regardless of the discussion concerning whether the *ma’dūm* has an entity/reality when does not exist.<sup>62</sup>

In addition, although al-Zamakhsharī seems to have accepted the Bahshamī approach when he says that the term “thing” can be used for *ma’dūm*, he differs from them by also describing *muḥāl* as a “thing.” (In fact, it is obvious that no meanings such as existence/entity/thingness can be attributed to *muḥāl*; therefore, from the point of view of the Bahshamī tradition, at least in the context that is the subject of this discussion, it is not possible to call *muḥāl* a “thing.”)<sup>63</sup> However, Ibn al-Malāḥimī states that unless “thing” is used to describe an entity (*dbāt*) as do the Bahshamīs, it means “something that is the subject of knowledge but whose existence (thingness in the

<sup>58</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, I, 311-312.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 208.

<sup>60</sup> Altun, “Behşemiyeye ve Hüseyiniyeye Arasında Zemahşerî,” 721.

<sup>61</sup> e.g., see al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī fī abwāb al-tawḥīd wa-l-‘adl*, ed. Maḥmūd Muḥammad al-Khuḍayrī (Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyyah li-l-Ta’līf wa-l-Tarjamah, n.d.), V (*al-Firaq ghayr al-Islāmīyyah*), 249; Mānakdīm Shashdīw, *Ta’līq*, 221.

<sup>62</sup> e.g., see Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 92.

<sup>63</sup> As a matter of fact, in his supercommentary (*ḥāshiyah*) on *al-Kashshāf*, Ibn al-Munayyir states that al-Zamakhsharī differs from both Ahl al-sunnah and ahl al-bid‘ah in terms of how he explains the concept of “thing.” While explaining this difference, considering the fact that he said that “in the eyes of Mu‘tazilah, the name ‘thing’ is used for both ‘existent (*mawjūd*)’ and ‘non-existent (*ma’dūm*)’ whose existence is possible;” it is understood that al-Zamakhsharī was actually opposing the Bahshamī view that Ibn al-Munayyir ascribed to the all Mu‘tazilah without customization; Abū l-‘Abbās Nāṣir al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Muḥammad Ibn al-Munayyir al-Judhāmī al-Jarawī, *al-Intiṣāf fī mā taḍammanahū l-Kashshāf min al-‘itizāl*, ed. ‘Ādil Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Mawjūd and ‘Alī Muḥammad Mu‘awwaḍ (along with *al-Kashshāf*, Riyadh: Maktabat al-‘Ubaykān, 1998), I, 312.

sense of entity) cannot be mentioned,” and he points to the “existence of a second eternal deity” as an example of these things “which can only be conceived in the mind,” that is, a *muḥāl*/impossible matter.<sup>64</sup> Consequently, in addition to the fact that Ibn al-Malāḥimī expresses the same definition used by al-Zamakhsharī, it is possible to say that their approaches to the scope of the concept of “thing” overlap exactly, and it is necessary to approach the characterization of al-Zamakhsharī as a Bahshamī with skepticism due to his approach to the issue of the thingness of *maʿdūm*. His subsequent interpretation of the word “thing” in Q 19:9, “I did indeed create thee before, when thou hadst been nothing!” should not be overlooked: “After all, *maʿdūm* is not a ‘thing’ or some ‘thing’ to be regarded/accredited (*laysa shayʿan yuʿtadd bihī*).”<sup>65</sup> Ibn al-Munayyir (d. 683/1284) states that al-Zamakhsharī first interpreted the phrase correctly as “*maʿdūm* is not a thing,” contrary to the Muʿtazilī view, but he later put forward a second opinion compatible with the Muʿtazilī approach.<sup>66</sup>

Moreover, al-Fāḍil al-Yamanī (d. 750/1349), who wrote a supercommentary on *al-Kashshāf*, also makes the following claim when interpreting the phrase “Allah, who attributes the feature of being created out of nothing to everything other than himself” in the introduction to al-Zamakhsharī’s *al-Kashshāf*: “He does not accept that *maʿdūm* is ‘thing,’ just like Abū l-Ḥusayn [al-Baṣrī] and Maḥmūd al-Khwārazmī [Ibn al-Malāḥimī]; and the fact that he uses the term ‘thing’ for ‘*maʿdūm*’ and even ‘*muṣtaḥīl* (impossible)’ in some places in *al-Kashshāf* means that it is possible to know and inform about them.”<sup>67</sup>

## 2.2. Proving the Existence of God (*Itbāt al-Wājib*)

The standard argument of kalām scholars for proving God’s existence is an argument from creation, and it is basically formulated as the claim that the elements that make up the universe have been created and that something that is created also needs a creator to bring it into existence. Instead of employing concepts from the standard atomist discourse such as “atom/the indivisible part (*jawhar/al-juzʿ alladhī lā yatajazzaʿ*)” for the proof of the existence of God, al-

<sup>64</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʿiq*, 92.

<sup>65</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, IV, 8.

<sup>66</sup> Ibn al-Munayyir, *al-Intiṣāf*, IV, 9.

<sup>67</sup> ʿImād al-Dīn Yaḥyá ibn al-Qāsim al-Fāḍil al-Yamanī al-ʿAlawī, *Tuḥfat al-asbrāf fi kashf ghawāmiḍ al-Kashshāf* (registered under the name of *Durar al-aṣḍāf ʿan ḥall ʿuqad al-Kashshāf*, MS Istanbul: Koca Ragıp Paşa Library, 175), 2b.

Zamakhsharī primarily discusses bodies (*ajsām*).<sup>68</sup> The claim that this tendency is an indication that he followed Abū l-Ḥusayn,<sup>69</sup> who refrained from confirming or rejecting atomism and remained uninterpreted with respect to this issue,<sup>70</sup> is open to question, at least in terms of the certainty of the alleged indicators. This claim does not exclude atoms, which are constitutive elements of bodies. However, regarding this issue, it would be appropriate to say that he followed the approach of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, who essentially said that the existence of God cannot be proven by examining the creation of accidents since after all, certain accidents can be created by other actors (*qādīrs*), but since creating bodies belongs only to God, proving their creation means implicitly proving the creation of accidents as well.<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, he also points to accidents and their creation, which are one of the basic elements of the classical argument from createdness and which are referenced by the Bahshamīs in the continuation of this account. At first glance, this view can be considered a deviation from Abū l-Ḥusayn’s understanding and a stance close to that of Bahshamiyyah. Abū l-Ḥusayn probably did not find “the argument from createdness” based on the concept of accidents to be sufficiently strong and criticized it, maintaining that the philosophers’ criticism of the notion of accidents and the method based on it has led to certain impasses.<sup>72</sup> However, in further

<sup>68</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Mu‘tezile Akāidi: Kitābū l-Minhāc fī usūli’-d-dīn*, ed. and trans. with an introduction by Ulvi Murat Kılavuz and Abdulkерim İskender Sarıca (Istanbul: Klasik Yayınları, 2021), 39.

<sup>69</sup> Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” 489.

<sup>70</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, 140.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>72</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, 84. Another reason for this attitude of Abū l-Ḥusayn is that he thinks differently from Bahshamīs regarding the nature of accidents. While they regard an “accident” as a kind of real being (= *ma‘nā*) (e.g., see Mānakdim Shashdīw, *Ta‘liq*, 96, 98; Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥasan ibn Aḥmad Ibn Mattawayh al-Najrānī, *Kitāb al-Majmū‘ fī l-Muḥīṭ bi-l-taklīf*, ed. J. J. Houben [attributed to al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār; Beirut: al-Maṭba‘ah al-Kāthūlikiyyah, 1965], I, 33), the Ḥusaynīs assumed accidents to be attributes determining the changing characteristics (*aḥkām*) and states (*aḥwāl*) of the body; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, 125-126; al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 115. Based on this claim, the method for constructing the argument from createdness employed by the Bahshamīs is called the “method of *ma‘anī*,” and that used by the Ḥusaynīs is called the “method of *aḥwāl*,” al-Rāzī, *al-Riyāḍ al-mūniqab*, 288. For a brief explanation of these

discussion of the subject, al-Zamakhsharī turned to developing a discourse in line with Abū l-Ḥusayn and uses his preferred “argument of particularization (*takbṣīṣ*).”<sup>73</sup>

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differences with respect to the argument from createdness, see Özerol, *Mutezile’de Tevbid: Son Büyük Mutezilî İbnü’l-Melâhimî’nin Düşünce Sisteminde Tevbid* (Bursa: Emin Yayınları, 2019), 50-53.

- <sup>73</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akâidi*, 40. The essence of the argument rests on the notion of the necessity of a particularizing agent (*mukbṣṣīṣ*), who selects and chooses one of these possible alternatives for something whose existence or nonexistence is possible or whose existence is possible with this or that property. It seems that when Abū l-Ḥusayn saw that the classical formulization of the argument from createdness was insufficient, he turned to a new construct based on the necessary-contingent (*wājib-mumkin*) distinction made by Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037). However, instead of Ibn Sīnā’s concepts of necessary being (*wājib al-wujūd*) and contingent being (*mumkin al-wujūd*), he used classical theological concepts such as *qadīm* (eternal/beginningless), *muḥdath* (created later) and *ḥādīth* (temporally created) as did al-Zamakhsharī (see Madelung, “Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣṭī’s Proof for the Existence of God,” in *Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy: From the Many to the One, Essays in Celebration of Richard M. Frank*, ed. James E. Montgomery [Leuven, Paris & Dudley (Mass.): Uitgeverij Peeters en Department Oosterse Studies, 2006], 275) and in this sense, he did not compromise on the principle of creation. Therefore, this argument, which combines the temporality (*ḥudūth*) and contingency (*imkān*) methods for proving the existence of God and which is claimed to have been put forward for the first time by al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), generally under the name of the method of *jawāz* (contingency), was also used by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣṭī before him. However, the thesis that Abū l-Ḥusayn was the first to reveal this method (Madelung, “Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣṭī’s Proof,” 274) is controversial. Namely, aside from the fact that the concept of a particularizing agent (*mukbṣṣīṣ*) had been in circulation since the first theologians (see Shlomo Pines, *Madhhab al-dharrab ‘inda l-Muslimīn wa-‘alāqatubū bi-madhāhib al-Yūnān wa-l-Hunūd*, translated into Arabic by Muḥammad ‘Abd al-Hādī Abū Rīdah [Cairo: Maktabat al-Nahḍah al-Miṣriyyah, 1946], 39, fn. 7), it is also claimed that the first person to employ the notion of *takbṣīṣ* was al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1013) (see Majid Fakhry, “The Classical Islamic Arguments for the Existence of God,” *The Muslim World* 47/2 [April 1957], 139, fn. 29). In addition, al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037-1038), who was a contemporary of al-Bāqillānī, uses the idea of *takbṣīṣ* more clearly than does the latter while constructing his argument. In the words of al-Baghdādī, “The reason why a *ḥādīth* emerges at a different time from other *ḥādīths* of the same kind is the existence of a specifier (*mukbṣṣīṣ*) creator who determines its emergence at this time. If such a specification did not exist, it

Another factor that draws al-Zamakhsharī closer to the Bahshamī model of reasoning is that he justifies the fact that the world needs a creator through the fact that the subject of human actions needs such a creator to occur, and thus by comparing the unseen to the perceptible world.<sup>74</sup> This method, which can be called the proof of *qiyās* (comparison), was criticized by Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.<sup>75</sup> According to him, a proof of the existence of God cannot be attained by comparing human actions because the knowledge that an entity that can exist or remain in nonexistence needs an effect is mandatory (*ḍarūrī*) knowledge and does not need to be put forward by *qiyās*.<sup>76</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī agrees with him concerning the necessity of this

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would not be better for this *ḥādīth* to appear at this time rather than before or later” (al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn* [Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1981], 69). However, it is possible to say that Abū l-Ḥusayn was the first to construct this argument, as seen in al-Juwaynī, and even in a more philosophical form and at a more developed/mature level. For an account of the argument in al-Juwaynī, see Imām al-Ḥaramayn Abū l-Maʿālī Rukn al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī, *al-ʿAqīdab al-Niẓāmiyyab fī l-arkān al-Islāmiyyab*, ed. Muḥammad Zāhid al-Kawtharī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-Anwār, 1948), 11-12; id. *Lumaʿ al-adillab fī qawāʿid ʿaqāʿid Abl al-sunnab wa-l-jamāʿab*, ed. Fawqīyyah Ḥusayn Maḥmūd (Cairo: al-Muʿassasah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Taʿlif wa-l-Anbāʾ wa-l-Nashr, 1965), 80-81; id., *Kitāb al-Irshād ilā qawāṭiʿ al-adillab fī uṣūl al-iʿtiqād*, ed. Asʿad Tamīm (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-Kutub al-Thaqāfiyyah, 1996), 49-50; id., *al-Sbāmīl fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. ʿAlī Sāmī al-Nashshār et al. (Alexandria: Munshaʾāt al-Maʿārif, 1969), 263.

<sup>74</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidi*, 40. With the statements of Abū Hāshim and Bahshamīs in this direction, cf. al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, ed. Tawfiq al-Ṭawīl and Saʿīd Zāyid (Cairo: al-Muʿassasah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Taʿlif wa-l-Tarjamah wa-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr, n.d.), VIII (*al-Makblūq*), 16; Ibn Mattawayh, *Kitāb al-Majmūʿ*, I, 69-70; al-Rāzī, *al-Maṭālib al-ʿāliyah min al-ʿilm al-ilāhī*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1987), I, 210.

<sup>75</sup> Al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 155. Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) also follows in Abū l-Ḥusayn’s footsteps in this regard and says that this form of inference (*istidlāl*) based on comparison is “weak” even though it is often used; Jamāl al-Dīn al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf ibn ʿAlī Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Manāḥij al-yaqīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Yaʿqūb al-Jaʿfarī al-Marāghī (Qom: Dār al-Uswah li-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr, 1415 AH), 258.

<sup>76</sup> Al-Rāzī, *al-Riṣād al-mūniqab*, 288; al-Najrānī elaborates on these criticisms and responds to the objection that their methods are also *qiyās*; *al-Kāmil*, 156 f.

knowledge.<sup>77</sup> On the other hand, after expressing Abū l-Ḥusayn’s conclusion, Ibn al-Malāḥimī also uses the other method (*qiyās*), which he calls the method of “our masters (*sbuyūkbunā*),” and responds to objections to it.<sup>78</sup>

In the face of these data, al-Zamakhsharī seems to have combined and reconciled the styles of reasoning of the Bahshamīs and those of the Ḥusaynīs in his approach to the proof of the existence of God. Therefore, it seems unlikely that we can identify an absolute and definite sectarian orientation from this point of view.

### 2.3. Divine Attributes

One of the main divergences concerning the subject of divine attributes pertains to the relationship between essence and attributes. At this point, two basic approaches emerged, one being the realist approach, which states that “attributes are entitative determinants (*ma‘ānī*)” that have additional realities to the essence,” and the other, the nominalist commenting that “the independent existence of attributes cannot be considered without the essence, and these are only names pointing to the qualities in the essence.” In principle, the first of these stances can be described as the Sunnī approach and the other as the Mu‘tazilī approach.<sup>79</sup> When al-Zamakhsharī stated that as a general principle, “God has power over all those who can be empowered, not by way of the qualities (*li-ma‘ānī*) that make them necessary, but by His essence, He knows all known things by essence, He is alive by His essence, hears and sees by His essence and perceives by essence all that is comprehended,”<sup>80</sup> this claim shows that he was an open defender of the aforementioned Mu‘tazilī approach.

An attitude contrary to the general acceptance of Mu‘tazilah concerning the nature of attributes is the characterization of attributes as states of the essence in the context of Abū Hāshim’s theory of modes (*aḥwāl*). The Ḥusaynīs, on the other hand, share the opinion that God has certain qualities through His essence and openly oppose Abū Hāshim’s approach. In fact, Ibn al-Malāḥimī discusses the Sunnī view on the basis of discourse, stating that “attribute is an element added to

<sup>77</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq*, 131.

<sup>78</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, 172-175.

<sup>79</sup> Koloğlu, “Mu‘tezile’nin Temel Öğretileri,” *İslâmî İlimler Dergisi* 12/2 (December 2017), 47.

<sup>80</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Mu‘tezile Akāidi*, 42.

the [divine] essence (*wa-naḥnu naʿnī bi-l-ṣifab hābunā huwa kull amr zāʿid alā l-dhāt*)” at one stage in an attempt to oppose the attitude of philosophers who are excessively exclusionary and ignore attributes; however, in the final analysis, he reduces these attributes to God’s essence and says that “the characterization of God with these qualities means ascribing these characteristics to His essence (*yufīd idāfat hādbihī l-aḥkām ilā dhātihī taʿālā*).”<sup>81</sup> What is noteworthy here is the use of the term *ḥukm* for attributes. Although Ibn al-Malāḥimī says that the separation can be reduced to words, given that he most likely views Abū Hāshim’s approach as a concession toward the Sunnī view, he clearly states that God is omnipotent, wise, and living not through certain real entities or states/modes (*aḥwāl*) but by essence. On the one hand, he says that there is a need for a *ḥukm* beyond the essence of God, which forms the basis for the characterization of the essence of God via these attributes. However, this notion of “being additional to the essence” cannot be seen as an ontological separation, and these qualities, which are called *aḥkām*,<sup>82</sup> cannot be considered real entities or states.<sup>83</sup> It does not appear that al-Zamakhsharī uses the term *ḥukm* openly, possibly as a reflection of his general tendency not to engage in detailed technical discussions within Muʿtazilah. However, in addition to not mentioning the notion of modes, which is one of the distinctive qualities of Bahshamiyyah, the fact that he also states that God is all-hearing, wise, and omnipotent by His essence in

<sup>81</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn fī l-radd ʿalā l-falāsifah*, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Hassan Ansari (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy & Freie Universität Berlin, 2008), 44; cf. id., *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 234.

<sup>82</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 182.

<sup>83</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 68. In the words of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, even though Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, absolutely opposes the claim that God should have a mode/state in addition to His essence in the sense understood by Abū Hāshim and Bahshamīs (for example, to have the attribute of omniscience for being omniscient), he does not object to the fact that it is called “state,” “attribute,” or even “knowledge (*ʿilm*)” as a separate entity (*maʿnā*), only as a literal usage, without any real equivalent. However, Ibn al-Malāḥimī does not accept this approach. Additionally, Abū l-Ḥusayn does not explicitly use the term *ḥukm* as does Ibn al-Malāḥimī; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 200-201. On the other hand, Abū l-Ḥusayn clearly states that God is wise and omnipotent by His essence (*li-dhātihī*); Abū l-Ḥusayn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī, *Taṣaffuḥ al-adillab*, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidke (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007), 74, 79.

*al-Kashshāf* and in *al-Minhāj*<sup>84</sup> is an indication that he does not accept the notion of modes, which can be seen as an element beyond the essence and therefore follows the line adopted by the Ḥusaynīs along with the majority of Muʿtazilah.

In line with this general Muʿtazilī attitude, which identifies affirmative attributes (*al-ṣifāt al-thubūtiyyah*) by the essence, certain attributes are reduced to others. In this context, first, God's being capable of hearing (*samīʿ*) and seeing (*baṣīr*) is reduced to his being perceiving (*mudrik*). That is, to be capable of hearing and seeing means that God perceives the things that are heard and seen when they exist. In the final analysis, this trait depends on the feature of being "living (*ḥayy*);" because God, who is capable of hearing (and hence is perceiving), does not have – by means of being hearing – a special and independent attribute beyond being alive.<sup>85</sup> However, it should be noted that this reduction does not mean ignoring the attributes of "hearing" and "seeing." At this stage, a conflict arises between the Basrah and Baghdad schools. Baghdādīs do not consider it permissible to use the attribute of being "perceiving" with respect to God on the grounds that doing so would entail assimilating Him to creatures (*tashbīh*), and these figures identify his being "hearing" and "seeing" with his being omniscient (*ʿalīm/ʿālim*).<sup>86</sup> This issue appears to be a conflict between Basrah and Baghdad schools rather than a Ḥusaynī-Bahshamī split. However, different determinations regarding the approach of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī to the issue give the impression that this topic is also the subject of dispute between Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah. Ibn al-Malāḥimī says in one passage that "in *Taṣaffuḥ*, he [Abū l-Ḥusayn] presented the inference of Baghdad school about the impossibility of describing God as 'perceiving,' and although he did not openly express his own preference, he did not answer this;"<sup>87</sup> however, in another passage, he states that "he quoted this inference, which he says is the strongest evidence of the Bahshamīs," and then

<sup>84</sup> Al-Zamakhsarī, *al-Kashshāf*, IV, 128; V, 197, 376.

<sup>85</sup> Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, V, 241; Mānakdīm Shashdīw, *Taʿlīq*, 168.

<sup>86</sup> Mānakdīm Shashdīw, *Taʿlīq*, 168; al-Ḥillī, *Manābij al-yaqīn*, 283; al-Manṣūr bi-llāh Ibn al-Rashīd al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī al-Zaydī, *Kitāb al-Asās li-ʿaqqāʾid al-akyās fī maʿrifat Rabb al-ʿālamīn wa-ʿadlibī fī l-makblūqīn wa-mā yattaṣil bi-dbālik min uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Albert Naṣrī Nādir (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿah, 1980), 71, 73.

<sup>87</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 38.

quotes his reply against it.<sup>88</sup> Most likely because of this ambiguity, it has been believed that Abū l-Ḥusayn adopted the view of the Baghdādīs.<sup>89</sup> However, Taqī al-Dīn al-Najrānī, who discussed the issues of controversy between Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah and who was critical of Bahshamī views as a follower of Ḥusayniyyah, states that Abū l-Ḥusayn, whom he describes as “our master (*sbaykbunā*),” opposes the use of the attribute “perceiving” for God but also does not find it correct to declare a judgment concerning this matter, and in this sense, he adopts an attitude of suspension of judgment (*tawaqquf*).<sup>90</sup> In this context, it is necessary to approach the claim that Abū l-Ḥusayn directly reduced these two attributes to being

<sup>88</sup> Accordingly, Abū l-Ḥusayn says that the inference that God cannot be perceiving is valid for those who view the attribute of being alive in the same way for the beings in the world of attestation and the unseen world and for those who consider it to be a state of living being; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 236. It seems that the people in question here are Bahshamiyyah. Al-Ḥimmaṣī (d. 600/1204), the first known follower of Abū l-Ḥusayn in Twelver Shiism, also made the following claim without mentioning any names: “Our masters (*masbāyikbunā*) proved that this attribute (being “perceiving”) is present for God by the fact that his being alive is the element that makes this attribute necessary.” Thus, he states that the objection to this claim is invalid, since the modes of being “alive” for God and for beings in the world of attestation are different; Sadīd al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn ʿAlī ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥimmaṣī al-Rāzī, *al-Munqidh min al-taqīd* (Qom: Muʿassasat al-Nashr al-Islāmī, 1412-1414 AH), I, 57, 58.

<sup>89</sup> Al-Rāzī, *Muḥaṣṣal afkār al-mutaqaddimīn wa-l-mutaʾakkbirīn min al-ʿulamāʾ wa-l-ḥukamāʾ wa-l-mutakallimīn*, ed. Ṭāhā ʿAbd al-Raʿūf Saʿd (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kulliyāt al-Azhariyyah, n.d.), 171; Fakhr al-muḥaqqiqīn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf al-Ḥillī, *Miʿrāj al-yaqīn fī sharḥ Nabj al-mustarshidīn fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Ṭāhir al-Salāmī (Karbalāʾ: al-ʿAtabah al-ʿAbbāsiyyah al-Muqaddasah, 1436 AH), 179; Kamāl al-Dīn Mītham ibn ʿAlī ibn Mītham al-Baḥrānī, *Qawāʿid al-marām fī ʿilm al-kalām*, ed. al-Sayyid Aḥmad al-Ḥusaynī (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-ʿUzmā al-Marʿashī al-Najafī, 1406 AH), 90, 95; Abū ʿAbd Allāh Jamāl al-Dīn Miqdād ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Suyūrī, *Irsbād al-ṭālibīn ilā Nabj al-mustarshidīn*, ed. Maḥdī al-Rajāʿī (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Marʿashī al-ʿĀmmah, 1405 AH), 205, 206; Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” 491; id., “Abu ʿl-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,” in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, XII (Supplement), 25.

<sup>90</sup> Al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 277. Al-Rāzī is also of the opinion that Abū l-Ḥusayn suspended judgment on this issue; *Iʿtiqādāt*, 48.

ʿālim, as in the Baghdad school, with caution.<sup>91</sup> Moreover, even though he is of the same opinion as the Baghdad school on this issue, as he distinguishes between the visible (*shāhid*) and unseen (*ghayb*) worlds in the context of the will, this stance can be considered to be the personal opinion of Abū l-Ḥusayn rather than the established opinion of the Ḥusaynī school.

Ibn al-Malāḥimī himself gives an objectionable answer to this question when he claims – as discussed above – that Abū l-Ḥusayn did not answer and that he considers being capable of hearing and seeing as being perceiving, as does the Basrah school in general. According to him, contrary to the opinion of the Baghdad school, omniscience and perceiving are two qualities that are separate from each other, and the second cannot be reduced to the first.<sup>92</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, on the one hand, says that God “perceives all that is perceivable by His essence” and further mentions that He is “hearing and seeing by His essence.”<sup>93</sup> However, he identifies the attributes of seeing and hearing elsewhere with being perceiving, and he opposes the Baghdādī view – without naming it – by saying that God’s perceiving is something different from his knowing.<sup>94</sup> Therefore, the fact that he mentions His attributes of being capable of hearing (*samīʿ*) and seeing (*baṣīr*) – along with His being actually hearing (*sāmīʿ*) and seeing (*mubṣīr*) – separately does not mean that he does not evaluate these attributes in terms of His being perceiving.<sup>95</sup> In this respect, he adopts the common view of the

<sup>91</sup> As a matter of fact, unlike other authors, Zaydī scholar Ḥusām al-Dīn Qāsim ibn Aḥmad al-Maḥallī (d. first half of 8<sup>th</sup>/14<sup>th</sup> century), who wrote a gloss (*taʿlīq*) on Mānakdīm Shashdīw’s *Taʿlīq ʿalā Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-kbamsab*, notes that Abū l-Ḥusayn, like Ibn al-Malāḥimī, adopted the Bahshamī [hence the established Baṣran Muʿtazilī] view; Schmidtke, *The Theology of al-ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1991), 200, fn. 143.

<sup>92</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 38-39; For a detailed discussion of this issue, see id., *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 212-238.

<sup>93</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidī*, 42.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 46.

<sup>95</sup> Thus, he indeed expresses the opinions that God’s perception of what is subject to hearing and seeing is absolutely beyond that of other “hearing” and “seeing” beings and that He perceives the smallest, subtlest, and most hidden things as well as the most gigantic, densest, and most obvious things (al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, III, 579); in addition, adding that God is truly *samīʿ* (capable of hearing) and *sāmīʿ* (actually hearing) and that “hearing” here means perceiving through hearing (*al-Kashshāf*, IV, 381), he also says that God hears and sees every sound and

entire Basrah school and therefore that of the Ḥusaynīs, except perhaps Abū l-Ḥusayn. Even if the claim that Abū l-Ḥusayn adopted the Baghdādī view is accepted as true, the claim that al-Zamakhsharī should be seen as belonging to Bahshamiyyah, not Ḥusayniyyah, as a result of his differentiation from Abū l-Ḥusayn does not seem very accurate.

In the context of divine attributes, one of the main issues that is the subject of dispute between the Bahshamīs and the Ḥusaynīs is the will. In fact, the Mu‘tazilah agree that will is an attribute of action.<sup>96</sup> In this context, like Abū ‘Alī, Abū Hāshim does not accept the fact that God is *murīd* by His essence, as in the case of other affirmative attributes, and he sees His will as an attribute of action. In the words of al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār according to the Mu‘tazilah, when God creates/makes the will, he becomes a “willer (*murīd*)” although He was not a willer beforehand. In this sense, He is the one who wills with a created will. However, they also emphasize the fact that God is the willer in the real sense,<sup>97</sup> and thus they oppose the reduction of will to any other element. The objection here is directed toward figures such as Abū l-Hudhayl (d. 235/849-50 [?]), al-Nazzām (d. 231/845), al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869), and al-Ka‘bī, who were the predecessors or contemporaries of them. In fact, Ibn al-Malāḥimī states that they opposed the claim God’s being a willer is something different from or beyond/additional (*zā’id*) to His motive (*dā‘ī*) for action. According to the majority of these figures, the characterization of God as the one who wills his actions means that He does not commit these acts unconsciously (as *sābi*) or under coercion (as *mukrah*); in addition, His being the one who wills the actions of others has the same meaning as His ordering them.<sup>98</sup> He himself believes that God being a willer (*murīd*) consists of the existence of motives for action (*dā‘ī*) and the absence of deterrents

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everything that can be seen in a single state and that perceiving any one thing does not prevent Him from perceiving the others (*al-Kashshāf*, V, 22).

<sup>96</sup> Al-Ka‘bī, *Kitāb al-Maqālāt*, 255; al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, ed. George C. Anawati (Cairo: al-Mu‘assasah al-Miṣriyyah al-‘Ammah li-l-Ta’lif wa-l-Tarjamah wa-l-Ṭibā‘ah wa-l-Nashr, 1962), VI/2 (*al-Ṭirādab*), 3.

<sup>97</sup> Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, VI/2, 3.

<sup>98</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 42; id., *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, 240; cf. al-Rāzī, *al-Riyāḍ al-mūniqab*, 223 (al-Nazzām), 260 (al-Jāḥiẓ), 279 (al-Ka‘bī); al-Nazzām also adds the meaning of God’s judgment concerning a thing; al-Ka‘bī, *Kitāb al-Maqālāt*, 255.

(*ṣārif*) preventing Him (from acting), and no additional element (*maʿnā zāʿid*) beyond these characteristics should be accepted.<sup>99</sup>

While al-Zamakhsharī describes the “willer” as “the one who is able to act in a certain way and not in another [although it is also possible],”<sup>100</sup> he defines the will as “the state that requires the action to occur by a living thing in this way rather than another.”<sup>101</sup> It is not overlooked that he does not use the term “attribute” or “entitative determinant (*maʿnā*)” for will but describes it as a “state (*ḥāl*)” and directly associates it with acting. After that, he first mentions Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s definition of will without mentioning that figure’s name and then notes that it is wrong to attribute the same characteristics of the “willing” human to God. What he means by this claim is probably that if a separate attribute of “will” is ascribed to God, it will be believed that He has a “will” that takes the form of orientation (*qaṣd*) and inclination (*mayl*) in human beings.<sup>102</sup> This view seems close to the opinion expressed by al-Nazzām and al-Kaʿbī. In fact, al-Kaʿbī noted that al-Nazzām said that “God intends to negate from Himself the unconscious deed (*sabw*), ignorance (*jabl*), and being under coercion (*ikrāh*) by using the word ‘will’,” and he clearly states that he also holds this view.<sup>103</sup> In the final analysis, alongside the names mentioned, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ḥusaynīs are of the same opinion with respect to denying a separate will for God, and al-Zamakhsharī also seems to incline in this direction intellectually. On the other hand, he says that when the attribute “will” is ascribed to God, He is the one who wills by a created entitative determinant (*maʿnā ḥādith*), that is, through will, and that anyone who supports this view must accept the existence of an accident that does not inhere in a substrate. It would be appropriate to say that the aforementioned view, which was the opinion of Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim and later that of Bahshamiyyah, was implicitly refuted here, as noted above.

<sup>99</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 43; id., *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 240, 249. In his words, even though Abū l-Ḥusayn understands the will to be something additional (*zāʿid*) to the actual motive (*dāʿī*) in the world of attestation, and in this sense, even though he makes a distinction between the world of attestation and the unseen world, his opinion of God’s will is not different from that of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.

<sup>100</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidī*, 46.

<sup>101</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, I, 243.

<sup>102</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidī*, 46; id., *al-Kashshāf*, I, 243-244.

<sup>103</sup> Al-Kaʿbī, *Kitāb al-Maqālāt*, 257.

As a matter of fact, commenting on the verse “*God wills to give them no share in the Hereafter.*” (Q 3:176), to the question that “while it would be sufficient to just say ‘God does not give them any share in the Hereafter,’ what it means to use the word will?” al-Zamakhsharī responds as follows: It is intended to point out that the motive (*dā‘ī*) for their deprivation of bounties and torment in the hereafter is whole and complete, so that there is no deterrent (*ṣārif*) due to their turning to unbelief.”<sup>104</sup> It is noteworthy that the term “complete (*kbālīṣ*) motive” is used here. Namely, Ibn al-Malāḥimī also says that the will is nothing other than the complete motive that leads to doing the deed or the dominant (*mutarajjih*) motive that makes doing it superior to not doing it.<sup>105</sup> At this point, it should be noted that he differs from Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, who distinguishes between the use of the notion of the will for God and for man, that is, between the world of attestation and the unseen world, and who argues that will in the world of attestation is something beyond the motive for action.<sup>106</sup> While al-

<sup>104</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, I, 663. Similarly, he interpreted the verse “*When Allah wills a thing ...*” (Q 36:82) in the context of will, as follows: “When the motive of wisdom leads Him to create, without any deterrent;” he also explains the phrase “[His] order to create” as having the complete motive to perform this act (*an yakbluṣ dā‘īhi ilā l-fi‘l*); *al-Kashshāf*, V, 197.

<sup>105</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq*, 169.

<sup>106</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq*, 43; id., *Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad*, 117. Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s concern with respect to this matter consists in opposing the views of Islamic philosophers who try to explain existence through the “theory of emanation” by identifying God’s “knowing” with his “willing.” He himself wrote a refutation of this position. As a result, in order to justify this understanding, figures who hold this view make a distinction between the unseen world and the world of attestation and assume different definition and content of the will of God and that of man; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn*, 92-93. For details concerning Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s discussion of this issue, see Koloğlu, *Mutezile’nin Felsefe Eleştirisi*, 186-190; cf. id., “İbnü’l-Melāḥimī,” 617. In this context, the statement of Ibn Mitham al-Baḥrānī (d. 699/1300) that “Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his followers accepted will and nonwill (*karābah*) as entitative determinants (*ma‘nā*) other than and beyond knowing (*‘ilm*) in the world of attestation (that is, for human agents) and the fact that they equated will and knowing for God.” (see al-Baḥrānī, *Qawā‘id al-marām*, 88) may be valid for Ibn al-Malāḥimī in terms of the second part, yet the statement that he distinguishes between the unseen world and the world of attestation is not correct. As a matter of fact, al-Najrānī clearly points to this differentiation between Abū l-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Malāḥimī; al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 284.

Zamakhsharī says that the act occurs through the power and will of the agent/actant (*fāʿid*), he interprets this will of man as the orientation and inclination of the agent to act and as the completeness of his motive in this matter.<sup>107</sup> In light of these data, it is appropriate to say that al-Zamakhsharī's understanding of will is a Ḥusaynī attitude in line with the views of Ibn al-Malāḥimī.

It can be said that the Muʿtazilah has a relatively uniform attitude concerning basic issues related to the attribute of power. Because the overwhelming majority of Muʿtazilah view God's omnipotence as His main attribute, it is admitted that knowing other attributes is of secondary importance.<sup>108</sup> In line with this account, it is accepted by both Bahshamīs and Ḥusaynīs that God has power over everything that is subject to power (*qādir alā kull al-maḥdūrāt*), and the views of some Muʿtazilīs, such as al-Nazzām, al-Aswārī (d. 240/854), and al-Jāḥiz, that God is not able to oppress (*ẓulm*), lie (*kidhb*), or abandon "the optimum (a human's) best interest; (*aslah*)" were explicitly rejected by both Bahshamīs and Ḥusaynīs on the grounds that this view would limit the power of God.<sup>109</sup> On the other hand, that it is impossible for God to actually create (or even will) evil (*qabīḥ*) due to His justice and wisdom, a point which is naturally agreed upon by all Muʿtazilīs. Al-Zamakhsharī also expresses the claim that "God has power over everything subject to power" in a general and encompassing manner in both *al-Minhāj* and *al-Kashshāf*.<sup>110</sup>

Following this consensus concerning the point that God does not commit evil deeds, a conflict between Bahshamiyyah and

<sup>107</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, II, 201.

<sup>108</sup> Mānakdim Sashdīw, *Taʿliq*, 151; Ibn Mattawayh, *Kitāb al-Majmūʿ*, I, 103; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Muʿtamad*, 182, 183.

<sup>109</sup> Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, ed. Aḥmad Fuʿād al-Ahwānī (Cairo: al-Muʿassasah al-Miṣriyyah al-ʿĀmmah li-l-Taʿlīf wa-l-Tarjamah wa-l-Ṭibāʿah wa-l-Nashr, 1962), VI/1 (*al-Taʿdīl wa-l-tajwīr*), 127; Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, *Taṣaffiḥ al-adillab*, 89; Ibn Mattawayh, *Kitāb al-Majmūʿ*, I, 246 f. In this part, Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī goes one step further and states that Abū ʿAlī, Abū Hāshim, and Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Kaʿbī not only say that God is capable of committing evil but also consider it possible for an evil act to come to pass through Him; see Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, *Taṣaffiḥ al-adillab*, 89. Al-Ḥimmaṣī also draws the same conclusion regarding Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim; al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidh*, I, 156.

<sup>110</sup> e.g., see al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, I, 545; III, 402; IV, 135; id., *Muʿtezile Akāidī*, 42, 45.

Ḥusayniyyah arises. Bahshamīs bases the fact that Allah does not commit an evil act on the fact that He knows that the act is evil and does not need it at the same time.<sup>111</sup> Abū l- Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn al-Malāḥimī, on the other hand, argue that it is absolutely impossible for God to commit an evil action since it is absolutely impossible for Him to have a motive (*dāʿi*) for committing an evil act.<sup>112</sup>

On the one hand, al-Zamakhsharī emphasizes that “the actor/agent only commits an act with a motive and refrains from doing it thanks to a deterrent,”<sup>113</sup> at the same time, he suggests two things as the reason why God does not actually commit evil deeds (and furthermore, does not command them): He does not have a motive for doing so, and he has a deterrent (*ṣārif*) not to do it.<sup>114</sup> From this point of view, it is possible to say that he defends the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn al-Malāḥimī almost in the same way, and therefore he follows in the footsteps of the Ḥusayniyyah, not those of the Bahshamiyyah, in this regard. On the other hand, it should be noted that while he justifies the claim that God does not commit an evil act, he also includes the aforementioned Bahshamī inference,<sup>115</sup> and in this sense, he exhibits a reconciliatory approach.<sup>116</sup>

As noted above, both the Bahshamīs and the Ḥusaynīs faced the problem of the creation of human actions by God, while given that they argue and claim in principle that “God has power over everything

<sup>111</sup> Al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughbnī*, VI/1, 77; Ibn Mattawayh, *Kitāb al-Majmūʿ*, I, 257; Mānakdīm Sashhdīw, *Taʿlīq*, 316.

<sup>112</sup> Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, *Taṣaffuḥ al-adillah*, 93, 97; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʿiq*, 128.

<sup>113</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidi*, 40

<sup>114</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, II, 437.

<sup>115</sup> al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidi*, 40, 48

<sup>116</sup> This conciliatory attitude was not limited to al-Zamakhsharī. Personalities such as Ibn Mītham al-Baḥrānī and Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, who are followers of the Ḥusaynī sect, primarily base their opinions concerning the issue of God’s not committing malicious/evil acts on the notions of *dāʿi* and *ṣārif*, and as a background for this discussion, they point to the way of explanation employed by Bahshamīs; see al-Baḥrānī, *Qawāʿid al-marām*, 111-112; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād fī sharḥ Tajrīd al-iʿtiqād* (Beirut: Muʿassasat al-ʿAlamī li-l-Maṭbūʿāt, 1988), 283; id., *Manābij al-yaqīn*, 375; Therefore, at this point, it can be said that the use of the Bahshamīs’ inference cannot be taken as an indicator of a distinctive identity.

which is subject to power.” At this point, the main concern seems to be to leave the door open to the doctrine of acquisition (*kasb*),<sup>117</sup> which argues that human action occurs via the creation of God and the acquisition of the servant, and therefore such action occurs under the influence of two capable agents (*qādir*); thus, it is possible to establish a relationship between evil acts and God. Since the Bahshamīs also argued that “a single created action (*maqdūr*) cannot be under the power of two capable agents,”<sup>118</sup> to reconcile this claim with the assumption that “God is omnipotent,” they develop the following belief: God has absolute power over the infinite number of all classes (*ajnās*) of acts that are subject to power, and therefore He also has power over the “classes” of acts that are subject to man’s capability; however, He has no direct power over the very acts of human beings.<sup>119</sup> On the other hand, the Ḥusaynīs defend the claim that God is also capable of the very acts of human beings to preserve the extent of His power.<sup>120</sup>

Al-Zamakhsharī does not express a clear preference regarding this controversial technical aspect of the issue. According to him, to discuss a capable agent and its power/effectiveness over anything, the act must not be impossible (*mustahīl*) in essence. Therefore, as he puts it, when the expression “capable of doing everything/has power over everything” is used [for God], things that are impossible naturally constitute an exception to this rule. A single act being subject to the power of two capable agents, on the other hand, is a controversial issue.<sup>121</sup> Considering his attitude of suspended judgment, it is not very accurate to suggest that “he is not Ḥusaynī, on the grounds that al-Zamakhsharī considers the existence of two capable agents for one act among impossible actions, and in this respect, he does not include the actions of the men among the subjects’ of God’s power all.”<sup>122</sup>

#### 2.4. [A Human’s] Best Interest (*al-Aṣḥab*)

Although the principled acceptance that it is obligatory for God to perform all the actions that He performs for His servants in the most

<sup>117</sup> Koloğlu, *Cübbâiler’in Kelâm Sistemi*, 374.

<sup>118</sup> e.g. see al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughbnī*, VIII, 131-161.

<sup>119</sup> Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughbnī*, VI/1, 159; Mānakdīm Sashdīw, *Ta‘līq*, 58, 155-156.

<sup>120</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq*, 83-84; al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidh*, I, 206.

<sup>121</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, I, 209

<sup>122</sup> Altun, “Behşemiyye ve Hüseyiniyye Arasında Zemahşerî,” 728.

correct and best way possible can be attributed to the entire Mu‘tazilah, the schools of Basrah and Baghdad disagree concerning the extent of this obligation to make/create the best (*al-aşlah*). Basran Mu‘tazilīs to some degree identify the *aşlah* with favor (*lutf*) and consider it to be an obligation of God to do only what is considered necessary in terms of religious obligation (*taklīf*).<sup>123</sup> Therefore, according to these figures, it is obligatory for God to do the best (*aşlah*) only with respect to the religious field, not the worldly field.<sup>124</sup> On the other hand, according to the Baghdādīs, beginning with al-Ka‘bī, it is obligatory for God to perform/create the best in worldly matters too.<sup>125</sup>

While their approach to the obligatoriness of performing the worldly *aşlah* for God is a distinguishing feature between the Basrah and Baghdad schools at this stage, this situation simultaneously produced a Bahshamī-Ḥusaynī split with the emergence of Ḥusayniyyah and his adoption of the Baghdādī view.<sup>126</sup> The fact that al-Najrānī does not mention this issue among the issues of controversy between the two schools probably stems from the belief that it can ultimately be reduced to a verbal dispute.<sup>127</sup> At this point, it should be noted that Abū l-Ḥusayn exhibits a hesitant or, in other words, a middle-of-the-road attitude regarding the worldly *aşlah*, stating that – although there is a motive for this act – it is sometimes obligatory and sometimes not.<sup>128</sup> On the other hand, the established opinion of the

<sup>123</sup> Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, ed. Muşţafā al-Saqqa (Cairo: al-Dār al-Mişriyyah li-l-Ta’līf wa-l-Tarjamah, 1965), XIV (*al-Aşlah - Istiḥqāq al-damm - al-Tawbab*), 53, 61; Ibn Mattawayh, *Kitāb al-Majmū‘*, ed. Jan Peters (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1999), III, 130.

<sup>124</sup> Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, ed. Abū l-‘Alā’ ‘Afīfī (Cairo: Maṭba‘at Dār al-Kutub al-Mişriyyah, 1962), XIII (*al-Lutf*), 20-21; XV, 254; Ibn Mattawayh, *Kitāb al-Majmū‘*, ed. J. J. Houben (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1980), II, 332-333, 360.

<sup>125</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 292; al-Ḥimmaşī, *al-Munqidb*, I, 298; al-Ḥillī, *Manābij al-yaqīn*, 399.

<sup>126</sup> Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī attributes the view that the worldly *aşlah* is obligatory to a group of Basran Mu‘tazilīs as well as al-Ka‘bī and Baghdadian Mu‘tazilīs, which very likely refers to the Ḥusaynīs; al-Ḥillī, *Kashf al-murād*, 322.

<sup>127</sup> Koloğlu, “Mu‘tezile’nin Hüseyiniyye Ekolünün Dünyevî Aslah Konusuna Yaklaşımı,” *İslâm Araştırmaları Dergisi* 39 (March 2018), 20, fn. 40.

<sup>128</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 293; al-Ḥimmaşī, *al-Munqidb*, I, 300. In this attitude of Abū l-Ḥusayn, the following objection by the Bahshamīs was effective: “If it were obligatory for God to do the [worldly] *aşlah*, then something that has no end, in other words, something which is impossible, would require making it

Ḥusaynīs beginning with Ibn al-Malāḥimī is in line with that of al-Kaʿbī and the Baghdad school. God’s generosity (*jūd*), which is cited by al-Kaʿbī and later by Baghdādīs as a main reason for the obligatoriness of the worldly *aṣlah* for God, seems to be identified with the presence of God’s motive for doing so in Ḥusaynian thought and the absence of any deterrent to prevent doing so.<sup>129</sup> From this point of view, the fact that the Baghdādī view overlaps with the general act theory of the Ḥusaynīs seems to be the most important factor in the adoption of this view by the Ḥusaynīs.<sup>130</sup>

In his *al-Minhāj*, al-Zamakhsharī addresses the issue of *aṣlah* only in the context of “worldly interest” and conveys the opposite view to that of al-Kaʿbī and Jubbāʾīs without stating his own preference.<sup>131</sup> Note that, other than mentioning the concept of *aṣlah* under the title of “Favors (*al-Altāf*),” he never uses the concept of *aṣlah* in his commentary<sup>132</sup> and prefers the terms favor (*luṭf*) or favors (*altāf*) and

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obligatory upon Him, because He is able to make the *aṣlah* that has no end (*yaqdir min dbālik ‘alā mā lā yatanābā*) (e.g., see al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, XIV, 56; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 292) On the other hand, al-Rāzī states that Abū l-Ḥusayn tended to regard this act as obligatory under conditions in which the objection from the Bahshamīs could be eliminated, that is, as long as the worldly *aṣlah* never came to an infinite regression, which is impossible, because it can be said that there is a motive here and that deterrents are out of the question; al-Rāzī, *al-Riyāḍ al-mūniqah*, 294.

<sup>129</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 292; al-Ḥillī, *Manābij al-yaqīn*, 399. However, for example, while Imāmī Muʿtazilī scholar al-Shaykh al-Mufīd (d. 413/1022), who adopted the approach of the Baghdad school, argues that the worldly *aṣlah* is obligatory for God, he grounds this claim on the fact that God is generous and that the opposite is not possible, and he does not mention the existence of a motive and therefore its influence; Abū ‘Abd Allāh Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Nuʿmān al-Ḥārithī al-‘Ukbarī al-Shaykh al-Mufīd, *Awāʾil al-maqālāt fī l-madbāhib wa-l-mukhtārāt* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Islāmī, 1983), 63. As a matter of fact, it should be noted that al-Kaʿbī approaches the issue from the perspective that God is not only omnipotent, omniscient, and wise but also generous (*jawād*), and not doing *aṣlah* can entail nongenerosity; al-Kaʿbī, *Kitāb al-Maqālāt*, 323.

<sup>130</sup> Koloğlu, “Muʿtezile’nin Hüseyiniyye Ekolünün Dünyevî Aslah Konusuna Yaklaşımı,” 13-14.

<sup>131</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidi*, 55.

<sup>132</sup> At this point, it should be noted that although he does not use the concept of “*aṣlah*,” he clearly states that it is obligatory for God to “fulfill an issue that is a

that contrary to Abū ‘Alī, who argues that favor cannot come from anyone other than God, he approaches the attitude of Abū Hāshim, who divided the notion of grace as follows: “first of all, God’s act; second, obligated person’s (*al-mukallaḥ*) own act, and third, the act of third person other than the obligated person, not God or the obligated person.”<sup>133</sup> All of these facts can be interpreted at first glance as evidence that al-Zamakhsharī adopts the Bahshamī approach. However, the last category in Abū Hāshim’s classification is not included in his view, and a dual division is seen in a way that can be formed from the action of God and the obligated person himself.<sup>134</sup> In fact, this view coincides with that of Ibn al-Malāḥimī, who develops the aforementioned dual classification, not the triple classification of Abū Hāshim.<sup>135</sup> In addition, although Ibn al-Malāḥimī does not use these concepts in the same way – al-Zamakhsharī’s division of favor into two categories, as the *muḥaṣṣilab* that ensures the existence and continuity of something such that when this exists (although it is possible to do so in both cases), the obligated person is inclined to obey by his own choice, and if it did not exist, he would be deemed to have disobeyed, and as the *muqarribab* that makes the obligated person closer to obedience if it exists and brings closer the one who is not close if it does not exist, even if it is possible to perform the action in both ways, as well as al-Zamakhsharī’s dual division with respect to “harm (*mafsadab*),” which is the opposite of favor (*maṣlahab*), in the same way, is a distinction that exists in Ibn al-Malāḥimī.<sup>136</sup>

In addition to these points, al-Zamakhsharī’s explanation of al-Ka’bī’s view as the claim that “God has a motive for making the worldly *aṣlah* and there is no deterrent that will prevent him from doing this”<sup>137</sup> – as stated above – is the established position of the Ḥusaynī tradition. The fact that he does not make an explicit choice here can be explained by his conciliatory attitude as well as by his view of Bahshamī position as a literal/verbal divergence from the Ḥusaynī

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religious *maṣlahab* and not refrain from doing it” and to “show the way that will lead to the truth.”; al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, III, 426; IV, 80.

<sup>133</sup> Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, XIII, 27; Mānakdim Sashdīw, *Ta’līq*, 519.

<sup>134</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Mu‘tezile Akāidi*, 55.

<sup>135</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 256.

<sup>136</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Mu‘tezile Akāidi*, 55; id., *al-Kashshāf*, I, 168; cf. Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 251.

<sup>137</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī *Mu‘tezile Akāidi*, 55.

approach, as in Ibn al-Malāḥimī.<sup>138</sup>

## 2.5. Sainly Miracles (*al-Karāmāt*)

It can be said that the possibility and occurrence of saintly miracles, or more accurately, extraordinary phenomena (*kbāriq al-‘ādab*) other than miracles, constitute the main issues regarding a split between Ahl al-sunnah and Mu‘tazilah. However, it does not seem possible to generalize views pertaining to the “rejection of the saintly miracles” even for the Mu‘tazilah. While some Sunnī sources attribute the rejection of saintly miracles to all Mu‘tazilah,<sup>139</sup> others generally refer to Abū I-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī as the only Mu‘tazilī scholar who accepted the possibility and occurrence of saintly miracles.<sup>140</sup> For example, al-Rāzī states in one instance that he opposed earlier Mu‘tazilīs such as Abū ‘Alī, Abū Hāshim, and al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār and criticized their arguments in this regard.<sup>141</sup> Based on these data, it is possible to characterize the issue of the existence of *karāmāt* as a Bahshamī-Ḥusaynī conflict within the Mu‘tazilah – at least for some time. In fact, as al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār openly states and defends, Abū Hāshim and Bahshamīs think that there should be a necessary relationship between being a prophet and presenting an extraordinary phenomenon (miracles in this context), and they identified these two states with each other.<sup>142</sup> In this sense, while the Bahshamīs consider the extraordinary phenomenon in terms of “signification [to the prophethood]” and subject it to a rational evaluation in the context of God’s attributes of

<sup>138</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā’iq*, 294-295.

<sup>139</sup> For example, see al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn*, 175; Abū I-Yusr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Ḥusayn al-Bazdawī, *Uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Hans Peter Linss (Cairo: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Kutub al-‘Arabīyah, 1963), 227; Abū I-Mu‘īn Maymūn ibn Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Nasafī, *Tabṣirat al-adillah fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Claude Salame (Damascus: Institut Francais de Damas, 1990), I, 536; Nūr al-Dīn Aḥmad ibn Maḥmūd al-Ṣābūnī, *al-Kifāyah fī l-bidāyah*, ed. Muḥammad Ārūchī (Beirut: Dār Ibn Ḥazm, 2014), 208; al-Taftāzānī, *Sbarḥ al-Maqāṣid*, ed. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Umayrah (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1998), V, 72.

<sup>140</sup> For example, see al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Arba‘īn fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Aḥmad Ḥijāzī al-Saqqā (Beirut: Dār al-Jīl, 2004), II, 377; al-Jurjānī, *Sbarḥ al-Mawāqif*, ed. Maḥmūd ‘Umar al-Dimyāṭī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1998), VIII, 314.

<sup>141</sup> Al-Rāzī, *al-Riyāḍ al-mūniqab*, 163-164, 294.

<sup>142</sup> Al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār, *al-Mughnī*, ed. Maḥmūd al-Khuḍayrī and Maḥmūd Muḥammad Qāsim (Cairo: al-Dār al-Miṣriyyah li-l-Ta’līf wa-l-Tarjamah, 1965), XV (*al-Tanabbu’āt wa-l-mu‘jizāt*), 217-221, 242-243.

justice (*al-ʿadl*) and wisdom, the Ḥusaynīs, on the other hand, tend to accept such phenomena via a scripture/tradition (*al-naql*)-oriented approach based on statements in the Qurʾān and the Sunnah that extraordinary phenomena are seen in people other than the prophets. However, it is possible to say that their acceptance of saintly miracles, not their rejection of such events, became a settled topic among the late Muʿtazilah, since in the Bahshamiyyah, there is no significant representative who rejected saintly miracles after al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār.<sup>143</sup> Indeed, Abū Rashīd al-Nīsābūrī (the first half of the 5<sup>th</sup>/11<sup>th</sup> century), a disciple of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, says that the idea that extraordinary phenomena seen through the people other than the prophets weaken the ability to use miracles as indicators of prophethood and render such miracles meaningless is not valid, subsequently adding that in order for a miracle to prove prophethood, there must be a prophetic claim beforehand and stating that this claim is not in question for anyone other than the prophet; therefore, he accepts the possibility of saintly miracles.<sup>144</sup> It is also noteworthy that he exhibits a largely “Ḥusaynī” spirit, stating that denying the possibility of miracles would mean denying many traditions pertaining to the occurrence of such phenomena.<sup>145</sup>

Beginning with Abū l-Ḥusayn, the Ḥusaynīs tend to accept the existence of saintly miracles. As Ibn al-Malāḥimī himself defends the existence of saintly miracles, he counts Ibn al-Ikhshīd among those who consider *karāmāt* possible, as well as Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī. However, he attributes to Ibn al-Ikhshīd the view that “saintly miracles are possible on the grounds of reason (*jāʿiz ʿaql<sup>m</sup>*), but indications whose source is revealed texts make them impossible.<sup>146</sup> Al-Najrānī also confirms Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s view of Ibn al-Ikhshīd. In al-Najrānī’s words, “Muʿtazilī shaykhs,” such as Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd al-Khwārazmī (Ibn al-Malāḥimī), except for Abū Hāshim and al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār, argue for the possibility and occurrence of

<sup>143</sup> Kevser Demir Bektaş, *Muʿtezile ve Keramet: Behşemiyye ve Hüseyniyye Ekolleri Arasında Kerametın İmkânı Üzerine Tartışmalar* (Istanbul: Endülüs Yayınları, 2019), 24.

<sup>144</sup> Abū Rashīd Saʿīd ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Nīsābūrī, *Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ*, ed. Richard C. Martin (in “A Mutazilite Treatise on Prophethood and Miracles: Being Probably the Bab ala l-nubuwwah from the Ziyadat al-sharh by Abu Rashid al-Nisaburi” [PhD diss]; New York: New York University, 1975), 147, 155-156.

<sup>145</sup> Al-Nīsābūrī, *Ziyādāt al-Sharḥ*, 146.

<sup>146</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 317-322.

saintly miracles on grounds both of reason and of tradition. In addition, al-Najrānī clearly states that he also holds this opinion and presents detailed arguments in support of it.<sup>147</sup>

In other respects, it has been claimed that al-Zamakhsharī rejects the occurrence of saintly miracles in his *al-Kashshāf*,<sup>148</sup> and the expression “*wa-fi hādhibā ibtāl li-l-karāmāt*,” which he employed while commenting on the verse concerning the time of doomsday (Q 72:25), has been translated as “... there is clear evidence for the cancellation of all types of saintly miracles,” interpreting it a Bahshamī expression that encompasses all aspects of the issue.<sup>149</sup> Although at first glance, this statement can be attributed to an attitude of absolute rejection, when we examine al-Zamakhsharī’s statements here in terms of the underlying concepts, we understand that he is only addressing the issue of “reporting from the unseen world (*al-ghayb*)” and that he seems to reject such a *karāmah*, in line with the Qur’ān’s clear statements that “only God will know the unseen/unknown (*al-ghayb*).” As a matter of fact, he states that the people to whom saintly miracles are attributed are not prophets, even if they are saints whom God has blessed, and that God has made only prophets aware of certain secret divine information in a way specific to them. The fact that he later notes that the expressions in the verse show the invalidity of issues such as divination and magic (*ibtāl al-kabānah wa-l-tanjīm*),<sup>150</sup> can be seen as a sign that the issue or the context in al-Zamakhsharī’s mind only pertains to *karāmah* claims regarding having information about the *ghayb* or telling or informing others about the *ghayb*. Therefore, based on this statement alone, it would be a hasty generalization to say that al-Zamakhsharī rejected saintly miracles and therefore that he was a Bahshamī.

From the same point of view, al-Zamakhsharī’s expression “For, in the absence of the prophet, it is evil (*qabīḥ*) for God to disrupt the natural course of events and ...”<sup>151</sup> in *al-Minhāj* is open to the

<sup>147</sup> Al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 354-376.

<sup>148</sup> Madelung, “al-Zamakhsharī, Abu ‘l-Kāsim Maḥmūd b. ‘Umar,” in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, XII (Supplement), 841. It should be noted here that a theological/sectarian affiliation is not provided based on this attitude of rejection.

<sup>149</sup> Altun, “Behşemiyye ve Hüseyiniyye Arasında Zemaşşerî,” 723.

<sup>150</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, VI, 235.

<sup>151</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Mu‘tezile Akāidi*, 57

interpretation that he argues that extraordinary events (*kbāriq al-‘ādab*) can only be associated with the prophet; therefore, he does not accept the occurrence of extraordinary phenomena other than miracles (*karāmāt* in this context). However, it should not be overlooked that he states that such extraordinary events cannot occur “in the absence of prophets” instead of claiming that they cannot occur “through people who are not prophets” (in fact, the use of such an expression would clearly show that he rejected saintly miracles). It is also possible to view this claim as a very limited “acceptance of saintly miracles.” For example, Ibn Ḥazm also states that the extraordinary phenomena that are stated to have occurred through the Companions while the Prophet Muḥammad was alive and which are given as evidence for the existence of saintly miracles, are miracles belonging only to Muḥammad (such as groaning sounds coming from the palm stump, increasing water in the bowl, etc.) because they occurred while the Prophet Muḥammad was alive, not after his death, and he narrates that these events took place by their hands as a way of honoring/blessing (*ikrām*) the aforementioned Companions. According to him, such a situation is not possible after the death of the Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>152</sup> This opinion coincides with the general understanding of miracles among the Ahl al-sunnah,<sup>153</sup> who evaluate saintly miracles as miracles of the prophet in the final analysis.

The relatively clearest indication that al-Zamakhsharī adopts a Bahshamī approach that rejects saintly miracles is seen in the following statements from the section of *al-Minbāj* that lists the characteristics of miracles: “And again, [the miracle] occurs at the time of the one who claims prophethood, because the truth of the claim is a feature of prophethood, and there can be no question of the existence of a feature without the thing that has that feature.”<sup>154</sup> However, it should be investigated whether this statement can also be attributed to the attitude of “limited acceptance” mentioned above. In fact, while interpreting the verses (Q 3:42-43) regarding Mary, the mother of Jesus, speaking to angels, al-Zamakhsharī also mentions “the possibility that it is an anticipatory miracle (*irbāṣ*) for Prophet Jesus.”<sup>155</sup> While al-Ṭībī,

<sup>152</sup> Ibn Ḥazm, *al-Uṣūl wa-l-furū‘*, ed. ‘Āṭif Muḥammad al-‘Irāqī et al. (Cairo: Dār al-Nahḍah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1978), II, 301.

<sup>153</sup> e.g. see al-Taftāzānī, *Sharḥ al-‘Aqā’id al-Nasafīyyah*, ed. Ṭāhā ‘Abd al-Ra’ūf Sa‘d (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyyah li-l-Turāth, 2000), 133.

<sup>154</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Mu‘tezile Akāidī*, 69.

<sup>155</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, I, 557.

a Sunnī author, addresses this statement, he notes that this incident could be an anticipatory miracle for prophet Jesus in the eyes of the Muʿtazilis, as al-Zamakhsharī also claims,<sup>156</sup> Abū Ḥayyān al-Andalusī (d. 745/1344) states that the Muʿtazilah accept certain extraordinary situations other than miracles, such as *irbāṣ* (an anticipatory miracle for a prophet), under certain conditions. One condition he proposes is that a prophet already exists at the time of the *irbāṣ*, which in this example is the Prophet Zechariah.<sup>157</sup> With the support of these comments, if it can be concluded that al-Zamakhsharī accepts *irbāṣ* from his statements, it can be noted that he does not categorically reject the existence of extraordinary states other than miracles; this view leaves the door open to the possibility that he accepted saintly miracles or at least makes it difficult to refute this opinion absolutely.

## 2.6. Enjoining Right and Forbidding Wrong (*al-Amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar*)

It does not seem possible to talk about an open disagreement between Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah concerning issues such as the obligatoriness and conditions of enjoining good and forbidding wrong. Despite the fact that enjoining good deeds may carry different provisions, such as being obligatory (*wājib*) or recommended (*mandūb*), depending on the verdict of the act ordered, since it is obligatory to abandon all kinds of evil (*qabīḥ*), it can be said that there is a consensus regarding the fact that it is an obligation to forbid evil.<sup>158</sup> Even with regard to forbidding wrong, the representatives of the two schools seem to have agreed to a large extent with respect to the following conditions, which were put forward so that this decree of obligatory duty would not be overturned: the one who is kept away from sin must not be caused to sin further, and the person who forbids him from doing wrong must not be killed or injured in a way that causes organ loss.<sup>159</sup>

However, there is disagreement even between Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim concerning how to know the obligatory nature of enjoining

<sup>156</sup> Al-Ṭībī, *Futūḥ al-ghayb*, IV, 104.

<sup>157</sup> Abū Ḥayyān Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf ibn ʿAlī al-Andalusī, *Tafsīr al-baḥr al-muḥīṭ*, ed. ʿĀdil Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Mawjūd and ʿAlī Muḥammad Muʿawwaḍ (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1993), II, 476.

<sup>158</sup> Mānakdīm Sashdīw, *Taʿlīq*, 745; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʿiq*, 542; al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidb*, II, 209; Ibn al-Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī, *Manābij al-yaqīn*, 542.

<sup>159</sup> Mānakdīm Sashdīw, *Taʿlīq*, 143; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʿiq*, 546.

good and forbidding wrong. While Abū ‘Alī is of the opinion that this nature can be known completely on grounds of reason,<sup>160</sup> Abū Hāshim argues that it can be known on grounds of revelation (*shar‘an*).<sup>161</sup> It is noted that Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī was also of the opinion that this point can be known on grounds of reason.<sup>162</sup>

Second, even if the provision of obligatoriness is omitted, there may be disagreement concerning whether it would still be good (*ḥasan*) to forbid someone from evil in a situation such as the one mentioned above. In line with the common acceptance mentioned, al-Qāḍī ‘Abd al-Jabbār states that one of the conditions for the obligatoriness of forbidding wrongdoing is that the person who forbids evil knows that doing so will not result in harm to his life or property or that a positive possibility prevails in his mind in this regard. However, according to him, this situation may vary from person to person. If insulting and beating will not have a bad effect on the situation of the person who forbids evil, then it can be said that the obligation to forbid evil remains in effect. However, it is not obligatory to forbid evil if it will lead to a bad effect and harm his position. He states that whether it is good to perform this act of forbidding evil, which is not obligatory, is also evaluated separately.

However, two different determinations have been made regarding al-Qāḍī’s view concerning this point. According to al-Qāḍī, as quoted by Mānakdīm, if it is a question of preserving the honor of religion by enduring this state of humiliation, it is good to forbid wrong; otherwise, it is not.<sup>163</sup> Ḥusaynī authors such as Ibn al-Malāḥimī quote al-Qāḍī’s view as follows: if the abandoned act has a more serious quality than the thing to which the person who performed the forbidding is exposed (e.g., if an act that expresses blasphemy is put to an end by forbidding from evil, but the person who performed the forbidding is killed by the other who is being forbidden), in this case, it would be “evil (*qabīḥ*)” to forbid wrong. In this context, they attribute the view

<sup>160</sup> Mānakdīm Sashdīw, *Ta‘līq*, 742. Ibn al-Malāḥimī and, possibly inspired by him, al-Zamakhsharī ascribe to Abū ‘Alī the view that this nature “can be known both on grounds of reason and revelation;” Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq*, 543; al-Zamakhsharī, *Mu‘tezile Akāidī*, 66; id., *al-Kasbsbāf*, I, 605.

<sup>161</sup> Mānakdīm Sashdīw, *Ta‘līq*, 742; al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidb*, II, 211.

<sup>162</sup> Al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidb*, II, 214.

<sup>163</sup> Mānakdīm Sashdīw, *Ta‘līq*, 143.

that forbidding would be good to Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.<sup>164</sup>

It is understood that al-Zamakhsharī presents the opinion of al-Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār by quoting Ibn al-Malāḥimī. However, he differs from Abū Hāshim by justifying the obligatoriness of enjoining good and forbidding wrong via both scriptural and rational proofs;<sup>165</sup> in addition, it is clear that he differs from the view of al-Qāḍī, who is a Bahshamī as quoted by the Ḥusaynī sources, concerning whether it would be good in the aforementioned case and that he approves of Abū l-Ḥusayn’s view.<sup>166</sup>

## 2.7. Restoration (*al-Iʿādab*)

The nature of the restoration has been the subject of controversy as a natural consequence of the split between the Bahshamiyyah and the Ḥusayniyyah concerning how religious obligations (*taklīf*) should be terminated. Two main approaches have emerged in this context: “passing away (*fanāʾ*)” means either that “the universe loses its quality of being and becomes absolute non-existence (*al-ʿadam al-maḥḍ*)” or that it is separated into parts (*tafriq*) but that these parts still continue to exist.<sup>167</sup> The first of these possibilities is referred to as the “annihilating (*iʿdām*)” view, as it envisages the occurrence of nonexistence instead of existence, and the other possibility is referred to as the “separation (*tafriq*)” view, since it advocates the separation of existing things into parts.<sup>168</sup> As al-Najrānī, who is a Ḥusaynī, says, “Our choice in this matter is to reveal the invalidity of the idea of *iʿdām*,”<sup>169</sup> it is clear that the first opinion belongs to the Bahshamīs and the second to the Ḥusaynīs. Accordingly, while the Bahshamīs argue that restoration (*iʿādab*) will occur in the form of creation from nothing, just as in the case of the first creation, Ḥusaynīs, on the other hand, are of the opinion that restoration will take place not from nothing but as a merging (*jamʿ wa-taʿlīf*) of parts that are fragmented but still

<sup>164</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fāʾiq*, 546; cf. al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidh*, II, 219.

<sup>165</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *Muʿtezile Akāidi*, 66.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, 66-67.

<sup>167</sup> Abū l-Qāsim Najm al-Dīn Jaʿfar ibn al-Ḥasan ibn Abī Zakariyyā Yaḥyā al-Muḥaqqiq al-Ḥillī, *al-Maslak fī uṣūl al-dīn*, ed. Riḍā al-Ustādī (Mashhad: Majmaʿ al-Buḥūth al-Islāmiyyah, 1414 AH), 132.

<sup>168</sup> Koloğlu, “Fenâ: Son Dönem Mutezilesinde Teklifin Sonlandırılması Üzerine Tartışmalar,” *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi* 18/1 (January 2009), 426.

<sup>169</sup> Al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 379.

preserve their existence.<sup>170</sup> Although there are differences of opinion regarding the reality of nonexistent that lies at the core of the divergence, among other things, the Ḥusaynīs emphasize that the view of *i‘dām* is wrong in terms of wisdom. Accordingly, in the event that the obligated person (*al-mukallaf*) is completely destroyed and recreated from nothing, the peculiar qualities that separate obligated persons from each other will disappear alongside everything else. The person who will be rewarded or punished by being recreated will not be the person who was on the right path or fell into disobedience while he was alive but will be a copy (*mithl*) of him created from nothing. This situation, in fact, would mean repaying someone who did not deserve it and would constitute oppression (*ẓulm*) and evil (*qabīḥ*) on the part of God.<sup>171</sup>

At first glance, it does not seem easy to identify the side to which al-Zamakhsharī inclines with respect to this point of divergence. Namely, he employs approaches that can be attributed to both opinions in different contexts. While explaining the verse “*Even as We produced the first creation, so shall We produce a new one (nu‘idubū)*” (Q 21:104), he uses a Bahshamī style of expression by giving the following answer to the question “What is the nature of the first creation and, in comparison, how [the God] will perform the recreation in the same

<sup>170</sup> Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq*, 443, 444 (provided that this is al-Jāḥiẓ’s view and that they themselves adopt it); id., *Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn*, 175; al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidb*, II, 181, 190 (provided that this is the opinion of al-Jāḥiẓ and a group of later Mu‘tazilah). With respect to this divergence and discussions concerning the nature of the restoration, see Koloğlu, “Mutezile Kelamında Yeniden Yaratma (İ‘āde),” *Usûl: İslâm Araştırmaları* 9 (June 2008), 8-15.

<sup>171</sup> Al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 386; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Kitāb al-Fā‘iq*, 455-456. This form of inference was used by Ibn Sīnā to prove the impossibility of the recreation of the *ma‘dūm*, in other words, the act of restoration in general; see Abū ‘Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Alī Ibn Sīnā, *al-Shifā’ (al-Ilābiyyāt)*, ed. Georges C. Anawati and Sa‘īd Zāyid (Qom: Maktabat Āyat Allāh al-Uẓmā al-Mar‘ashī al-Najafī al-Kubrā, 2012), 36. Therefore, it is possible that this objection by Ibn Sīnā had an effect on the shaping of the Ḥusaynī view. As a matter of fact, Ḥusaynī authors reformulate and use this inference in line with their own way of thinking, but they note that Ibn Sīnā’s objection is not binding on them, since they do not agree to the belief in a restore from nothing; Ibn al-Malāḥimī, *Tuḥfat al-mutakallimīn*, 177; al-Ḥimmaṣī, *al-Munqidb*, II, 194; Baḥrānī, *Qawā‘id al-marām*, 147 (noting that philosophers agree on this point and that the opinion of Abū l-Ḥusayn and Ibn al-Malāḥimī and his own preference tend in this direction.)

way.” “The first creation is to bring into existence from non-existence; He will bring it back from non-existence in the second creation, just as He brought it into existence from non-existence in the first creation.”<sup>172</sup> Since the view that recreation will occur in the form of a creation from nothing is generally accepted by the Ahl al-sunnah,<sup>173</sup> Ibn al-Munayyir argues that with this statement, al-Zamakhsharī is returning to the truth from the misconception that he expressed elsewhere, that is, “the view that restoration is the bringing together of disintegrated parts.”<sup>174</sup> However, the main point that al-Zamakhsharī emphasizes here is that restoration will occur just as in the case of the first creation in terms of being subject to God’s power, that is, that it can be done more properly.<sup>175</sup> In fact, Ibn al-Munayyir also draws a certain inference

<sup>172</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, IV, 168.

<sup>173</sup> For example, see al-Baghdādī, *Kitāb Uṣūl al-dīn*, 232; al-Rāzī, *Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn*, II, 39; al-Jurjānī, *Sbarḥ al-Mawāqif*, VIII, 316; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn Ashraf al-Ḥusaynī al-Samarqandī, *al-Ṣaḥāʾif al-ilābiyyah*, ed. Aḥmad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Sharīf (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Falāḥ, 1985), 91. The issue is not mentioned in the early Māturīdī sources. Ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457), one of the later Māturīdīs, states that the issue is not definitive, and based on the fact that the bodies will disappear completely except for *ʿajb al-dbanab* (al-Bukhārī, “al-Tafsīr,” 39/3, 78/1; Muslim, “al-Fitan,” 141-143; Ibn Mājah, “al-Zuhd,” 32), he seems to be inclined to accept the recreation model in the form of both creation from nothing and unifying disintegrated parts (atoms). (Kamāl al-Dīn Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wāḥid ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Ibn al-Humām al-Sīwāsī, *al-Musāyarah fī ʿilm al-kalām wa-l-ʿaqāʾid al-tawḥīdiyyah al-munjiyyah fī l-ākḥirah*, ed. Muḥammad Muḥyī al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd [Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Maḥmūdiyyah al-Tijjāriyyah, n.d.], 144). The Māturīdī scholar Abū l-Barakāt al-Nasafī (d. 710/1310) explains recreation (*ḥasr*) as follows: after decomposing into parts and changing the form/structure (*ḥayʿab*), this structure is recreated with all its features, bringing together the disintegrated parts and creating life in them. On the other hand, this style of explanation, which is similar to the Ḥusaynī approach, constitutes an exceptional view among the Ahl al-sunnah; see Abū l-Barakāt Ḥāfiẓ al-Dīn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Aḥmad al-Nasafī, *Sbarḥ al-ʿUmdab fī ʿaqāʾid Abl al-sunnab wa-l-jamāʿah al-musammā bi-l-Itimād fī l-ʿitiqād*, ed. ʿAbd Allāh Muḥammad ʿAbd Allāh Ismāʿīl (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyyah li-l-Turāth & al-Jazīrah li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ, 2011), 436. A similar exceptional approach is advocated by al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), an earlier Māturīdī author; see *al-Kifāyah*, 375.

<sup>174</sup> Ibn al-Munayyir, *al-Intiṣāf*, IV, 169.

<sup>175</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, IV, 168. Elsewhere, he states that the second creation is a creation like the first and that it takes the form of “bringing into existence from

about al-Zamakhsharī from the latter's interpretation of the verse "Surely, We will do this" as "We are capable of doing this." According to him, al-Zamakhsharī actually argues that what God promises to do in the verse is not to recreate bodies from nothing, even though He is able to do so, but to restore them in the form of reuniting separated parts with their old forms.<sup>176</sup> This passage is a very clear expression of the Ḥusaynī view. Moreover, in another place, al-Zamakhsharī reveals this inclination in much clearer terms. He even explains the verse "But does not man call to mind that We created him before out of nothing?" (Q 19:67), which was uttered by God after the addressees were surprised at being resurrected after they had died and turned toward denial, as follows: He created atoms and accidents by bringing them into existence from nonexistence, and the second creation is similar and virtually has an example to follow. According to al-Zamakhsharī, this creation consists of bringing "existing and lasting parts together (*ta'līf wa-tarkīb*) and returning them to their former unified (*majmū'ab*) states after have exhibited disintegrated (*tafkīk wa-tafrīq*) states."<sup>177</sup>

### Conclusion and Evaluation

In light of the data taken from historical and biographical sources, the determinations and testimonies of the authors of *al-Kashshāf* commentaries and supercommentaries, and most importantly, the views that he puts forward in his own works, although certain exceptional claims have been made, it is an undoubted fact that al-Zamakhsharī has a Mu'tazilī identity. In addition, it is plausible to characterize him as an exceptional scholar of language, rhetoric, and tafsīr rather than as a scholar of kalām (theologian) in the technical sense. Therefore, *Kitāb al-Minhāj*, which is the only theological work from which his creed or theological affiliation can be determined, provides a basis for this identification only as a general framework. In

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non-existence," and he summarizes the difference between them via these statements: in the first, He made it from the very beginning/for the first time (*ibtidā'<sup>am</sup>*), while He had not yet made a like, but the second is a [re]creation that will come into effect after He has made a like. However, what he also emphasizes here, as the continuation of the verses and the general context indicate, is the issue of God's omnipotence; al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, IV, 543 (in the context of the commentary of Q 29:19-20).

<sup>176</sup> Ibn al-Munayyir, *al-Intiṣāf*, IV, 169.

<sup>177</sup> Al-Zamakhsharī, *al-Kashshāf*, IV, 41.

fact, although al-Zamakhsharī does not organize *al-Minbāj*, which consists of nine chapters (*bāb*), in the manner of Muʿtazilī authors, namely, in line with the five principles (*al-uṣūl al-khamsab*) of the Muʿtazilah, by opening main headings and elaborating them, he does deal with the principles of “promise and threat (*al-waʿd wa-l-waʿīd*)” and “enjoining good and forbidding wrong (*al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf wa-l-nahy ʿan al-munkar*)” in separate sections. Considering the fact that other titles also implicitly refer to the remaining three principles in terms of content, it can be seen that *al-Minbāj* is a work that addresses the five basic principles of Muʿtazilah.<sup>178</sup>

The question-answer style structure of *al-Minbāj*, which is defined as “a short credal tract on theology,”<sup>179</sup> or “a brief summary of his theological creed,”<sup>180</sup> functions as a kind of thematic introduction to the specific subject of a passage and offers the opportunity to present opposing perspectives in a balanced manner. Based on this initial impression of his desire to “keep the balance” and his lack of an openly partisan attitude in *al-Minbāj*, it is stated that al-Zamakhsharī is in search of a defense of “a broadly based, catholic Muʿtazilism.”<sup>181</sup> In this context, based on the content of the work, it has also been noted that in terms of compiling the ideas put forward by previous generations and presenting the relevant arguments, he aimed to reveal the agenda of the Muʿtazilah in those days, which is now only represented by

<sup>178</sup> The second chapter, titled “Knowing the Eternal by His Attributes” – and constituting the most voluminous part of the work – is within the scope of the principle of *tawḥīd*, while the following sections “Imposing Obligation (*al-Taklīf*),” “Favors (*al-Aḥqāf*),” “Pains (*al-Ālām*),” “Sustenance, Prices, and Terms of Death (*al-Arzāq wa-l-asʿār wa-l-ājāl*),” and at the end “Prophethood (*al-Nubuwwā*),” are within the scope of the *ʿadl* principle. Although it seems that a separate title has not been opened with respect to the principle of “the intermediate position (*al-manzilab bayna l-manzilatayn*),” al-Zamakhsharī dealt with this issue in terms of its nature and content under the title “Promise and Threat.”

<sup>179</sup> Schmidtke, Introduction, 9.

<sup>180</sup> Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” 488.

<sup>181</sup> Madelung, “The Theology of al-Zamakhsharī,” 493. Beyond Bahshamī and Ḥusaynī views, his use of elements such as the *tawḥīd* argument of Abū l-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Kaʿbī, who is a Baghdādī, when appropriate (see *Muʿtezile Akāidī*, 44) can be interpreted as a reflection of this attitude; for al-Kaʿbī’s presentation of the evidence, see al-Kaʿbī, *ʿUyūn al-masāʾil wa-l-jawābāt li-Abī l-Qāsim al-Balkhī al-Kaʿbī (273-319 H)*, ed. Rājiḥ ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Saʿīd Kurdī et al. (Amman: Dār al-Ḥamīd, 2014), 111-115.

Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah.<sup>182</sup> On the other hand, his answers, especially with the phrase “*qultu* (I would say)” – as stated above – can be seen as an implicit indication of his undisclosed preferences regarding issues that are controversial between schools.<sup>183</sup> The fact that the question-answer style, which reflects the fact that he is in search of information, actually features a didactic style in which the respondent reveals the correctness of his own view and rejects contrary views<sup>184</sup> supports this possibility. However, his interpretations and approaches in *al-Kashshāf* often do not provide a clear and direct indication concerning whether he is a follower of the Bahshamiyyah or of the Ḥusayniyyah, considering the facts that even the “Mu‘tazilī” identity of the work has been put into question and that there are, from time to time, even expressions that can be attributed to both views. However, it is also noteworthy that this dual approach emerges in the context of the methods used to address and prove these points rather than as a response to the substance of the issues.

Despite the fact that it is not possible to determine al-Zamakhsharī’s opinions concerning each of the controversial issues that distinguish the Bahshamiyyah and Ḥusayniyyah, which become particularly important when the details are examined, and despite his conciliatory attitude, according to which he tries to avoid disagreements – at least apparently – it can be determined that his dominant tendency with respect to these disagreements is much closer to Ḥusaynī convictions. Undoubtedly, the most decisive factor at this point must be the fact that he learned kalām from Ibn al-Malāḥimī, one of the most important representatives of Ḥusayniyyah, with whom he had mutual teacher-student relations. The fact that al-Zamakhsharī’s views sometimes completely overlap with or are similar to the discourses of Ibn al-Malāḥimī in terms of his definitions, his interpretations of theological

<sup>182</sup> Oliver Leaman, “Sabine Schmidtke (ed. and tr.): *A Mu‘tazilite Creed of az-Zamahṣarī (d. 538/1144) (al-Minbāj fī uṣūl ad-dīn)*. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Bd. LI, 4), 83 pp. Stuttgart: Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft, Kommissionsverlag Franz Steiner, 1997. DM 42,” *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 61/3 (October 1998), 537.

<sup>183</sup> Sebastian Günther, “Schmidtke, Sabine (ed. & tr.): *A Mu‘tazilite Creed of az-Zamahṣarī (d. 538/1144) (al-Minbāj fī uṣūl ad-dīn)*. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes, Band LI, 4). Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart, 1997,” *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 56/5-6 (September-December 1999), 778.

<sup>184</sup> Hans Daiber, “Masā’il wa-Adjwiba,” in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam New Edition*, VI, 638.

issues and even in his mode of expressing these views makes it possible to identify al-Zamakhsarī as a follower of Ḥusayniyyah who was shaped specifically by Ibn al-Malāḥimī. Although Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, the founder of the school named after him, established the intellectual boundaries of the sect to a large extent, he also emphasized “individual” convictions that were not followed by his successors in certain respects. The fact that Ibn al-Malāḥimī, who occasionally opposed Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, was referred to as “al-shaykh”<sup>185</sup> by both al-Najrānī, who is Ḥusaynī, and by the Yemeni Zaydī-Mu‘tazilī Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Raṣṣāṣ (d. 584/1188), who followed the views of Bahshamiyyah, a term which only applies to those who occupy a certain position within the Mu‘tazilah, and the fact that al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad (d. 1029/1620), although a relatively late source, refers to Ibn al-Malāḥimī’s view on a matter concerning which he differed with the views of Abū l-Ḥusayn as “al-Malāḥimiyyah,” almost like an independent school,<sup>186</sup> confirm this judgment.

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<sup>185</sup> Al-Najrānī, *al-Kāmil*, 105; Abū Muḥammad Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Ḥasan ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Raṣṣāṣ, *al-Barābīn al-zābirah al-jaliyyah ‘alā anna l-wujūd zā’id ‘alā l-mābiyyah*, ed. Hassan Ansari, in *A Common Rationality: Mutazilism in Islam and Judaism*, ed. Camilla Adang et al. (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag, 2007), 341.

<sup>186</sup> Al-Qāsim ibn Muḥammad, *Kitāb al-Asās*, 69.

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